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ABSTRACT

Domestic agricultural policy appears to have been formulated with
little regard for the foreign trade objectives advocated by the United
States since the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts.

This

study is an attepmt to analyze the effects that foreign trade and agri
cultural policy decisions, often at cross purposes, have had on resource
utilization by American agriculture.
Authoritative works in the fields of foreign trade policy and agri
cultural policy were used as the sources for most basic ideas.

Congres

sional hearings, and government publications and statistics were used to
supplement the works cited above in showing the effects of past policy
decisions on various selected agricultural commodities and their produc
tion.

A short inquiry was made into the reasons for, and benefits

accruing from trade between this nation and others. Import restrictions
that tend to lessen movements of goods and services were examined to see
what effect they had on the economy and upon the producers of agricul
tural commodities. The use of resources in the productionof various
commodities was examined in order to determine how the efficiency of
their use was affected by the contraction or expansion of American im
ports .
It was determined that agricultural policy should be more closely
coordinated with foreign trade objectives to further international re
lations . In addition, farm policy which is often incompatible with the
best interests of international relations in many cases, is also incom
patible with the best interests of American agriculture.

It was estab

lished that the "farm bloc" has often aided in the passage of legislation

which aids very few farmers and which may impose a burden on the entire
economy. In addition it was discovered that much of the latest agricul
tural legislation and policies have not been helpful in solving the real
farm problem--excessive numbers of low income farmers.

It was establish

ed that attempts made to increase the level of farm income with price
support programs often gave little if any help to low income farmers.
Nevertheless, such programs have restricted normal exports and led to
"dumping".

In addition these price support programs have increased the

need for import restrictions and have tended to slow up the normal pat
tern of resource shifting.
It is concluded that a re-orientation of agricultural policy should
be forthcoming.

Resources should be aided in their shift to more ef

ficient and better paying pursuits. Potential importers should be
encouraged, not hampered.

Agricultural producers unable to cope with

imports should be aided in shifting resources to the production of
other commodities or other industries.

The program should presume that

benefits accruing to the economy should not be paid by the producers
feeling the brunt of competition from increased imports.

For this reason

the cost of re-orientation should be borne by society and the time
needed to accomplish the shift should be long enough to permit a smooth
period of transition.

To assist in accomplishing this shift the econo

my needs to be kept at full or near full employment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economic theorists and producers fcr export markets have generally
advocated lessening of restrictions on the trade between nations.

On

the other hand, many producers confronted with Import competition have
demanded protection in the form of tariffs and other trade restrictions
and these demands have often been intensified during business reces
sions.

Economists have generally discredited the use of most protective

restrictions by a nation that has developed to the position of an ad
vanced creditor nation.

International trade that does take place is

normally assumed to follow along lines which are consistent with a
more productive allocation of resources.

A persistent confidence in

that principle on the part of our policy makers was an important under
lying factor in orienting American foreign trade policy, after 1730$
toward a lessening of trade barriers and a stimulation of irfcernational
trade.
By all odds, the most significant modification in either the theory
or practice of tariff policy in the United States in the last 100 years
was the passage, in 1934# of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Amendment
to the Tariff Act of 1930.

Largely as a result of the trade agree

ments program which that new legislation made possible, the average
ad valorem equivalents of the customs rates on imports of dutiable
merchandise into the United States has fallen steadily - in round
figures, from 53 per cent in 1930 to 12 per cent in 1955.

The specif

ic duties that many imports carry force the rates up, as a per cent
of import values, when money prices are deflating.

In 1932 at the

height of the depression import rates reached a high of 59 per cent.

1
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Conversely, today continuation of inflationary pressures is lowering
the rates as a per cent of import values.
Agriculture supplies a large, although declining, portion of total
American exports and is receiving increasing competition in the world
markets, and, where imports are permitted, also within the domestic
markets.

Relative and absolute losses of exports have caused spokes

men for certain agricultural blocs to advocate export subsidies, while
incroased import competition has been used as an argument for increas
ed restrictions by other agricultural bloc spokesmen*
The goals of agricultural policy and foreign trade policy seem to
be diametrically opposed— one in favor of more restrictions on trade,
the other in favor of allowing greater freedom to trade.
Following a review of some pertinent principles in Chapter II,
this study will turn from general trade theory and explore the ef
fects that restrictions placed upon international trade by the Uhited
States have had upon various segments of agriculture.

The present

plight of agriculture will be examined to see whether trade restriction
concessions made in favor of agriculture, and those asked for by agri
culture, are aiding agriculture.

The effects of domestic agricultural

policies will be examined to see what effect they have upon foreign
trade policy.

The domestic agrieulture and foreign trade policies will

be examined to see how effective they are in their attempts at solv
ing the low income farm problem; effects on the general economy will
also be noted.
An analytical study of trade and farm policies would seem to be
in order at this time because of the political importance attached to

3
tho maintenance of a prosperous agriculture. and the need to improve
international relatione in order to help forestall a decline in Ameri
can prestige abroad,
'•lthin the last five years Congress has held several hearings to
obtain information by which legislation could be formulated to aid in
solving these problems.

From April 9 to June 15, 1953 the Senate Com

mittee on Agriculture and Forestry held public hearir^s on the effects
of exports and imports, and specifically on the impact of agricultural
exports and imports on farm price support programs.

From February

25

to June 2, 1955 a subcommittee of the same committee held hearings on
the administration of Acta relating to the disposal of surplus agri
cultural commodities.

From Soptember 17 to December 13« 1956 a subcom

mittee of the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings in the
United States, Europe, and Asia on the administration and operation of
existom and tariff laws and the trade agreements program.
During this same period of time, 1953-1957 academic interest was
exhibited by articles pertaining to various aspects of these problems
in such journals as The American Economic Heview and The Journal of
Farm Economics. A comprehensive work was done on the subject by
S. Payson Perry in 1908,

C. Addison Hickman did

research on the

subject and published a book, Our Farm Program and Foreign Trade, in
1949#

D, Gale Johnson published his work, Trade and Agriculture, in

1950,

While many of the writers in tho field have given much thought

to the effects of trade upon agriculture and society in general, they
have given comparatively little attention to the effects of farm policy
and restrictions on trade.

Nor have they related these effects to the

degrees of efficiency in the prodviction of the various agricultural

4
commodities.

Neither have the effects of trade restriction programs

been closely correlated with the attempts to solve the farm income
problem among tho different sized farmsteads.
Practically all proposals to solve the "farm problem" have been
aimed at one and the same objective, that of maintaining satisfactory
price levels in order to solve the low income problem.

Our attempts

along this lins have, of course, not yielded a satisfactory solution.
Instead, it has been accused by many of actually intensifying the
problem.

The use of price support measures in an attempt to solve

the farmers' income problem is untenable unless imports are restricted
and exports are subsidized.

Primarily for this reason a consideration

of the effects of trade restrictions and domestic policy upon different
segments of agriculture, the consumer, and the taxpayer will be followed
by an examination of various alternative policies.

The possible re

sults of the programs based upon such policies will be contrasted and
compared with the results of present policy.

Throughout this explora

tory effort, due attention will be given to the matter of differentiat
ing policy recommendations along lines that are indicated by the varying
needs of the several segments of our agricultural production.

CHAPTER IT
BASES FOR TRADE AND FACTOR RETURNS
Trade, when un-encumbered with state trading or dumping, may be expected to take place when the proper combination of circumstances
is in evidence,

Item3 will normally be imported if they can be bought

cheaper by the importer than similar items at home.

Production of ex

pert items may be expected when profits are greater than they would
be if production factors were used to produce items to satisfy local
demands alone.

The prices, when free to do so, that will determine

whether commodities are exported, produced for local use, or are im
ported depend on the use of certain real productive factors, their
location and their abundance.

Freedom to exchange goods while in

search of profit makes possible the efficient use of the real produc
tive factors, or resources.

Demand for factors used in the productive

process depends upon the sale of tho product at a price which is high
enough to give each factor a return which is at least equal to oppor
tunity costs for that factor,
A nation is a logical exporter of a given commodity when its
comparative costs are less in terms of total inputs than are the cost
ratios of producing the same conanodity relative to different commodities
in other areas.

The reason that a nation may be capable of producing

a certain commodity cheaper, relative to other producing nations, de
pends on its combination of factors of production or its resource
endowment.
Among the causos for differing productivity of land are geographic
location, the elenvants contained in the soil, rainfall,
5

return,
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and transport potential.

Differences in labor productivity may be

traced to several causes, among which are the quantity of labor, its
health, education level, and manual dexterity.

Capital productivity

may, among other things, depend variously on circumstances associated
with capital accumulation, government stability, institutionalized
interest patterns, the demand for investments to export production,
the national growth pattern, and government monetary and fiscal poli
cies,
A nation, by producing commodities best fitted to its peculiar
combination of the factors of production for domestic and export users,
and by importing those things not especially adapted to production
with its factor combination, is following "the law of comparative ad
vantage."

The remainder of this chapter consists of a discussion of

the applicability of that law under various sets of circumstances and
a review of factor returns as a determinant of the volume, nature, and
direction of foreign trade.
Comparative Advantage
Society will be better off if it can increase the number of units
of a given quality of output obtained without a corresponding increase
in the effort needed to produce this increase.

It would normally be

imprudent to employ capital and labor in the production at home of the
things that could be purchased cheaper from foreign countries,

This

fact is more likely to be overlooked in the case of & country whose
foreign trade makes up only a small percentage of its total trade.
The foreign trade of the United States, while admittedly small as com
pared to its domestic trade, is nevertheless vitally important to
those dependent on its continued existence and growth.

The impor

tance of foreign trade to the American econoay is often not understood.

7
In fact, many of the laws which have been enacted to restrict and
regulate trade appear to be shortsighted•
The answer to the question, "Why do goods move into trade?" is
to be found in an understanding of the principle of comparative advan
tage,

It is easy to observe the advantages to be gained where one good

that is peculiarly adaptable to one person or rogion is traded for
another goad that is the specialty of another place or person.

What

is difficult to see, however, is what causes trade to exist where one
group of people or region appears to be better adapted to satisfy all
its own wants than is another group or region.
To repeat, trade takes place because buyers, through trade, find
a cheaper way of satisfying their wants.

Prices cannot readily be com

pared between nations, for each nation has its own monetary unit.
However, price ratios within a nation can be compared as between a
given commodity and other commodities.

Whon the price ratio is more

favorable for some specific item in another nation, that item becomes
a profitable import.

The relative ranking of commodities in each na

tion's price schedule, assuming free markets, is a manifestation of
comparative advantage, and the determinant of which goods will enter
foreign trade if left free to do b o

.

Alfred Marshall states the law of comparative advantage as follows s
"Countries whose advantages are distributed in
unequal proportions among different industries,
may generally carry on a trade profitable to
both, even though one of them is absolutely the
stronger all around,"^

^Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade (London:
1932), p. 18.

MacMillan and Co.,

a

Differences of Endowment and Combinations of "Factors of Production11
The model of comparative advantage does not depend on differences
in price as between one nation and another.

And at the present time

it is particularly difficult to make such price comparisons in the pre
sence of multiple exchange rates, bilateral agreements, exclusions, and
areas of preferential treatment.

Much of the explanation of trade

rests upon the fact that through trade wants are satisfied with less
effort.
greatest.

Nations specialize in fields in which their aptitudes are
Products move from areas of specialization to increase the

satisfactions of producers in other specialized areas.

Thus it is of

ten possible and profitable for an area to forego the production of
commodities not readily produced by existing factor combinations, and
permit a shifting of resources to areas of high aptitude.

Product

movement is called International trade whenever goods happen

to cross

international political boundaries.
The comparative differences of costs of producing various goods
within the several nations stem from differences of resource endowments.
Broadlv speaking, resource endowments are land, labor, and capital, the
factors of production.

Ordinarily those factors which are abundant are

relatively cheap, and the scarce factors are relatively expensive.

In

illustration, the Borough of Manhattan would have relatively low cost
labor in relation to land costs when compared with Nye County, Nevada,
although both labor and land may be absolutely higher in Manhattan.
The different commodities that man produces to satisfy his wants
are made with varying combinations of the basic factors of production.
Indeed, in many instances the same item may be produced in different
circumstances with different factor proportions.

The comparative costs

9

of these factors of production under unlike conditions can make a
vast difference in the cost of the same finished produst.

Cotton

which sells in a national market is profitably produced in California
where labor and adequate farm land are scarce, yet in areas of the
South where both labor and land are relatively abundant, cotton farm
ing is unable to support a decent scale of living.

The large size of

the many California farms males them more conducive to capital dis
placement of labor, whereas small size farm units common to certain
areas in the South are dependent on man and mule, and are located on
very poor soil.
Some commodities are preponderantly labor-using in their produc
tion.

i&amples are tobacco, sugar beets, and berries.

are often largely land-using.

Other crops

These include timber, cattle, wheat,

and similar agricultural crops.

Capital-using products, on the other

hand, include such items as com, sugar cane (in Hawaii and Louisiana),
and so on.
The determining factor of comparative advantage for the different
type goods an area produces is found in comparative costs.

Were labor

and capital completely mobile, costs might be much closer, and the de
ciding factor would then be land.

Labor and capital, however, tend to

be immobile for various reasons.2 The comparative costs of certain
goods within an area will be determined by the relative scarcity of the
factors of production, and a least-cost combination of these factors.
Only those goods which are able to command high returns to the factors

^Lawrence W. Towle, International Trade and Comnercial Policy
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948), pp. 5-9•
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of production should normally bo found in a nation's exports.

Goods

unable to command high returns to the productive factors are incapable
of being produced efficiently with the factors a v a i l a b l e T h u s it is
the item which does not command high returns to tho productive factors
that we normally expect to be imported.

In some instances inadequate

demand may preclude optimum factor usage and certain economies of size.
Advantages of Large Scale Production and Better Resource Utilization
The optimum output-input ratio is obtainable when tho efficient use
of the factors of production has been maximized.

The larger the area

from which to obtain the least-cost combination, the more likely It is
that factor combination usage can be maximized.

The larger the market,

the greater will be the possibility of increasing output enough to take
advantage of certain economies which are often associated with large
size.

The United States as an economic unit with a minimum of internal

restrictions on trade is an example of such conditions.

With mass pro

duction, capital-using production methods realize their fullest advantage.
With a chronic manpower shortage relative to land and capital, the de
veloping United States econony has been confronted with high labor costs,
and has needed labor-saving production methods to reduce costs,

fiffi-

Efficiency in production will be defined as having been obtained
when the total costs of tta factors of production used in producing a
given commodity cannot be decreased by use of a different factor com
bination.
3©e Lorie Tarshis, International Trade and Finance (New York;
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 115-122,
'/hanover location is considered, transport costs must be included
in the productive factor combination. Climate, soil difference, rain
fall, and ethnic differences affect efficiency and must also be consider
ed. Returns to the factors to be considered adequate, or high enough,
should be as high as they would be from any other me.

11

cient use of capital to supplement labor was assisted by the relative
freedom of goods and raw materials to move within the United States.'*4'
Europe is today emulating this advantage by attempting to form an
economically integrated community in order to obtain a freedom of special
ization similar to that which our several states have enjoyed since this
5
country's birth.
However, the traditionally restrictive trade policies
in Europe are such that only the broad outlines of European free
are now visible.

trade

Hard negotiations will be necessary before concrete

results can be expected.

It is believed that the benefits of a wider

market in manufactured goods may prove to be the force that will remove
many of the obstacles to this development.

It should be further noted

that Europe has not been confronted with labor shortages often asso
ciated with the history of America’s industrial growth.
The need for labor saving devices in many American industries may
be traced in some instances to the relative scarcity of manpower.

A

major justification for capital investments in agriculture is found in
the fact that with wide expanses of land, relatively expensive labor
cannot be profitably utilized without capital.

Capital, on the other

hand, cannot be efficiently used unless it is cheaper than labor.

By

^Paul T. Ellsworth, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Rep
resentatives, 84th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C., (1956)
p. 125, See also 3ertil Ohlin Interregional and International Trade.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 170-182. Economies
of large-scale production is discussed on p. 172.
^The New York Times. May 26, 1957, ’’Europeans Unite in Customs
Union:" Treaties signed in Italy bring six European nations together in
a single market and customs union for the free circulation of goods. A
common tariff is to be adopted and import quotas to be eliminated in a
period of twelve years. Signatory nations, with a total of 160 million
people, are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
West Germany.
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the process of substitution when labor costs more than capital, the
machine or technology is used.

Capital use fas varying degrees of

effectiveness in different industries, and in different countries
because of differing combinations of the factors of production.

Be

cause of different factor endowment, and therefore different cost
ratios, nations with a high degree of capital development have as much
need for trade among themselves as non-developed areas have for trad
ing with developed ones.^
A frequent determinant of capital investments in large scale heavy
industries is the nature of the industrial process in relation to
natural resource location.

Examples of the right combination for cap

ital oriented development are the Ruhr area in Germany, and the Pitts
burgh-Great Lakes area of the United States.

On the other hand, no

comparable economic justification is found for attempting large scale
heavy industry in a country like Argentina with a lack of economically
located raw materials needed in basic heavy industries dependent on
iron.

Such an industry in Argentina would, call for protection behind

a tariff wall, and thus would place a burden on the products which the
nation's factor combinations are most efficient in producing, such as
wheat, wool, cattle, and like commodities.

7

Nati onal Survival and Vested Interests
A nation may wish to maintain domestic production of commodities
that could be more cheaply acquired from foreign suppliers.

For in

stance, during a war for survival, cei'tain crucial commodities, if

^Towle, op. cit.. pp. 111-116.
^Wendell C. Gordon, The Economy of Latin America (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 103-107.

13

imported in entirety, could leave the nation vulnerable.

This is the

argument used for protection by nearly every industry that asks Congress
for protective legislation.

Even corsetiers have sought protection as

needed for national survival.

Spokesmen for wool and sugar have both

claimed to represent strategic commodities needed for national survival.
According to Lloyd, "The most generally recognized responsibility of a
nation is the preparation of an adequate defense against possible foreign
aggression."

Even Adam Smith makes a case far protection if such is

needed to maintain an industry vital for a ration’s defense.^

If pro

tection for national defense is a valid argument, it can be used for
almost any item used in. today's economy, since total wars might call
for complete self-sufficiency.

This, however, is an unattainable goal

for any nation, even for the USSR or the US A . ^

At the 1956 Tariff

Hearings, Mason made a case against protection.

He would have peace

time acquisition and stockpiling of raw materials essential for national
defense, with a possible exception of oil.
"For materials capable of stockpiling— and most strategic
materials are— stockpiling in peacetime from low-cost
sources, either domestic or foreign is much to be pre
ferred to protection of domestic output, which means
procurement from high-cost sources both in peace and
war. The existence of an adequate stockpile, moreover,
can make it unnecessary in war to divert scarce man
power away from military service and into the war-time
production of strategic materials. Oil represents a

^L. E. Lloyd, Tariffs (New York:
p. 116.

York:

The Devin-Adair Company, 1955),

^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Edited by Edwin Cannan; New
The Modern Library, Random House, Inc., 1937), pp. 429-432.

■^Paul T. Ellsworth, The International Economy (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1950), pp. 334-385.

The
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rather special case that I shall return to pre
sently, ... Most of these oil imports come from
Venezuela which, in the event of war, must be
judged a relatively safe source, ... . " H
To this it may be added that the stockpiling of petroleum products may
now be within the realm of feasibility.

By way of illustration, the

Esso Standard Oil Company is now using salt dome storage in the Louisiana
swamps,
An industry which is vital for the nation's survival may demand the
protection that tariff walls afford.

Such protection may limit terri

torial specialization which would cause each nation to attempt to become
more nearly self-sufficient.

An alternative to protective tariffs is

the subsidization of "needed military goods production."

The advantage

in this procedure is the ability to scrutinize the costs of protection
each time a budget is reviewed.

The consumers will benefit and the tax

will be placed in accordance with ability to pay in so far as such taxes
"I p

may be progressive. ^
Regardless of the bases for a nation*s protective policy its citi
zens will not all be affected alike by trade restrictions; usually some
wLll benefit and others will be hurt.

If the individual who may be

benefited by tariff protection is vocal enough, it is possible that we

Edward S. Mason, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee
of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Re
presentatives, 84th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D, C., (1956),
p. 122. The information presented to the subcommittee was a synthesis
of Chapters 11 and 12 of Mason's book Economic Concentration and the
Monopoly Problem. Harvard Economic Studies, (Cambridge; Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1957)* See especially pp. 250-252,
12

Harry G. Brainard, International Economics and Public Policy
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), pp. 345-34^
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may have a tariff policy which is detrimental to the majority,,
"In some instances, tariff legislation has
actually been the occasion for parliamentary
corruption. More frequently, legislators
have been willing to sacrifice the general
interest in order to placate powerful busi
ness interests among the constituencies, and
thus ensure their own personal re-election
to office. "13
Certain pressure has been maintained for tariffs by various groups
since the earliest beginning of this nation.^

Most groups will admit

that protection often decreases a nation’s standard of living, but they
usually contend that other factors outweigh this temporary factor.
once protection is given a lease on life, it seems never to die.
temporary need may end but protection itself seems endless.

Yet,
The

The chief

driving force that has caused major trading nations to retain tariff
walls is the self-interest of certain groups of producers.

Although

the general public, which does the consuming, suffers from protection,
special interests profit.

The individual who benefits by being protect

ed receives concentrated returns which are of more interest to him than
the losses of individual consumers who, while hurt, are only hurt a
little. The consumer is rarely aware that he is being hurt while the
benefactor is extremely cognizant of his benefits.^

Factor Returns and Foreign Trade
Acceptance of the goal of expanded trade focuses attention on where

■^Towle, op. cit.. p. 327*
^■Howard R. Smith, "The Farmer and the Tariff: A Reappraisal,"
The Southern Economic Journal. XXI (October 1954)> 164.
4s early as 1848 the South, a free trade area, had its sugar interests
seeking protection.
■^Towle, o£. cit., pp. 327-328.
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the benefits which are derived from trade shall accrue.

In addition

the question is raised who must shoulder the costs of changing exist
ing pattersn of trade.
Mercantilist Thought
The goal of mercantilism was the maintenance of a favorable balance
of trade; the "Mercantilists" overlooked the need for eventually balanc
ing a nations balance of payments.

Exports should be as valuable and

numerous as possible while imports should be limited if competing with
domestic production.

Invisible items should be supplied by national

enterprises whenever possible.^

Under mercantilism, products are pro

duced from scarce natural resources, and their export is often subsi
dized.

Yet imports in many instances are restricted,

A reason often given to jmtify protection for domestic producers
is the low level of foreign wages.

This argument assumes that low wages

necessarily mean low cost and therefore vie must protect home industry
against imports from nations with lower wages than ours.

Actually,

cost is determined by all of the factors of production, and if the
opportunity cost of labor in a given nation is high because of alter
native uses in combination with capital, there is little justification
for protecting a hand-intensive use of labor.

Wages are generally low

where productivity is low and productivity depends not on labor alone
but on capital and land as well.

Land, of course, includes such "quali

tative" features as geographical location, productivity of the soil,
and climatic conditions.

It is a nation’s total output and the distri-

^ P , G. Newman, The Development of Economic Thought (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 18-24,
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bution of that output that really determines wealth.

If today’s

"Mercantilists" are permitted to thwart the nation’s best resource
utilization and are able to influecne an increase of exports with
stricter limits on imports, two major damages are bound to result.
First, the American standard of living will be lower than it otherwise
might be.

Secondly, far less could be done to relieve the dollar short

age situation which has become chronic in many of the major trading
nations.

Productivity and Factor Returns
Productivity, which is the basis for the high American scale of
living, will depend on proper use of resources if the scale of living
is to continue its upward climb.
The worker with a machine pacing his work is less affected by de
creasing efficiency than a man setting his own pace.

Machine using jbbs

are far less subject to productivity fluctuations than hand-intensive
jobs.17
The reason for increased productivity, although measured in manhours of output, is not that man has become twice as capable as he once
was, but rather that man has implemented his limited efforts with dif
ferent combinations of capital and land.

Man, using a machine as the

standard setter, is often able after a few hours training to make pro
ducts of acceptable quality.

But when the worker relies on skill rather

than machines to set the standard of his production, the training period
often runs into years, and quantity is definitely limited by the number

■^Philip Taft, Economics and Problems of Labor (Second Edition;
New York: Stockpole and Heck, Inc., 1949), pp. 303-305.
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of trained personnel.

It is therefore easier to increase output in

a nation with a high propensity to use capital productive methods than
in a nation oriented toward manual methods of production.

Output in a

nation dependent on mass use of manual labor is limited by the number
of skilled workers and labor’s physical endurance.
Manpower-using industries within a nation that normally uses a pro
duction combination heavy with capital investments is likely to cause
relatively high prices for hand-intensive crops.

When a nation attempts

to maintain a labor-using industry, in the face of cheaper imports, pro
tection is required.

Competition for workers calls for wages high enough

to be competitive with pay in the more productive industries.

The fol

lowing quotation is an illustration of this principle and its operation
with refernece to a specific industry.
". . .there is a fallacy in saying we are com
peting with cheap foreign labor. Really, what
we are doing is competing with the efficiency
of the automotive industry. . .”1#
More important still in a consideration of agricultural production
is the fact that barriers to imports of cheaper hand-intensive commod
ities cause the price to be higher, and commonly reduces consumption.
Effort that is used to produce a labor-intensive crop in a highly in
dustrialized nation is a waste of resources if that commodity can be
imported cheaper, as the manpower so used could be. used more effective
ly elsewhere.
The returns to the factors of production tend to be determined by

18
C. H. Percy, President, Bell-& Howell .Company, A Statement in the
hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, WORLD-WIDE COMPETITION
SPURS TRADE. Reprinted by Committee for National Trade Policy; House of
Representatives, Washington, D. C., ( 1 9 5 5 p. 13*
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the scarcity of each factor and the productivity of the combined fac
tors in relation to the demand for the different commodities.

The

amount of capital available from professional investors for investment
in any industry depends on profit expectations.

The cheapest goods are

those which can be efficiently produced, that is, goods using a country's
factor combination that makes use of large amounts of the cheapest fac
tor.

The net result will then be the largest return possible to those

utilized f a c t o r s . T h e bargaining power of the various factors of
production, as well as their scarcity and productivity, helps to deter
mine the returns to each individual factor.
The return for one factor can temporarily become out of balance,
such as when labor demands pay increases that are not in line with in
creases in productivity.

As soon, however, as management is able to

readjust the factors to a new least-cost combination, balance will
again be obtained.

Lack of import restrictions would no doubt speed

up such a readjustment, or prevent in the first place any one factor
from obtaining a temporary share much greater than its proportional
contribution to productivity.

As soon as domestic price is raised to

cover increases above productivity to one factor, imports may be ex
pected to increase competition.
Trade. Prices and Factors of Production
Both in a domestic market and in the world market, prices tend
to reflect the cost of production.

The greater the amount of com

petition and the longer the time period considered, the nearer will
prices approach cost.

If the factors of production were mobile, costs

19Ellsworth, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF
LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, pp. 124-125.
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would be the same in all countries.

Because the factors are not free

to move at will, the costs, reflected in differing ratios of prices
among the several commodities within different nations, dictate inter
national movements.
Complete protection for a commodity, the production of which de
mands a factor of production combination relying heavily upon a scarce,
high-cost factor, would result in a high price relative to other com
modities within the country.

Production of the protected commodity for

local consumption will depend upon the willingness of consumers to pay
a price high enough to divert that scarce factor away from other pur
suits.

The "tulip mania" in Holland was to some extent at least a result

of a country's willingness to use a scarce factor, land.
of bulbs was high enough to support the fad.

The price

Similarly, if Alaska were

to offer complete protection for hot-house bananas and the demand for
bananas was intense enough, some one would go into production.
The nation producing a protected commodity which requires large
quantities of scarce, high-cost production factors not only cause that
commodity to be scarcer and higher priced than it need be, but also
causes the prices of all other goods dependent on the same scarce fac
tor to be higher.

When one industry uses a share of a given factor, it

competes with all other industries using the same factor; the greater
the competition for a limited supply, the higher the prices.

This not

only makes the general price level higher for local consumers, but also,
by readjusting the relative price differences within a nation, makes the
nation a poorer market in which foreign nations may buy.
Reduction of imports into a nation that imposes restrictions will
allow less foreign exchange for would-be purchasers of that nation's
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exports.

A nation that is discriminated against by trade restrictions

might have a great desire for some good high on the efficiency list of
the nation that imposes restrictions.

However, the nation which is

discriminated against, with less chance to obtain needed foreign ex
change may be forced to discontinue purchases from the discriminating
nation.
The two-fold reduction of natural advantage by protection of an
industry which is economically unable to compete can be seen to hurt
not only the protecting country but also the excluded trading country.
That country must turn to its own facilities to obtain substitutes for
the goods that it wished to import.

This will probably cause a redirec

tion of factors within its econoigy, with resulting higher prices.

Both

nations have suffered by the exclusion, not only the protected nation,
but the excluded one as well.

Both have higher general price levels;

both have less in total products.
Chief Trading Nations and Wage Differences
One reason that factors of production do not have the same cost in
all countries is the lack of factor mobility.

Land, which includes the

soil and climate, is incapable of relocation.

Holland in extending

dikes, and other nations with drainage and irrigation projects attempt
to alter land use, bub only by a small amount.

The productivity and

scarcity, in relation to the other productive factors, determine the
distribution to land.
Capital and labor tend to seek greater returns.
one of them affects the productive power of the other.

A movement by
The movements

of both factors tend to give them a uniform value producing power.
Labor and capital both tend to gravitate to a place where there is a
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shortage.

This is so because the law of supply and demand dictate

higher value to a good which is demanded but is in short supply.

The

entrepreneur is the adjuster of the factors of labor and capital, and
the adjustment is final when the wages and interest are determined by
the productivity of labor and capital.
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While capital and labor returns may tend to equalize, a cursory
glance at contrasting wages in different areas creates doubt as to the
equalization.

In 1954, a comparison of daily agricultural wages showed

the United States at $5*30, while Ceylon had agricultural wages of 2.5
Rupees for male employees.

The Rupee was worth less than 30 cents in

exchange for dollars; hence, the Ceylonese farm hand was making less
than one-seventh as much as his American counterpart.
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If there is

a tendency for wages and interest to equate there must be some expla
nation for these differences.

First, labor is unable to move between

nations because of exclusions, quotas, different cultures, and a general
inertia which tends to hold one to his native country.

This reluctance

to move results from such factors as limited finances, family ties, re
ligious ties, cultural background, immigration regulation and a lack of
information as to opportunity elsewhere.

For tbs above reasons, labor

is not mobile between nations or within nations.

And in addition to

international and intranational immobility there is inter-industry im
mobility.

^ J . B. Clark, The Distribution of Wealth (New York:
Company, 193&), Ch. 19.

The MacMillan

^"ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1955 (Geneva, Switzerland:
International Labor Office, 1955), Table 19, pp. 234-235.

23

"... we can divide labor, somewhat arbitrarily,
into four major groups: (l) technical and
managerial labor, (2J skilled labor, (3) semi
skilled labor, (4) unskilled labor. Members
of each group compete directly with one another,
but only to a
limitedextent with those
of the
next higher or lower group, and scarcely at all
with those at a greater distance on the scale.
And while there is some movement from one group
to another, it is slow and gradual ... ."22
It can be seen that labor is not capable of quick adjustment, but
what keeps capital
tries?

from

quicklyadjusting between

countriesandindus

Presently, the threat of nationalization, tax differentials,

restrictions on removal of profits from a nation, and instability of
governments are prominent deterrents to international investments.
Furthermore, where such investments are made there is often a demand for
exceedingly high returns to offset the risks involved.

Another obstacle

is found in the fact that, once capital has been invested in a heavy
capital-using industry of a specialty nature, such investment is ex
tremely difficult to be reoriented into a pursuit which has come to
offer the investor a greater opportunity for profit.
Capital may be accumulated by reallocation of resources by an au
thoritarian government, by credit expansion, and by savings within an
economy ,2-^ If these methods fail to produce tto9 needed capital bases
for desired productivity, capital must be imported.
be used as the drawing motive for imports of capital.
high, the payment to capital must be high.

Interest rates may
If the risks are

A nation with a high level

of real income is in a far better position to offer the temptingly high
interest rate and to increase its capital than one with a low level of

99

Ellsworth, The International Economy, p. 173*

23Ibid., pp. 182-163.
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Income.

It is to be remembered, moreover, that the need of a nation

for capital is frequently rendered all the more urgent by the fact of
its dependence on capital for making its labor more efficient.
With greater freedom of trade, capital will be more nearly free
to go where it is most needed.

Labor, if unable to cross borders, at

least will be able to increase efficiency with imports of capital.

Com

parative advantage, determined by factor resource combinations, depends
upon the exchange of goods to increase the welfare of those living in
different areas.

However, the effects of trade restrictions, or lack

of them, on one segment of an economy, such as agriculture, may be
quite different from their effects on what is known as the general
welfare aspects of a nation's life.

Frequent reference to this point

will be included in the chapters which follow.
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CHAPTER III

EFFECTS OF TRADE REGULATION ON
AGRICULTURE IN GENERAL
The United States, an importer of agricultural goods, is also
a major exporter of such commodities.

A study of the effects of re

strictive trade regulations on agriculture introduces two problems:
(l) the effects on United States exports of agricultural commodities;
and (2) the effects on the output of import-competing crops.

An

objective of many farmers is less restrictions on imports of all but
farm commodities.

The reason, of course, is the possibility of low

er prices for the things farmers must buy.

For example, southern

cotton farmers have historically opposed tariff restrictions.

In

1908, S, Payson Perry, a Republican farmer who became a Democrat
because of the Republican stand on the tariff question, took this
position in a book, The Tariff and the Farmer

Yet farmer advocacy

of less restraint on imports has by no means been unanimous.

Some

farm groups have attempted to maintain trade restrictions because,
for them it was beneficial to do so.

The sugar producers, both beet

and cane, have long been advocates of protection.
The tariff is a tax levied by nations on imports or exports for
revenue or to restrict trade.
be used only on imports.

In the United States such a tax may

In any country this tax is a powerful means

for implementing a commercial policy.

While the tariff is by far the

^S. Payson Perry, The Tariff and the Farmer (Worcester, Massachu
setts: F. S. Blanchard and Co., 1908), p. 7*
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best known tool for restricting trade between nations, it is by no
means the only tool.

Other tools and devices have been developed

and used to help domestic producers who desire protection,

Another

device for directly restricting trade is the import quota.

The im

port quota, whether opei’ated on a first-come-first-served basis or
by negotiation between trading nations, can be even more restrictive
than tariffs.

An import licensing program may also be effective in

eliminating many imports.

Once the quota is filled, or no more

import licenses are issued, imports are completely excluded.

For

eign exchange controls may be operated in such a way as to be highly
discriminatory against specific imports.

Price controls on imports

are still another tool which may have a restrictive effect on imports.'1
Several forms of indirect trade restrictions sometimes prove to
be just as frustrating to international traders as do the more direct
forms mentioned above.

The most exasperating of such indirect restric

tions are found in connection with the administration of the United
States tariff laws.
very complex.

The tariff classifications of goods are often

A special source of difficulty and. uncertainty is that

many goods are comprised of different materials, having different duty
rates, and there must be a decision as to which is the component of
chief value that will determine the classification.

The uncertainty

of not knowing sometimes what rate will be applied discourages impor
tation.

Valuation is also difficult to determine in many instances,

with some items being valued at wholesale in the exporting country,

“Tor a more elaborate treatment of the various means of restricting
imports, see Brainard, ojd. cit.. Ch. 17.
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and in other instances the value set is the retail price.
The quarantine and sanitary regulations have been used quite
often to bar agricultural imports.

The exclusion of all meat and

cattle from a nation which has evidence of hoof and mouth disease is
a well known example.

Provisions covering this situation were in

cluded in the 1930 Tariff Act.

"Buy at home" slogans and campaigns,

when coupled with required marks of origin, can also deter imports.
Limitations placed on government purchases from domestic sources,
where such purchases are of major significance often have a limit
ing effect on the quantity of imports.
The fact that some restrictions do not take the form of subsidies
to producing groups must not be overlooked.

While trade restrictions

are generally an attempt to subsidize a favored group, restrictions,
such as thos imposed against exports headed fcr a communist-dominated
market, may be purely an international political tool.

Use of such

a tool may prove economically detrimental to the entire nation*s econ
omy and not help any special group.

Varying Effects of Tariff Regulation
and Other Restrictions

The various tools that are available to our protectionist-minded
legislators are effective in excluding or reducing import competition.
The use of.these tools, however, has had differing effects upon the
separate segments of our econony, and this has led to a continual
struggle between groups who are in favor of tariffs and those who are
opposed.

Farmers, while basically against the principle of protection,

Nevertheless in many instances insist upon being protected.

Much of
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the West has long insisted upon moderate protection although they
would receive little benefit from a policy of overall protection,,
The

importance of wool and sugar in the

makeup of theWest’s economy

has

been a major factor in the moderate

protectionismcharacteristic

of the area.
With many American crops dependent on foreign markets for a
large portion of their sales we can expect a sentiment on the part
of their producers in favor of less trade restrictions.

Yet there

has been an imbalance of trade in competitive agricultural commodi
ties of nearly half a billion dollars per year in favor of importing
nations.^

The fact that many of our commodities are competing with

foreign imports leads us to expect the producers of these products
to favor protection.

Thus agriculture has certain blocs in favor of,

and other blocs opposed to trade restrictions.

Level of Factor Employment in Export and in Import-Competing Commodities

Historically exports of cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice have
ranged between 25 per cent and 50 per cent of the entire crop. 5

Because

^Howard R. Smith, ojc, cit.. pp. 162-168.
^Homer L. Brinkley, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953), p. 168.
See also, Trenton, "The Farmer's Stake in our Foreign Economic Policy",
those produced domestically in insufficient volume, and those with vol
ume claimed to be sufficient. The total of both catagories make up
less than 10 per cent of domestic agricultural production if those com
modities under price support levels which are above the world market
price are excluded.
5
"Foreign Agricultural Situation." Foreign Agricultural Service.
USDA (Washington, D. C., October 1953;, p . l67
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the volume of employment of the factors of production depends on out
put changes in amounts of exports will be felt by farmers producing
these exports.

Before 1940, cotton accounted for one-half or more

of the total agricultural exports of the United States.

Since then

its percentage of the export market for agricultural commodities has
fallen to around 30 per cent.

The total number of bales exported had

dropped from S.8 million before 1914 to 5.3 million in the late thir-

/
ties.

Regardless of the quality and reputation of American farm

products their sales have been declining in the world markets.

Un

less the American farmer and American industry are willing to allow
an increase of imports, the level of exports will, in the absence of
some sort of an export support program, probably continue to decline.^
The encouragement of some imports which might compete with do
mestic producers would seem to be the answer to the problem of
increasing exports.

Should cotton, or any other commodity, bear the

brunt of import competition?
as an export?

Which commodity should be encouraged

On broadly theoretical grounds the level of factor em

ployment and efficient use of these scarce factors should determine
which crops, as well as which industrial goods, will enter foreign
markets and which crops and goods must stand on their own against com
peting imports.

If markets were free to determine prices there would

eventually be in the market only those commodities which could com
pete with foreign products.

At the present time, however, with import

restrictions, with most would-be purchasing countries suffering short-

^Marketing. The Yearbook of Agricul+”T’° USDA (United States Govern
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
, p. 7&.
?Ibid.. p. 85.
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ages of dollar exchange, and with artificially maintained domestic
price levels there is very apt to be less than maximum use of pro
ductive facilities.

Would-be export commodity production factors

must be retired, shifted to other industries cr maintained in the
present pursuit by relying on government purchases and dumping.
If we are to maximize the productive capabilities of our land,
labor, and capital, and thus maximize the benefits of comparative
advantage, there should be a shifting of such factors from the less
productive crops to the more productive ones and to non-agricultural
pursuits.

The

ffects of the immobility of the factors of production

would be partially remedied by the movement of goods created by these
factors.

When export crops are reduced the whole agricultural economy

feels the effect.

Land, once used for export crop production becomes

competitive with land used for domestic market production when the
exporter who loses his foreign mariet begins competing for a home
market.^
Foreign investments in production facilities of imported com
modities have sometimes served as an outlet for export capital from
the United States.

Often, however, such commodities may be excluded

in order to benefit a group of domestic producers who otherwise could
not meet competition.

American investors with an abundance of capital

resources relative to labor and .certain types of land will often seek

g

This idea seems to be generally accepted among economists and
was presented as general information to a recent Senate Committee by
the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs, Department of State,
Harold F. Linder, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington^ D. C., (1953), p. 48.
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more profitable investment opportunities in a different area.

By

way of illustration, much of the sugar production in Cuba has been
financed by United States investors.

There has been a tariff, often

nominal, and a quota limitation on imports into the United States.^
In addition to being an outlet for two-thirds of a billion dollars
of American investment, Cuba is also a heavy importer of Americanproduced goods and services.^

Cuba imports around $100,000,000

worth of agricultural goods a year from the United States.^

With

out the limitation on shipments of sugar into the United States,
which has aided in the return of around $350,000,000 to Cuban agriculture each year since 1950,

12 it is possible that Cuba would be

an even better market for American investment, industrial goods,
services, and agricultural commodities.

Table I shows the foreign

trade in agricultural commodities that has taken place between Cuba
and the United States from 1945 to 1955.

9
Factors Limiting United States Investment Abroad. Part I, Survey
of Factors in Foreign Countries, United States Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C., 1953), pp. 30-31.
■^The major achievement of the United States sugar legislation
has been to strengthen the purchasing power of Cuba, the Phillipines
and other foreign sugar suppliers. The price however, averaged about
1.8 cents above the world price between 1953 and 1956. World shortages
in 1951 and 1957 caused the world price to go above domestic price with
the 1948-1957 average domestic price about one cent above the world
price. Foreign Trade Policy. "Compendium of papers on United States
Foreign Trade Policy." Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy, Committee
on Ways and Means, (Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing
Office, 1957), PP. 689-691.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA,
(Washington, D . C., 1956), p. "l"6."
12Ibid.. p. 25.
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TABLE I
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CUBA AND IMPORTS
TO THE UNITED STATES FROM CUBA
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

1945-49

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

Exports

119.0

128.4

159.0

154.0

143.3

133.2

107.6

Imports

341.4

376.6

303.5

390.4

377.9

377.9

N.A.

SOURCE:

Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA,
Table 20, p. 16, and Table 27, p. 25.

Specialization means that factors most abundant become more
efficiently used in all trading nations, for specialization facili
tates mass production and mass narksts.

Trade and specialization

of this sort will tend to lead to a stable equilibrium between trad
ing nations.

Farm commodities that are produced under increasing

costs caused by excessive use of scarce factors will shift factors
until all are used at the same margin of efficiency.

At this

equilibrium level the cost of crop production that had been un
wisely extended will have become cheaper.^

Crops that had been

less than fully developed because of lack of export markets will
also become cheaper because the factor combination has become more
efficient.

Inefficient and Efficient Producers
Increasing productivity, a measurement of increasing efficiency,

■^Brainard, o£. cit.. pp. 146-147.
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may be determined by changing ratios of inputs to outputs.

One way

of determining the effects of trade restrictions on efficiency is to
compare factor costs of various crops and see how such costs have
changed.

All costs have risen since before World War II, but input

costs have increased at different rates.

To have the same factor-

cost ratio per commodity now as twenty years ago, the productivity
of each crop would need to have undergone a gain equal to any in
creasing cost of input applicable to the crop in question but not
to others.

Such an equalization, however, is practically impossible,

for the realtive costs of producing crops have changed in the last
few years, and there have been changes in the ratio of inputs per
crop to offset the differing input costs.
Although wage rates for farm labor have more than quadrupled
since 1935-1939, and many other input costs have mare tton doubled,
costs of production have generally not registered comparable in
creases.

The ability to increase the ratio of units of output to

input used in order to offset increasing costs is mere noticeable
in some commodities than in others.
much to account for this.

The use of machinery has done

In some instances, labor costs increased

at about twice the rate of machine costs, and consequently machinery
replaced labor.

The use of fertilizer increased to such an extent

as to offset land costs which, in turn, increased faster than the
cost of fertilizer.^
The shifting of the factors of production as the cost ratio changes

Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956. Agricultural Marketing Service
USDA (Washington, D. C., November 1954), pp. 18, 62.
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is far easier in the production of some crops than others.

Since

trade itself normally tends to reflect increases or decreases in
efficiency of production, it is to be expected that commodities
in the production of which the factor ratios do not adjust in such
a way as to offset increasing costs of a particular factor are los
ing their place in the pattern of exports.

Imports would be expected

to increase to compete with such commodities on the home market.
However, what actually transpires in such cases maybe illustrated
by reference to several of our major crops.
Wheat production in the Plains States has had one of the great
est increases of productivity among our agricultural commodities.

In

spite of this, since 1948 the United States has lost nearly threefourths of its market for wheat exports.

Cotton farming, which in

some areas still makes mass uneconomic use of resources has lest only
about one-fourth of its export market during the same period of time.
Tobacco farming in the tobacco-livestock farm area of Kentucky has
seen very little increase in productivity and has actually lost re
lative to wheat farming.

Nevertheless, tobacco exports have increased

by 12 per cent since 1948.^

Table II shows some of the relative

changes in farm production per unit of input that took place between
the 1930ts and 1956.

^Ibid., Table 12, p. 62, and Table 98, p. 84.
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TABLE II

COMMERCIAL FARMS PRODUCTION PER UNIT OF INPUT
INDEX NUMBERS BASED ON 1930-1939 = 100

Location and Type of Farm

Production per Unit of Input

Northern Plains
Spring Wheat
(wheat, small grains, livestock)

187

Kentucky

124

Tobacco
(Tobacco, Livestock)

Southern Piedmont

Cotton

99

Mississippi Delta

129

Blackland, Texas
(cotton farming)

SOURCE:

97

Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956. Table 12, p. 62.

Using 1947-1949 as the base year, one is able to compare some of
the differing rates of changing efficiency among farm commodities.
Manpower in all farm work had declined to 83 per cent while farm out
put had increased to 123 per cent by 1953.

The number of tractors had

increased from 2,735*000 in 1947 to 4*400,000 in 1953-

The number of

trucks on farm had increased during the same period from 1,700,000 to
2,550,000;-combines from 465*000 to 918,000; corn pickers from 236,000
to 615*000; and the number of farms using milking machines has in
creased from 525*000 to 715*000.

During this period the tobacco pro

duction per man-hour had only increased to 103 per cent of 1947-1949
levels.

Feed grains had increased to 158 per cent, food grains to

132 per cent, oil crops to 158 per cent, sugar production to 139 per
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cent, cotton to 129 per cent, meat animals to 105 per cent, fruit
and nuts to 103 per cent, and vegetables to 110 per cent,^

Table III

shows the general decrease in man-hours of labor required for pro
duction of various farm commodities between 1943 and 1953.
TABLE III
INDEX NUMBERS OF MAN-HOURS OF LABOR USED FOR FARM WORK
BY GROUPS OF ENTERPRISES

(1947-49 = 100)

Commodity

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

Meat Animals

93

100

103

108

109

109

Tobacco

94

96

97

109

108

99

Fruit & Nuts

99

98

98

100

96

93

Vegetables

101

97

95

91

39

91

Cotton

103

107

65

93

89

89

Sugar Crops

96

87

96

74

74

77

Food Grains

100

93

73

74

76

73

Feed Grains

105

93

85

74

68

64

Oil Crops

104

81

77

72

64

64

SOURCE:

Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency, PERB Series,
USDA, Table 9, p. 28.

Using such efficiency increases as have just been noted as a
criteria for improving a crop's ability to enter the world market, one

16

Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency. Production Economics
Research Branch Publications, PERB Series, USDA (Washington, D. C.,
1954), pp. 28-31, 36.
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might expect to find certain increases and certain decreases in
the foreign trade make-up of the above crops.

Oil exports, feed

grains, sugar, food grains, and cotton should be going more into
exports or at least meeting less import competition.

Tobacco, meat

animals, fruits and nuts, and vegetables should have declining ex
ports or an increase of import competition.

Actually, however,

these expectations have not always been realized.

Exports of apples,

pears, prunes, and oranges have declined in the world market.
exports have increased.

Rice

On the other hand, the amount of tobacco

exported has not decreased but seems to be gaining, even though it
is relatively less efficiently produced now than wheat, which has
lest some ground. 17'

Although wheat was losing ground in relation

to tobacco exports, it is far more, efficiently produced now than
formerly if man-hour output is a criterion of efficiency.
The lack of any apparent pattern of correlation between ef
ficiency based on the man-hour criterion and foreign trade of
agricultural products is hard to explain.

Worldwide trade im

balances accompanied by foreign exchange shortages, trade restric
tions, and various support programs undoubtedly lead to less than
maximum efficiency in the use of production factors.

In addition,

one cannot safely isolate agricultural products, but must consider
them as only a portion of the total of the products of the nationTs
economy.

Then too, the elasticity of demand for exports from the

nation may well mean that certain exports, although they are effi-

17
Ezra Taft Benson, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D . C ., (1953), p. 41.

cient users of the ration’s factors, are overlooked in favor of
other exports that the importing nation is unable to obtain from
any other supplier.

Domestic Sales and Prices: Bxport-Import Sales and Prices
Except for trade barriers and the cost of shipping, the prices
of goods in all countries would be approximately the same.

Prices

have a tendency to become uniform within the nearly barrierless
marketing area of the United States.

The price for cattle through

out the country is set at the terminal markets by the action of
sellers and buyers.

Other markets vary somewhat as supply and.demand

shift, but basically the prices are determined by trading at the
terminal markets.

Any area that has prices which appear out of line

quickly undergoes an adjustment.

For example, if for some reason

Baton Rouge’s supply of butcher calves was short enough that prices
were forced up by demand, there would be a diversion of carcass meat
from other areas to the Baton Rouge area and the price would return
to normal,
Whenever a local market must pay more for its cattle than at the
central market, and if that amount is above the cost of transportation,
then livestock will be purchased where the price is lower.

The de

creased amount of bqying at the area of high price will cause a decline
in the price.

IS

This is the picture of a market price being set and

maintained under the conditions of a free play of supply and demand.
This is the type model most often presented to explain market price
phenomena.

Yet within the United States there has not always been a

•^Marketing, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 2E*

P*
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complete freedom for supply and demand to determine price.

If

competition had been permitted, the domestic prices could and pro
bably would have been determined as the model would indicate. Instead,
conditions came to be such that, in 1948, the Department of Justice
filed suit against Armour, Swift, Cudahy, and Wilson in an attempt
to break up these four firms into fourteen independent firms in order
to restore competition in the meat industry."^

This suit suggests

that an element of monopsony may be present in certain areas of agri
cultural marketing.
Commodities entering foreign trade would, if restrictions were
elimated, be sold and priced more nearly like the model of a domestic
trade transaction.

The only difference would be a larger marl®ting

area* the world, instead of a smaller national area.

With the increase

in the size of the market the cost structure would change.

More cost

would be allocated for storage and transportation but less for pro
duction.

Overall prices would tend to be lower.

On purely economic

grounds, the question of whether a nation should or should not trade
does not differ from the question of whether each county of each state
in the United States should trade.

The need for trade will exist as

long as costs of production including transportation are not equal.
A Plethora of examples could be cited in which domestic prices
are generally higher than world market prices because of protection.
In such cases scarce factors such as land, labor and capital are in
vested in ventures which are perpetuated by import restrictions.

^Harry L. Purdy, Martin L. Lindahl, William A. Carter, Corporate
Concentration and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950),

p. 555.
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Similarly, many American export items have remained in the
world market because the government has subsidized them in various
ways.

If one is to export, one must be paid.

eventually, to receive goods or services.

To be paid means,

In many cases, however,

the American exporter has been paid by taxes collected from Ameri
cans.

Exports of many agricultural commodities as well as other

goods and services have often depended upon government grants or
government guaranties of private loans.
well enough to see to that.

Exporters have organized

Harris, in a recent Congressional

hearing, stated that the United States government subsidized ex
porters to the extent of $125 billion in the last thirty to forty
years.

The methods used were through government aid, assistance,

loans, purchases of gold, and so forth.

Harris says this has per

mitted foreign consumers to use $125 billion worth of United States
exports that they did not pay far with imports.

20

Many of the policies and practices of our government affecting
the demand for an prices paid for some of our export commodities have
hindered the best resource allocation.

Lend-Lease and other activities

during and following World War II have no doubt diverted scarce factors
into the production of crops that are no longer capable of competing

20Seymor E. Harris, A Statement in the hearings before a sub
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM.
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington) D . C ., (1956),
pp. 5&-59j hereinafter cited Harris, Statement in Congressional Hearings,
This information presented to the committee was taken from his book
International and Interregional Economics (New York: McGraw Hill Book
Co., Inc., 195777 PP« 324-337* Harris contends that attempts to over
come this continued imbalance of payments should not be entirely directed
to use of tariff policy with the burden placed on import-competing
industries e

for world markets.

Should these resources remain in the production

of commodities for a vanishing market?

World market prices say ’no*

but domestic policy often says ’yes.1 Assuming that world market
prices should determine our policy, the question arises, should the
displacement of production factors be swift, slow, or never.

Many

domestic producer interests say never ; some free traders, who think
like Charles Taft and Howard S. Piquet, say as soon as economically,
possible; and Harris in his defense of protection for the New England
textile industry says very slowly. Another fact which cannot be over
looked is that world prices are often not free to reflect degrees of
efficiency.

In many cases national policy sets prices as well as

quantities in the various producing countries.

Secondary Employment
The protests against imports and the demand for protection come
not only from those producing a commodity which has to be protected,
but also from those serving the needs of such producers.
tude is far from being new.

This atti

The towns and merchantmen that were

dependent upon the indigo farmer and rice planter in colonial times
were in favor of a protected market for those products.

Loudest and

most insistent in approval of restrictions are the voices of those
who stand to gain most by them.

These include not only the actual

producers of protected commodities but also those who serve those pro
ducers; profit also accrues to banks, storekeepers, newspapers, trans
portation agencies, and the labor force of all such organizations as
provide ancillary services for a protected industry.
Once capital is invested and labor trained to produce a given
crop, a sudden shift away from this crop is not looked upon favorably
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by either the producer cr his ancillaries.

The lily growers of the

northwest as well as those who were secondarily dependent on bulb
sales were hard pressed when bulb imports were resumed after the end
of World War II.

Land values had skyrocketed.

The area in and

around Corbett, Oregon had never before seen such a boom.
ulace, to a man, was against a return to imports.

The pop

The same held

true for the residents around Beaverton, Oregon when imports of
filberts again began to reach the American market.

The almond

growing area in San Luis Obispo County, California was equally up
set when almonds from the Middle East again reached the American
market.
When the production of a commodity becomes a part of the pattern
of an economy there will be repercussions if production ceases.

Re

gardless of how the end of production comes, some vested interest are
bound to be hurt.

This has been noted in the' shifts from cotton pro

duction in areas of the South, lumber production in Maine and Wisconsin,
fish-wheel salmon fishing on the Columbia River, and production of
numerous other commodities that have been discontinued in various parts
of the nation.

This may be called a process of equilibration within

a dynamic economy or of equilibrium economics in a developing economy.
Harris, in his study of the New England textile industry, con
cludes that an adjustment necessitated by changing economic conditions
requires a long period of time.

The change is probably inevitable;

textile investment and labor will seek other outlets, but the change,
if sudden, will make adjustments difficult.

If tariffs and import re

strictions can allow an industry to make a gradual adjustment over a
twenty-year period the adjustment will be easier to make than one
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attempted in a short period of time.

In addition Harris points out

that in the case of New England a large area is suffering the pains
of readjustment and for this reason the adjustment is harder to make
than in a small area.

21

There may be centers of prolonged unemployment brought about by
readjustment of production factors such as in New England.
ters cause depressed conditions.

These cen

Payrolls are down or non-existent.

Services dependent upon a larger and more active labor force are no
longer needed.

Tax receipts are down.

Schools, government activity,

and transporation facilities are farced to curtail or discontinue ser
vices.

Such elements in the picture of an industrial area often lead

to demands for protection by those dependent on a certain commodity
being produced.
Domestic Policy and Foreign Trade

One of the major farm problems of today arises from the over
production of some farm products.

Too many of the productive factors

are being used to produce these products.

Farm incomes would be lower

than that which is considered a fair return if prices were allowed to
fluctuate in order to clear the narket.
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Donestic farm policy is de

signed to increase the incomes of those dependent upon agricultural
production, yet our foreign trade policy is designed to expand multi
lateral trade.

Are these two goals compatible?

It is probable that

serious differences will tend to exist as long as farm policy is main
ly occupied with price support matters and trade policy primarily

PIHarris, Statement in Congressional Hearings, pp. 77-51.
■^CED, Economic Policy for American Agriculture. (New York:
Committee for Economic Development. 195^0. p. k*

concerned with increasing world-wide trade.
The farmer's side of the foreign trade-donestic policy problem
is presented by John A. Baker of the National Farmers' Union, as
follows:
"I do not believe that United States farms which
produce for export or which produce commodities
that must compete with imports should be asked
to bear the full cost, respecting this production,
of an intelligent United States foreign policy.
I accord the same right and privilege to other
domestic raw material and industrial producers.
The benefits of better international economic co
operation accrue to all the people and the tempo
rary costs involved should be borne by all the
people,"23
Professor Thorp presents the trade side of the picture thus:
"Since 1950, our gross national product has
increased #105 billions. Our total of #391
billion for 1955 compares with #361 billion
in 1954. The total number employed in the
labor force has increased to new peaks.
Within these totals there have been major
changes in products, processes, and plant
location. For the most part these changes
have been responsible for our growth. And
within this total picture of a dynamic econo
my, I find it difficult to feel that we need
to give special attention to minor adjustments
which might result from continuing the gradual
liberalization of our trade policy."24

John A. Baker, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., fl953), p. 41*
24
Willard A. Thorp, A Statement in the hearings before a sub
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM.
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington, C. C., (1956),
pp. 88-89*
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Quotas. Tariffs and Price Supports

Such widely different policy voices as have just been referred
to gain greater concreteness and pointed meaning when emphasis is
given to the implements which are used for putting a policy into ef
fect.

Prominent among these implements are quotas, tariffs, and

price supports.

Import quotas may be absolute, simply restricting

the amount imported during a specific period; or there may be tariff
quotas, which allow certain quantities to enter free of tariff, or
at a favorable rate, and the remainder at the regular tariff rate.
The quota, as a restrictive measure against imports, is especially
acceptable to farm groups as an adjunct of domestic farm price policy.
Since quotas on imports tend to limit supply, their use is perhaps
the easiest method of maintaining domestic prices above world prices.
Combining absolute import quotas with donestic production quotas is
an assured method of supply control.
Well aware of the effectiveness of this combination of quotas
the sugar industry pressured Congress to such an extent that both quo
tas were incorporated into the sugar acts.

The Sugar Act of 1943 has

been referred to as a "legal monopoly," yet it was accepted even though
it appears to contradict the liberal trade policies which the United
States has urged upon foreign countries.

Many of the countries ad

versely affected by the quotas of this 1943 sugar act are in the Western
Hemisphere where dollar balances

21?

are short. J

Import quotas when used either separately or with tariffs are use
ful in the successful administration of agricultural price support

25C . Addison Hickman, Our Farm Program and Foreign Trade (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 19497, pp. 53-61.

programs.

Without limitation of imports on a crop which is receiving

support above the world price the supporting government would, in
effect, be supporting the entire world production.

The problems of

supporting a domestic crop without limiting output would be greatlyaggravated by the large number of producers involved in operating
a plan on a global basis.

Again, the assurance of government pur

chases supplementing consumer demand at a given support level has
brought forth bumper crops.

Government purchase and storage of

commodities has also brought about marketing quotas.

Thus if a

supported crop which is import-competing needs domestic marketing
quotas to equate supply to demand at the supported level, it follows
that import quotas are also necessary.

The authors of the Agricultural

Adjustment Act were aware of the need for import restrictions and to
meet this need enacted Section 22 of that Act in 1935.

This Section

provides for the use of quotas or fees on imports that may tend to
interfere with or render ineffective any price support or marketing

26
program. .
American agriculture, with a few exceptions such as sugar and
wool growers, was not much concerned with foreign competition until
World War I.

Agricultural tariff protection on a large scale began

with the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, and the Fordney-McCumber Act
of 1922.

It was later buttressed by the Hawley- Smoot Act of 1930.

One of the objects of these acts was to aid farm price recovery fol
lowing the collapse after World War 1 . ^

Benson, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
2^Hickman, op. cit.. p. 55.

The United States, however,
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has such a makeup of agricultural imports and exports that a tariff
has little protective value for mcst crops.

The total volume of ex

ports from the United States is around 3 per cent of total production.
Of this small portion of products that are exported, agricultural pro
ducts make up a large part.

This is especially true of such crops as

cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice which seek foreign markets in the
amount of approximately 40 per cent of the entire output.

Tobacco,

fresh fruit, soybeans, and lard, have depended upon foreign markets
to provide their profit margin.

While only 3 per cent of the total

United States production is exported, about 20 per cent of all ex■2ft

ports are agricultural in nature. °

The South according to Efferson

exports nearly 20 per cent of its agricultural output.

Nearly 60

million acres of crop land in the United States are required in rais
ing our agricultural exports, and the income from exports of agricultural
goods supports around 18 million Americans. ^
Of the total United States imports, about onehalf are agricultural
products, including tropical fruit, tea, coffee, cacao, and rubber.
These crops have no competing production in the United States; conse
quently a tariff on them would not help any domestic producers. On
the other hand, cotton, wheat, tobacco, rice, and the other crops which

J. Norman Efferson, Southern Agriculture and World Trade. Mimeo
graphed Circular No. 159, Department of Agricultural Economics, College
of Agriculture, Louisiana State University, 1954, pp. 12-13. Data from
the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957. shows exports to
average close to 4 per cent since 1929. Foreign Agricultural Trade,
Statistical Handbook, USDA, p. 1, gives agricultural exports as per
cent of total exports at above 20 per cent for all but a few years,
mainly during war periods.
^Efferson, og. cit., p. 2.
-^ I b i d ., p. 2.
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make up the bulk of our exports cannot be protected by tariffs.

Re

gardless of any tariff "help," export commodities must sell for the
going price on the world market.

An import tariff on export commodities

gives no price or income assistance as far as the export shares of
such crops are concerned.

Such a tariff may exclude competing imports

from the domestic market, but unless the domestic price is artificially
pegged, domestic production will drive the price down to that of the
world market unless the cost structure precludes so low a price, in
which case exports will cease.
Our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 has been followed
with tariff reductions which, in the main, have been applied to pro
ducts that have never been subject to import competition.

The commodities

that actually make up a large part of the import competition with do
mestic producers have been protected more by quota restrictions.^
The Agricultural Act of 1948 took some steps toward reducing the
cross purposes of farm policy and foreign trade policy.

The re-exami

nation of parity rates on different commodities resulted in an attempt
to reduce over-valuation of some crops that appeared to maintain chronic
3?
surpluses.-'*

The depression legislation of the Roosevelt era was pri

marily directed toward raising prices.

To do so the agricultural

Adjustment Act of 1933 was passed with a sliding support scale ranging
from 52 to 75 per cent of parity on certain basic crops.

This support

level was deemed adequate to restore farm incomes to the proper relation
ship with other income groups.

The war needs, which necessitated a

■^Hickman, ojo. cit., pp. 55-57.
^ Ibid.. p. 68.
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change in objective from adequate income to that of stimulating pro
duction, resulted in an increase of the parity rate to 85 per cent
and later to 90 per cent.
hostilities ceased.

These latter ratios were maintained after

It was not until 1954 that Congress allowed this

stimulus to production to be lowered.-^

The program of high parity

prices supported by the government has shown that attractive price
levels lead to over-supply at the demand schedule for those prices.
If the producers are to continue selling their produce at the arti
ficially high price, one of two things can happen.

Either the govern

ment must biy the supply that the-consumers do not want at that price,
or else production must be restricted.
Under present domestic policy, price supports are mandatory for
O I

basic cropso
and peanuts.
ports.

"Basic" crops are:

corn, cotton, wheat, rice, tobacco,

Certain non-basic commodities also have mandatory sup

These commodities include wool, mohair, tung nuts, honey, milk,

and butterfat.

Other crops are supported at the discretion of the

Secretary of Agriculture.

The supports are maintained by loans, pur

chase agreements, and outright purchases of all but wool and mohair,
which are supported by incentive payments.^5
The minimum price support level of basic crops since World War II,
contingent on the producers accepting marketing controls, was 90 per

-^Marketing. The Yearbook of Agriculture, oj). cit., p. 400.
-^"Basic crops" appear to have become basic, to some extent,
because enough political pressure was brought to bear on that classi
fication. When this was done the so-called "basic" crops appeared
to receive preferential treatment at the expense of other agricultural
crops. How rice and peanubs ever became tagged as basic crops pro
bably remains a mystery, even to those who produce them.
-^Farm Policy Dictionary, Let’s Agree on Terms Used in Making Agri
cultural Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Agricultural Extension Service, The
Ohio State University, 1956), pp. 4-5•

50

cent of parity until 1954 when it was made “flexible," ranging from
75 per cent ot 90 per cent of parity.

If marketing controls are not

voted, the cooperators in the support program are entitled to 50 per
cent of parity s u p p o r t s , A price support policy of 85 per cent
and 90 per cent of parity was considered to be necessary in order to
have a "stimulating" effect on production.

But under today’s much

changed conditions, it can easily be seen why supports of many crops
at high levels require marketing quotas.

And with domestic marketing

quotas it is necessary to limit imports of supported commodities,

Decline of Exports of Agricultural Goods.

Some Consequences

The foreign trade of the United States has shown a steady de
cline of agricultural products in the percentage structure of total
American exports.

This trend was reversed temporarily after World

War I and again after World War II.

The dollar value of agricultural

exports showed a growth trend, though somewhat erratic at time s, from
1865 until 1920.

Following World War I, agricultural exports were

stabilized somewhat until the depression, at which time foreign trade
in general collapsed.

About one-third as much dollar value of exports

of agricultural goods was recorded during the depression period and
before World War II as during the 1920’s.

During World War II the

export of agricultural goods increased in value but not nearly as
rapidly as non-agricultural goods.

Following that war such exports

remained high and even increased on a percentage basis until the Korean
War started.

Since the Korean conflict agricultural goods have under-

36Ibid.. p. 5.
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gone a dollar value as well as percentage decline in the United States
export pattern^

Table IV shews the pattern of exports for several

selected years.
TABLE IV
UNITED STATES EXPORTS*

Year

Total Exports
Million Dollars

Agricultural Exports
Million Dollars

Agricultural Exports
as a Percentage of
Total
Per Cent
46

1922

3,887

1,798

1931

1,908

752

39

1939

3,744

738

20

1946

12,725

3,610

28

1953

15,226

2,936

21

■^Selections were made from USDA publication Foreign Agricultural Trade.
with an attempt to show representative years'.-^
The increase of imports following World War II was accounted for
largely by commodities not produced at all in the United States and by
commodities which we are unable to produce in sufficient quantities to

37Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, 0£. cit..
Table I, p. 1.
-^Ib id .. Table I, p. 1. At the present time, 1955-1958 agricultur
al exports are, in terms of current dollars, at an all time high. Even
with constant dollars todays exports are above most post war years. A
large portion of these exports are nmde up of U. S. attempts to dump
past accumulated "surpluses." Since 1954 government export programs
have been stepped so that 40 per cent of agricultural exports are under
some form of government program. See Section III "Factors Supporting
High Exports," The Problem of Maintaining High Level Agricultural Ex
ports . USDA. (Washington: Foreign Agricultural Service, 1957)•
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meet consumer demand.

The loss in export markets following the Korean

conflict came ahout as a result of an economic conditions that can be
expected to follow the end of an era during which exports were stimu
lated in order to feed and clothe our allies and the occupied territories.
As these nations again became able to feed and clothe themselves, their
need of economic aid, including foodstuffs and fibers, declined.

This

was matched by a decline in export crop production which released hun
dreds of thousands of acres from export production and permitted
production of import-competing crops.

With the shift away from some

export crops, more commodities were thrown on the domestic market to
*

be taken by consumers at lower prices or, in some instances, taken
by the government under support programs.
Acreage restrictions were relied upon to reduce the build-up of
"surpluses'' in some supported crops.

Thus wheat exports during the

period 1950-1955 decreased by more than one-half.

From 1948 to 1955,

the Economic Cooperation Administration purchased nearly $2 billion
worth of wheat for export s h i p m e n t . T h i s aid helped stimulate wheat
production, and when it was reduced it left a vacuum in the demand for
United States wheat.

During the same period, 1948 to 1955, the E. C. A.

purchased over $2 billion worth of cotton, $398 million worth of corn,
$35 million worth of rice, $453 million worth of fats and oils, along
with many more millions spent on fruits, milk, cheese, wool, and

•^Edwin D. White, Deputy Director, Office of Food and Agriculture,
Foreign Operations Administration, A Statement in the hearings before
a subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL
OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES. United States Senate, 84th Congress, Wash
ington, D. C., (1955)* pp. 288-289. This information was collected by
the Department of Agriculture as previously requested by the subcommittee
to be presented by Mir. White at the hearings.

tobacco.^

In addition to such E. C. A. activities there were numerous

other acts and programs which stimulated production for export by grant
ing aid to allies and occupied areas during and after World War II and
the war in Korea.
Wheat, as an example of war-stimulated production, increased in
quantity of output by some 50 per cent from 1939 to 1946.

Wheat acre

age increased from 57 million acres average 1935-1939 to 71 million
acres average 1945-1949.

The exports of wheat largely financed by

United States taxpayers was, in 1943, five times that of late 1930’s . ^
This wartime stimulation encouraged the transfer of productive factors
into wheat growing.

Some observers contend that It is the government's

responsibility to see that successful peacetime adjustments are made.
Recognition, so they insist, should be given to the need of readjust
ment rather than a continuation of attempts to mairitain exports of an
emergency level.
As important as is the agricultural share of exports, it is steadi
ly declining.

A two-way trade offers a workable solution for maintaining

exports of American commodities in world trade channels.

Unless Ameri

can consumers and industries are willing to increase imports to a level
that will approximate exports, American sales in the world market will
continue to decline.^

The alternative to increasing imports seems to

be a continued support program with production quotas.

Some of the

programs that have been considered in order to reduce our ’insold agri
cultural products are the soil bank program, increased consumption,

4°Ibid., p. 290.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit.,
Section III, Commodities, passum.
42Marketing. The Yearbook of Agriculture, o£. cit., p. 35.
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the Brannan Plan, gifts to needy nations, forward pricing, two-price
plans and export subsidies.

These programs will next be briefly re

viewed .

The Soil Bank
The soil bank plan is a means of paying farmers for shifting soil,
ill-suited for production, into soil-building and land-conserving crops.
By this program, productive factors used for crops that had been stimu
lated into export patterns by war needs, and which are not well-suited
for the production of domestic or import-competing crops, are to be
diverted from production.

With such diversion, the exportable sur

pluses would be reduced and uneconomic competition for domestic
markets could be avoided.

The domestic markets would be spared the

depressing effects of increasing supply diverted from producers of
crops for which the export market has been lost.
There are two suggestions for administering the soil bank.

Land

could be diverted from production and permitted to go to grass for
perhaps three to ten years in order to restore fertility.
such idleness could be by cash or in "surplus" commodities.

Payment for
This sug

gestion would, in effect, provide an acreage reserve similar to the
government’s moth-balling of naval vessels which are held on a stand
by basis until needed.

The alternative to the creation of this stand-by

productive capacity is the permanent diversion of less productive land
into forestry preserves, forage, or water sheds.43
The Yazoo-Little Tallahatchie flood prevention project is an ex
ample of what can be done in a conservation program coupled with the

^ F a r m Policy Dictionary, o£. cit,, p. 16,
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reduction of "surpluses" of an export commodity.

Excess cotton

production was one of the major causes of this region’s deterioration.
Cotton farming along with over-grazing and poor logging procedures
had, by the early 1940’s, reduced incomes in the Yazoo Watershed to
less than #500 per family for some 36,000 farm families.

The pres

sure on this land was high, with 112 persons per square mile.

In

1936 The United States Corps of Engineers began flood control work,
and in 1946 the flood prevention project was aimed at soil conser
vation.

Almost one-fourth of the cropland in the area is now being

properly managed with the application of conservation measures.

Land

has been reforested and taken out of single-crop production and ro
tation is being practiced on 225*000 acres,

A strong trend has de

veloped for cattle raising and grassland farming.

Much soil-building

lespedeza and kudzu forage is now the basis of this shift from cotton
to diversification.^

Increased Consumption
The efforts on the part of the producers and the government to
increase consumption have been attempts to reduce "surpluses" and thus
offset the loss of export markets as well as decreased domestic sales
of farm commodities.

One plan has been to divert farm products into

domestic relief channels.

Three methods have been used to divert com

modities to low income groups:

the food stamp program, the school lunch

program, and relief milk distribution.

Compensatory payments have been

^ W a t e r . The Yearbook of Agriculture, USDA (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 199-205*
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suggested as a means of increasing consumption by lowering the price
to consumers and thus boosting consumption.^

The Brannan Plan
The Brannan Plan would use the moving average of the first ten
of the last twelve years to calculate parity.

Price supports for

storable commodities would be at 100 per cent of parity and the plan
would make use of production controls, marketing quotas and subsidies.
Non-storable commodities would receive production payments high enough
to maintain an income level corresponding to that received on storable
commodities.

Payments would depend upon compliance with production

and marketing control regulations.

A base income level was proposed

above which the farmer would receive no support payments.^

Under this

plan the government could sell the supported commodities at the market
price.

This would have solved the problem of storing "surpluses" and

would have given the consumers lower prices.

The cost, while possibly

less for the economy than the cost of a price support program, would
undoubtedly channel more money through the government's hands.

Direct

payments by the government, while no more of a burden to society than
the higher prices and storage costs of a price support program, are more
obvious.

Forward Pricing
Those favoring price policy revision claim that this method of
support will interfere less with foreign trade than long-term price

^ F a r m Policy Dictionary,
46Ibid., pp. 17-13.

o jd .

cit., pp. 12-13.
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supports.

Prices would be announced far enough in advance for farmers

to make intelligent production plans.

These prices would remain stable

long enough to permit the completion of at least one crop harvest.

Such

prices would be calculated in a manner that would keep supply in line
with forecast demand.^

Forward prices, if used as a tool to discourage

production of crops that have excess supply on hand, could re-direct
resources from one crop to another.

However, this plan would probably

not direct resources away from agriculture and maintain satisfactory
farm income levels any better than other support methods, without mak
ing use of marketing quotas or production controls.
Export Subsidies
A problem of how to clear the domestic market arises whenever the
domestic price of a commodity which is normally exported becomes higher
than the world market price.

First, the export market will be supplied

by foreign, producers who are, in effect, being induced to produce more
than they normally would.

Second, without import quotas foreign pro

ducers will sell their produce in the United States market.

If the

domestic market were free to react to supply and demand pressures this
problem could not arise.

Thus, whenever a support program on an ex

port-oriented commodity raises the domestic price above the world market
price there is pressure on the government to sell the quantity of the
commodity which begins to pile up in storage wherever and for whatever
it can be sold.
Essentially, export subsidization amounts to nothing more than
dumping.

If the domestic price is above the price in the world market,

^Hickman, o£. cit.. p. 6 9 .
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it is necessary to sell abroad at a lower price than in the protect
ed home market.

In effect, a two-price system is established whenever

export commodities are subsidized.

As commendable as it nay be to

dispose of accumulated commodities, that is, commodities which have
accumulated because of a decreasing volume of exports and price
support programs, the possible effects of such disposal by dump
ing should be studied before a dumping program is begun.
Jesness in the Congressional hearings in 1956 on customs and
tariff laws emphasizes that as long as we restrict the sort of im
porting which we class as dumping by foreign nations, it is under
standable that foreign nations might disapprove of United States
dumping.

Nations generally have methods of counteracting dumping

when such an action appears to be advisable.

The United States, under

the Anti-dumping Act of 1922, may auply countervailing duties to off
set any advantage gained in its markets by export subsidies on the
part of other nations seeking to invade the United States market.
Not only the nations receiving the "dumped” commodity, but other ex
porters of the same commodity, will view such actions as unfair
competition.

Jesness also suggested to the Congressional committee

the lack of economic wisdom in giving others the benefit of lower
prices at the same time that American consumers must pay higher prices
as well as carry the cost of such a program through higher taxes.^

^ 0. B. Jesness, A Statement in the hearings before a sub
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM.
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956),
pp. 535-537.
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Mexico and Canada have been uneasy over United States programs
for selling increased amounts of cotton and wheat by reducing prices
on government owned supplies.

Denmark has been disturbed over the

possibility of attempts to unload United States dairy stocks on for
eign markets.

The United States is not the one to determine what

constitutes dumping; instead the determing factors are the reactions
of other countries, their interpretation of United States action,
and the effects of such action on them.
"Surplus" wheat has posed an acute problem, with a two-year
supply for food needs in the United States on hand by 1955.

During

the six years preceding 1955 an export subsidy averaging about 60
cents a bushel had been in effect.

Without this subsidy little wheat

would have been exported, and even with the subsidy the United States
share of world exports of wheat has been declining, while non-dollar
countries have been increasing thexr exports.

LG

It appears that price support programs have created a necessity
for a two-price policy or "dumping" in order to sell many of the United
States export-oriented commodities in the world market.

For example,

with price supports on cotton, the domestic price is higher than the
world market price.

With the government buying cotton and storing it,

quotas must be imposed to keep other nations from exporting cotton
into the United States.

However, the United States has no control

over other cotton-producing nations when it comes to selling cotton
to cotton-consuming nations which normally buy from the United States.
With the support prices running between 10 and 20 per cent above the

^CED, Economic Policy for American Agriculture, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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world market, there is an added incentive for other nations to in
crease output and undersell United States producers,5®

Mexico and

Brazil both increased their cotton production under the protection
of the United States support program.

Some observers maintain that

the program has been in effect so long now that there is no way of
determining whether export price reflects efficiency, and thus forces
inefficient foreign producers to shift resources away from cotton
production, or if this price simply reflects the dumping power of
the United States treasury,

51

Mr, Schwenger points out that the use of export subsidies is
not a tool which only one nation can use.

In fact, the nature of some

commodities entering the world market may force retaliatory export
subsidies by nations which are hurt, or fancy they are hurt, by others.
Certain Latin American nation^ have used multiple exchange rates as
a means of subsidizing exports.

For example, wool shipped to America

for dollar exchange may get more local currency than wool shipped to
a soft currency nation such as France.

In some instances a subsidy

of this sort amounts to as much as 40 per cent of the commodity’s
price,

Greece has established export subsidies for tobacco, Israel

for citrus fruits, France for cereals, fish, dairy products, and pork.

50Ibid., p. 8.
^Lawrence Witt, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee
of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, House of
Representatives, &4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956), p. 544.
See also Charles P. Kindleberger, THE TERMS OF TRADE A EUROPEAN CASE
STUDY, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press
of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1954), pp. 83-85*
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According to Schwenger,
"... export subsidization runs the risk, if
there is a surplus situation, of becoming
competitive between different export countries.
This can drive the export price to low levels
and create international friction. For coun
tries depending heavily on exports of a few
commodities, it can lead to serious economic
difficulty.
After the experience of the prewar period,
it may be a deterrent to the extensive use of
export subsidies."52
Subsidizing exports is not compatible with an expanding multi
lateral trade, a policy that the Department of Commerce and the State
Department are attempting to carry out.

If a subsidized commodity

is withheld from world trade, no direct harm is done to other coun
tries.

However, export subsidies, as well as protective tariffs,

tend to allocate scarce factors of production to crops that often
have no economic justification for their cultivation in an economy.
In addition, friendly trading nations may suffer injury.

American ad

vocates of export subsidies call such programs "stop-gap" measures.
Regardless of their label they are a necessary part of any support
program dealing with export commodities.

In fact, such plans have

been expanding rather than contracting.53

52
Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch,
Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, United States Senate, S3rd Congress, Washington, D. C.,
(1953),-PP« 263-264. The possibility of retaliation when a nation
resorts to export subsidization is cited in any foreign trade text.
The use of such a commercial warfare weapon if it provokes retaliation
may gain no advantage for the instigating nation. Agricultural Handbook
No. 132, Agricultural Policies of Foreign Governments, USDA (Washington,
D. C., Foreign Agricultural Service, 1957), p. 2 states that export sub
sidies, though important are decreasing.
53
^Hickman, ojd, cit., pp. 50-52.
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Regulation and the Farmer

Traditionally, American farmers have been free traders.

An

exception has been the sugar producers and wool growers who had de
manded and received protection long before World War I.

The protection

movement for agriculture began on a much brcada? scale in 1921 and was
strengthened in 1930.

These tariff measures were ineffective remedies

as most agricultural commodities receiving protection from imports were
5L
export o r i e n t e d . A s a result, renewed emphasis was given to these
questions.

Who needs the tariff?

Who needs export subsidies?

If

they are needed, what are their effects on the individual farmer?

Who

makes farm policy, the farmer or the Farm Bloc?
The Farm Bloc according to Black consists of a group of Congress
men, mostly from rural states, who represent farm organization leaders
and lobbyists with ideas sufficiently alike that they tend to strive
for a common end.

It is apparent that the legislative and administrative

policy which this bloc supports nay not always represent the interests
of the farm people.

Often the cotton trade stands to benefit more by

proposed measures than the cotton farmers.

The leaders and management

often stand to gain more, both in the shcrt and long run, from the
measures they advocate than do the farmers on the land.^
There are wide income differences in agricultural production.
Although agricultural income averages less than non-agricultural income
there are many farm operators with quite satisfactory levels of living

54Ibid.. p. 55.
'’'’John D, Black, Parity. Parity. Parity (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, 1942), pp. 10-

12.
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by any standard.

Some two or three million farners have wages com

parable to those of industrial workers, and 2 or 3 per cent of the
farmers, those who produce about one-fourth of the farm marketings
have very satisfactory incomes.

At the other extreme are the farmers

who are poor and who account for the very evident poverty in some
rural areas.

About one-third of the farm families tove low produc

tivity and low income.

Ultimately., inadequate use or misuse of

resources accounts for low productivity.

The -underemployed farmers

tend to drag down the average income level.^6
li/hat effect does farm policy and trade policy have on the Ameri
can famer?

The Farm Bloc, as has already been suggested, will, in

its attempts to transform policy into legislation, largely reflect
the interests of organized groups and lobbyists.
plight of all farmers better?

Will this make the

Again, is national farm policy directed

toward the best economic use of scarce resources?

A crucial point

affecting that larger question is that the problem of low farm income
will not be solved until more people leave agriculture and until farms
are reorganized in such a way as to raise their producing and earning
capacity. ^

Without reorganization and better utilization of under

employed resources any regulation designed to aid "farmers" is apt to
benefit a few a great deal and the majority very little.

An ever

present danger is that with the Farm Bloc making and imposing farm
policy and being capable of affecting foreign trade policy, it is pro
bable that any concessions made by "farmers" will have very little

^Harold G. Halcraw, Agricultural Policy of the United States
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), pp. 14&-150.
5?Ibid.. pp. 360-361.
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effect on the higher income group of farmers and those influencing the
"Farm Bloc," while the brunt of any such concession will be felt by.the
farmers with the smaller incomes.

Farm Size and Production of Exports
In all that is said about farming, the problems of farmers, and
price support aid to farmers, one seldom finds any mention of who is
a farmer or what constitutes a farm.

The 1950 and the 1954 Censuses

of Agriculture counted as a farming unit three acres or more which
produced agricultural products worth #150 or more.

These products,

accounting to that definition, could be either for home use or for
sale.

A "farm" of less than three acres must have produced for sale

agricultural products in the amount of #150 or mere.
control of one person was considered as one farm.

Land under the

Land worked by a

tenant or sharecropper was considered as a separate farm,5^
Under the census classification, a retired doctor living in a
city apartment would be a farmer if he sold #150 worth of mushrooms
that he raised in his basement.

Or a country squire with ten sons

in the FFA, by leasing three acres to each son to raise a show steer,
would be responsible for eleven farm statistics, if each son could
sell his steer for #150 or more, provided of course, the squire had
enough land left over to produce #150 income for himself.

As con

trasted to the above mentioned "farms," the King Ranch in Texas which
takes half a day to cross, carries no more weight, as far as number of

^1950 United States Census of Agriculture. "Farms and Land in
Farms," General Report, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1952), II, Ch. I, p. 5.
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farms is concerned, than any one of the scores of "farm" operations
embraced under the Census definition.
Agricultural support programs generally use averages of farm
data as the basis for determining income needs.

Average farm income

would include Price x Quantity divided by number of farms. P. x Q. =
a sum which, when divided by the number of "farms" gives the "farm
income."

Undoubtedly some farmers need help, but there should be

cognizance of the differences in farms and what the "help" will ac
complish for each of the different classes of farms.
The Census Bureau divides farms into two major groups:

"com

mercial" and "other farms."

"The ’commercial farms' were classified into
six groups, classes I through V on the basis
of value of farm products sold and class VI
on the basis of value of farm products sold,
off-farm work (less than 100 days) by the
operator, or the relationship of the income
of the farm operator and members of his family
from non-farm sources to the value of farm
products sold. "Other farms" were classified
as part-time, residential, and abnormal farms.

"Abnormal farms" are institutional units such as prison farms,
school farms, experimental farms, and cooperative farms.

^1950 United States Census of Agriculture, "Economic Classes
of Farms," United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952),
II, Ch. XII, pp. 1109-1110.

60Ibid., p. 1110.
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Following is the census classification of 1950:

COMMERCIAL FARMS
Class of
Farm

Number of
Farms

Value of Farm
Products Sold

I

103,231

II

381,151

III

721,211

5,000 to

9,999

IV

882,302

2,500 to

4,999

V

901,316

1,200 to

2,499

VI

717,201

250*to

1,199

$25,000 or more
10,000 to $24,000

•^Provided the farm operator worked off the farm less than 100 days, and
provided the income of the farm operator and members of his family re
ceived from non-farm sources was less than the value of all farm products
sold.

OTHER FARMS
Part-time farms are farms with sales between $250 and $1,199 with
more than 100 days employment off the farm or greater income from non
farm employment.
Residential farms include all farms, except abnormal farms, with
sales bringing less than $250.61

The term "large Farm" applies if the farm sells farm products
valued at $70,000 or more in a year.
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Commercial farms in the 1950 Census totaled 3,706,412.
totaled 1,672,838.

Other farms

In 1940 there were 5,379,250 farms, but classes I,

II and III farms made up only about 22 per cent of the total number of

6l
1950 United States Census of Agriculture. "Farm Labor and Farm
Expenditures," United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1952), VII, Ch. IV, pp. xxx-xxxi.
62Ibid., p. xxxii.
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farms, yet produced over 70 per cent of the value of agricultural crops
sold.

Class I farms made up less than 2 per cent of all farms, yet

they produced 22 per cent of all agricultural crops sold.

Other farms

accounted for around 30 per cent of all farms but produced less than
3 per cent of the farm sales.

In fact, 78 per cent of all farmers

were able to produce less than 30 per cent of farm commodities sold, ^
Farm commodities are generally sold by grades.

Cotton, wheat,

wool, rice, and other supported commodities are classed according to
specifications and supports are based on these classifications.

Thus,

cotton of comparable grade from a large farm will sell in the market
for exactly the same price as cotton from a class VI commercial farm.
With nearly 78 per cent of American farmers operating class IV, V, VI,
and non-commercial farms, it can easily be seen that support prices,
import quotas or any other programs based on price level manipulation
will fail if the goal of the program is to increase the incomes of all
farms to an acceptable level.

There are instances where a program of

500 per cent of parit?/" would not appreciably help certain ’’farmers,11
When the price support programs were instituted the idea was to
increase the living standards of the farmer comparable to that of other
groups in the economy; in other words, to see that a just share of the
distribution of the nation!s income was obtained by the farmers.

The

use of import quotas, price supports, export subsidies and other pro
grams have all been aimed at the same goal of increasing prices.

By

increasing prices, 70 per cent of the benefits in 1950 were paid to
22 per cent of the farmers and about one-fourth of the benefits to
around 2 per cent of the farmers.

About 44 per cent of the commercial

^Calculated from data in the 1950 United States Census of Agri
culture, "Economic Classes of Farms."
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farmers received about 90 per cent of the benefits,^

Thus, the

farmers with incomes over $25,000 would receive nearly one-fourth
of the price support benefits while farmers with incomes over $5,000
would receive about 70 per cent of the benefits from any support
programs.

It would appear that the farmers who are helped most by

support programs are the farmers who least need help.

Farmers who

most need help are those who get the smallest benefit.

In fact, it

Is possible that the program initiated to help the farmer actually
harms the class V and VI farmer instead of helping him.
A large farm with much capital equipment and a good credit rating
has a great deal more flexibility than a small subsistence-type farm.
Thus when a 10,000-acre mechanized corporate farm has acreage re
strictions imposed on its cotton crop, it is relatively easy to shift
the lost acreage to some other crop.

When a 20-acre farm which is

producing cotton has its acreage reduced at the same ratio as the cor
porate farm there is not much choice for the proprietor.

He might

put In corn to feed his mule but he could buy more corn by selling
the cotton he could have raised; so for him a 10 per cent above market
support might mean a major loss of income because of the inflexibility
that attaches to acreage restriction in his case.

Lacking the flexi

bility that the larger farmer has, he may leave the farm to seek
employment in town or may look for additional part-time work to sup
plement his income if he stays on the farm.

Regulations and the Exodus from the "Farm”
The farm-to-city movement is a phenomenon which has been develop
ing in the United States for many years.

^Ibid.

The once predominantly rural

"Economic Classes of Farms," Passim.
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population is now four-fifths urban.

Among the reasons for this move

ment are the higher birth rate in rural areas and the increasing
efficiency and technology in farming.

Any movement which entails

change is due to be resisted by these who are, as individuals, ad
versely affected.

The cotton producers today are not pleased when

they see rayon and nylon being used almost exclusively in tire car
casses, or new highly water-resistant washable rayon coming onto the
market.

The dairy farmer was very vocal in his distaste for other

edible fats which, it was discovered, could be used in making passable
substitutes for ice cream and butter.
One of the greatest difficulties in easing restrictions on imports
is the resistance of certain groups which are already import-competing.
Among these groups are some important branches of agriculture charac
terized by slow growth and few alternative opportunities for a quick
shift of resources.

Returns in these pursuits are low as compared

with returns in expanding export industries.
On the one hand factor returns would probably increase if emphasis
were shifted from protecting import-competing commodities to assisting
potential purchasers of United States produce to obtain the foreign ex
change which could stimulate the export of more efficient crops. ' Yet
it is widely believed that the displacement from presently protected
inefficient producers must not be more rapid than the displaced re
sources can be absorbed elsewhere.

The problem, then, is to absorb

excessive employment of misused resources.

This, of course, is an

ever-present task even before any attempt is nade to increase imports.
Moreover, it is probable that increasing imports would lower the al
ready low incomes and increased exports would raise the already high
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incomes.
Basically, profits and income levels have been the major deter
mining factors in the shift from farm to city.

With the increased

efficiency in the use of land, labor, and capital in agriculture,
fewer inputs have given increased outputs.

The fewer resources used

in producing more agricultural commodities, the more resources there
are available to produce the non-agricultural goods that are associ
ated with a high standard of living.

With greater efficiency in

production and excess capacity, production has grown faster than de
mand, and the incomes derived from farming have tended to remain lower
than incomes from other sources.

This is a manifestation of equili

bration in a competitive economic system, or the dynamics of economics.
One hundred and fifty years of exodus from the farm has largely been
the outgrowth of increasing efficiency in agriculture.
Although there are now fewer small-size (20 to 99 acres) farms
than in 1920, there are more by far under 10 acres, and about the same
number in the 10- to 19-acre bracket.

These smaller farms are primar

ily a d a c e to live rather than a source of income.

The farms in the

100- to 259-acre bracket have also decreased, but not nearly as notice
ably as the smaller sized farms.

Farms between 260 and 499 acres had

changed little in numbers between 1920 and 1945.

The farms in the 500-

to 999-acre group have increased somewhat, about 16 per cent between
1920 and 1945.

The large farms of over 1,000 acres have increased

more rapidly in number than any other bracket, with nearly 70 per cent
more in 1945 than 5n 1920.^5

^^Sherman B. Johnson, Changes in American Farming. "Miscellaneous
Publication No. 707." USDA (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, 1949), p. 53. The trends in farm size changes have continued
since Johnson made his study and evidence points to their further con
tinuation.
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The ever-commitment of resources to agricultural pursuits has
tended to correct itself throughout the dynamic growth of the American
economy.

Various states have from time to time attempted to protect

special interest groups, but on the whole and in the long run analysis,
economic forces in the United States have tended to allocate resources
to their most productive uses.

It is possible, of course, that the

protective measures which were introduced in the 1930's may tend to
slow down this process of equilibration.

On the international scene,

agricultural policies that have distorted trade show that one nation
alone is unable or unwilling to cope with world-wide problems.

Policy

has often tended to shelter certain groups from the effects of world
market forces. 66

This sheltering of special interest groups may slow

the general trend toward a more productive allocation of resources and
may thus divert the movement from marginal and sub-marginal farms or
from low income import-competing commodities to the production of
more efficient export crops.
Agriculture still engages about twice as many farmers as needed.
This surplus must be kept moving into other lines of production or
the farmers will simply be dividing the farm returns among more pro
ducers,

Some students of the subject urge that, rather than flat

payments to farmers or payments proportional to sales, an essential
part of any price or income policy should be a program of general im
provement in education, both general and technical, to prepare farm
children to move out of agriculture and compete on equal terms with

^Robert B. Schwenger, "World Agricultural Policies and the Expan
sion of Trade," Journal of Farm Economics. XXVII (February 1945), 86-87*
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non-rural workers.^

Farm Income Levels and Foreign Trade
Mention has already been made of the marled differences in the
incomss of individual farmers.

The greatly increased demands for farm

products during the war years, which made farm incomss very profitable
for millions, was unable to provide more than a marginal, -and in some
cases, sub-marginal existence for millions of other farmers.^
To the extent that the efficiency of factor use manifests itself
in factor returns, agricultural exports are more efficiently produced
than are import-competing crops.

Unweighted average hourly earnings

in export agricultural crop production was #1.25 in 1947 as compared
with hourly returns of $1.23 for import-competing crops.

Weighted by

man-hours, leading export commodities returned $1,269 as against $.999
for import-competing crops in 1947.

The spread was greater in 1952

when the weighted per man-hour returns were $1,671 for export agri
cultural crops as against $1.01& for producers of import-competing
commodities.

These figures were determined by weighting the returns

according to the importance of the different commodities in the make
up of this country's exports and its imports of commodities which
compete with domestically-produced commodities.

The greater the im

portance of exports the higher the man-hour returns, and the greater

^Geoffrey Shepherd, "A Rational System of Agricultural Price
and Income Controls," Readings on Agricultural Policy (Philadelphia:
The Blakiston Company, 1949), pp. 1o 2-163.
^Hickman, op. cit., p. 36.
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the amount of competition from imports, the lower the returns. 7
In view of the contrast between farm income levels and the great
er return to export commodities than to import-competing commodities,
it would seem unwi.se to attempt to exclude cheaper imports.

An easing

of import restrictions, which could make dollar exchange available to
other nations, would allow a more rapid shift of resources to agri
cultural export, as well as to industrial export goods production.
This would lead to even higher returns to American productive factors
and give foreign nations much less need for grants and "loans" with
which to pay for the American goods they desire.
The practice of supporting import-competing commodities which
make high demands on scarce factors, thus protecting them against
imports, perpetuates inefficiency.

In addition, by excluding for

eign imports, less foreign demand will be manifested for efficiently
produced exports.

These effects are obvious, but another less com

monly recognized effect is equally as wasteful of scarce productive
factors.

Supporting a crop at such a level that production is stim

ulated at above the world price may prevent United States production
from entering the world market.

This result prevails in connection

with the production of wheat and cotton and possibly other commodities.
The effect of a supported price which stimulates production often
leads to sales to the government of a large portion of a crop.

Farms

which could have sold their crop profitably at a lower price will see
economic rent and expectations of continued rent force their land

^Irving B. Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Review of Economics
and Statistics. XXXVIII (February 1956), 27-30.
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values up to such a height that they can no longer sell in the lower
priced world market.^
With all farms producing for a nationally supported price, dif
ficulty arises when world prices fluctuate.

When the world price goes

up, all is well; domestic producers sell on the world market at above
support price.

However, when the world price drops below support

levels, producers sell to the government.
The United States has an advantage in world trade where ma
chinery improves the productivity of labor to a high enough degree.
The problem in trade policy is to reconcile the national interest
with the interest of particular groups.
is reduced because of the

I 03 S

When the production of crops

of this foreign market, the unused

factors will begin competing with factors producing other commodities
and thus aid in driving incomes down in these fields.
The bulk of the population of China, India, Mexico, and marp/
other nations are dependent upon agricultural production for a meager
existence. The se nations all have low productivity, much manpower
used and little mechanization.

This would seem to be the goal that

protection, for crops not adaptable to mechanization, is aiming for
in the United States.

Only by making the utmost use of technological

and scientific improvements as swiftly as possible can American agri
culture hope to remain competiti 3 in the world market.

An agriculture

"^Richard T. Ely, and George S. Wehrwein, Land Economics (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1940) pp. 121-133. Ely and Wehrwein point out
that land receives its value from capitalization of the returns from
the land. For this reason when land is sold at a high price because
price supports have permitted high economic rent to be capitalized,
the new owner is no longer able to sell at less than the level of the
support price.
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which contributes its part to a dynamically growing American econony
must continue to adopt new technology as fast as do industry, market
ing, and ancillary pursuits.

Otherwise, it will retard the nation's

economic progress.
Capital-Intensive Crops 71
Agriculture which is efficient and which returns a high income
level to its producers aids in maintaining a high national income
and a prosperous nation.

This is also true of any other basic pro

ductive group in the economy.

However, a nation cannot be prosperous

if agriculture is so inefficient that it uses all the productive fac
tors of the economy to feed and clothe the populace.

If a nation is

not efficient in agricultural production, it must remain at a re
latively low level of living or import foods and fibers to free
workers for other pursuits.
For at least thirty years the frontiers of the United States
have been closed.

No longer is it possible to add to extensive pro

duction in order to increase agricultural output.

Only by improvements

in a technology which decreases relative inputs to outputs will Ameri
can agriculture be capable of increasing productivity at the same rate
as increasing efficiency in industrial production.

Only if something

like a balanced ratio is maintained as between the efficiency of agri
culture and the efficiency of industry, will agriculture contribute
its due proportion to the American standard of living.

ay the term "capital-intensive crops" is meant commodities that
lend themselves to production with maximum use of machinery, fertilizers,
improved seed stock, and with relatively very little manpower necessary
in their cultivation.
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Some avenues toward an improved agriculture are of course more
promising than others.

Land and climatic conditions are relatively

unchangeable, except for such secondary influences as swamp drainage,
added humus, fertilization, and irrigation.

The greatest potential

for increased productivity of agriculture is attainable through the
substitution of capital for labor.

This is true because, as com

pared vrith most other nations, the United States has excessive
capital and a shortage of labor.

If comparative advantages are to

be obtained, a nation can produce more cheaply those products which
make the greatest use of the abundant factors and the least use of
the scarce factors.
The commodities which lend themselves well to a substitution
of capital for labor and those which are unsuitable for production
elsewhere because of climatic or other natural conditions are the
ones which should be exported.

The crops which are unable to be

come "capital intensive" will become more incapable of entering the
export market as industry continues to become more efficient.

If

the ratio of manpower to capital usage fails to keep abreast of the
industrial revolution which is now in process, then the cost com
petition for manpower in the industrial processes will tend to
cause agricultural prices to become so high that agricultural pro
ducts will not be able to enter the export market.

In fact, with

the exceptions of bulky low-value commodities and perishable goods,
the trading partners of the United States will tend to export more
and more agricultural commodities to the United States unless the
"agricultural revolution" keeps apace with the trend toward auto
mation in industry.
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The technology of agriculture tends in general to advance as
rapidly as other sectors of the economy.

About 80 per cent of farm

extension effort is directed toward technological improvements in pro
duction.

Some observers contend that it is necessary that more than

20 per cent of the total effort be applied to farm planning and re
search into the economics of production.

Because of projected national

growth, the United States will need all the agricultural productivity
possible in another generation.

Technological development, so it is

maintained, is at the point where all that is needed in order to have
incomes in most of the low income areas of the United States is to
practice the new technologies on farms of sufficient acreage.^
Hand-Intensive

Crops

^3

There are certain commodities which will probably never be
significant in the international trade between distant areas.

In

point of production method, these may be either hand-intensive or
capital-intensive, and generally they do not significantly influence
either import or export patterns.

One of the reasons for this is

the low value and large bulk quality of some commodities, which tends
to increase transportation costs above the profitability point of
shipping.

Another factor is the perishability of some commodities.

Fresh meat shipments, for example, were impossible for hundreds of
years other than by actually shipping the live animal.

John D. Black, "Agriculture in the Nation’s Economy," The
American Economic Review, XLVI (March 1956), 40-41*
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By "hand-intensive crops" is meant tho6 e crops which, because
cf their nature, require in their production a great deal of hand labor
which cannot be done by machine processes.
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The commodities in the United States which tend to be hand
intensive and which can be produced elsewhere and shipped to the
United States will be subjected to more and more import competition.
Yet again, there will be a continual increase in the malallocation
of productive factors if special interest groups remain strong enough
to compel the entire population to pay higher and higher prices as
the production of these commodities becomes more and more inefficient
relative to other segments of the economy.

The production of such

commodities will continue to become more inefficient unless capital
is able to replace labor as fast as it does in other industries.
Some of the commodities which require a large amount of hand
labor for which machines cannot as yet be substituted and which thus
could be classed as hand-intensive are:

tobacco, certain fresh fruits

and vegetables, cotton under some conditions, hops, wool, poultry,
and beet sugar.

If the advantages of highly productive land (soil,

climate, rainfall, and location) are not great enough to offset the
use of the large number of farm workers that cannot be replaced by
capital, production is to a large extent dependent upon protection.
Any commodity which consistently depends upon support for its existonce is a drag on the rest of the economy.

Therefore in the dynamic

economy of the United States, if there is to be a continued maximum
rate in increasing the standard of living, hand-intensive crops need
ing protection should be losing productive factors to production of
capital-intensive goods and commodities.
It is true that land values are high on much land that produces
hand-intensive, protected commodities.

If this land were diverted to

the production of other products it would lose much of its value.
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Such a shift would also result in a sizable loss to the owner at the
time of changing from, say, sugar cane to dairy pasturage in Louisiana.
But how did the land obtain its value?

It was mainly through the

capitalization of the income of a crop, opportunity cost of other
crops, or alternative non-agricultural uses.

In the example of sugar

land values, import quotas instigated by lobby campaigns of vested
interests gave the land its value in the first place.
true of any other protected crop.

The same is

In sum, the protection afforded to

an inefficient labor utilizing crop will keep the land values high.
If the protection were to cease, the land would be diverted to the
commodity which had the next highest opportunity cost, and without
protection it would be a crop better suited to the factor proportions
that are available.
In preparation for an examination of the effects that restrictive
trade regulation have on various hand-intensive and capital-intensive
commodities, this chapter was designed to indicate some of the effects
on agriculture in general.

The conditions under which factor employ

ment nay not be maximized and inefficient production may be perpetuated
have been noted.

Likewise, the ways in which a domestic program may

interfere with import and export practice, and the effects of trade
regulation on ancillaries of primary producers have been noted.

In

addition, an examination was made of the regulatory tools and such
other matters as the decline in the importance of agricultural exports,
the size of farms and the historical movement from the farm to urban
locations.
The remaining chapters will include an examination of the effect
supports and regulations have on factor usage in production of export
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commodities and import-competing commodities.

These observations

will be made while examining crops classified as capital-intensive
and hand-intensive.

CHAPTER IV

CAPITAL-INTENSIVE CROPS AND RESTRICTIONS

The term "restrictions" as used here means regulations dealing
with either domestic or foreign trade, which may adversely affect
quantities of imports of exports*

Capital-intensive crops will be

dealt with mainly in this chapter and hand-intensive crops in Chapter
V.

Some of the crops covered are both hand-intensive and capital-

intensive and will therefore be discussed in both chapters.
In order to determine the effect that fluctuations of international
movements of capital-intensive commodities have on the nation’s re
sources, leading export industries will be examined.

The growth of

efficiency of resource use in various crops, as well as the correlation
v
between export levels and trade restrictions will be noted.

Leading Export Industries

The work done by Professor Kravis in his article on "Wages and
Foreign Trade" and also his statement in the Congressional hearings in
September 1956 will be used as a basis for the selection of leading ex
port- and import-competing agricultural industries discussed in the
chapter.

Others will be used as the occasion arises.

Table V in this

chapter is Table 8 in the article on "Wages and Foreign Trade;" it is
known as Table 7 in the Congressional hearings statement.
While accepting the work done by Kravis as a basis to work from,
it must be realized that hourly returns were obtained from the di
vision of man-hours of labor into the net income realized by the
industry.

This, of course, would incorporate any high or low prices
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TABLE V
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT IN FOREIGN
TRADE; 1947 HOURLY EARNINGS; 1947 AND
1952 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
Exports and Imports in Millions of Dollars
1-0

Industry

Estimated
Returns per
Hour

Exports of leading Export Industries^
1947

1952

Imports of leading Import-competing Industries^
1947

1952

220

314

Livestock &
Products^-

$ 0.58

5

Food Grains

3.17

441

855

2

72

6

Feed Grains
and Hay

.57

215

339

4

85

7

Cotton

.80

1,365

864

44

35

8

Tobacco

.82

100

95

9

Oil Bearing
Crops

1.65

41

81

139

56

Vegetables &
Fruits

1.10

155

139

102

111

32

38

543

772

4

10-11

12

Tree Nuts

Total, above industries

.91

(6)
2,316

(6)
2,373

(5)

61'

^Estimated hourly returns were obtained by dividing man-hours of
labor used in farm work into realized net income of farm operators plus
expenditures for hired labor.
^All industries with exports of $50 million or more either in
1947 or 1952.
^All industries with competitive imports of $30 million or more
(foreign value) either in 1947 or 1952.
^Excludes meat and dairy animals and their products.
^Negligible.
^Exports below $50 million; industry therefore not included as
leading exporter.
SOURCES:

Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," p. 27.
, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee of
the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CUSTOMS
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AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM,, House of Representatives,
blith Congress, Washington, D. C., (1996)

into man-hour returns.

Thus, any prices that may have been unduly de

pressed or supported unrealistically at the time this work was accomplished,
would inject this same note of artificiality into the findings.

Man-hour Returns of Leading Export Crops
The man-hour estimates and the man-hours actually spent in the pro
duction of commodities, at best, give only a rough approximation of
average efficiency of labor use for a given commodity.

Average figures

are shown in estimated returns per hour in Kravis’ table.

This table

is based on total production figures and total manpower figures and is
therefore not representative of any one area.
more per man-hour in one area than in another.
the commodities entering foreign trade.

Cotton may return much
This is true for all of

Some producers are sub-marginal,

some marginal, and others may be profitable but will tend to become high
cost producers as land values appreciate*
Kravis finds that the export commodities when weighted show an av
erage hourly return of $1.269 in 19U7 and $1,671 in 1992.

His figures

for import-competing average hourly returns are much lower, being only
$.999 in V9bl and $1,018 in 1992.2

This is somewhat misleading, however,

because the efficient as well as the inefficient producers are taken into
account.

There is no way of determining which cotton is produced effi

ciently and which inefficiently.

The same is true for tobacco, wheat, oil,

^"Although The Bureau of Labor Statistics made an extensive study in
19li-7 and again in 1992 concerning industrial efficiency, no such study was
made for agricultural industries until Kravis, using raw data from the U.S.
D.A., completed the above work for leading export and import commodities.
2
Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Taboe 9, p. 30.
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vegetables, fruits or nuts.

What can be determined, nevertheless, is

how rapidly an industry sub.slifi/ites capital for manpower, if the sub
stitution is possible.

When

the

substitution is rapidand the farms

which have not been able to make the substitution tend to have a re
latively low level of living as compared with those which have shifted,
then it is evident that capital returns are higher and capital-intensive
production more efficient. If this were not true there would be no ef
fective inclination to substitute capital for labor.
Industries unable to substitute capital for labor in order to re
main efficient relative to other industries can expect to be eliminated
from production in a dynamic industrializing economy.

Capital will nor

mally be substituted for labor when it is cheaper in the long run to
make the substitution.

With

the

increasing demand forlabor from north

ern industrial centers,

with

industries shifting to theSouth and West

to follow the mariets, as a result of increasing labor mobility, and
with minimum wage laws, labor is becoming increasingly more costly
throughout the nation.
Production of wheat, a major export commodity, very early lent .it
self to methods designed to save relatively scarce manpower.
the reaper was being used commercially.

By 1847

Manpower was a scare factor in

the West where wheat was adaptable to the extensive use of rich prairie
lands.

With few men, horses and machines were used.

Large machines and

large units of power in the production of wheat was established long be
fore the internal combustion engine was adapted to field work.

As soon

as the internal combustion engined tractor became practical it was draft
ed into use with other improvements in mass production following,

begin

ning around 1920 tractors soon made horsepower obsolete in the job of
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plowing large wheat ranches.
horses and mules declined.

As the tractor improved, the number of
The combine, using gasoline power, became

a smaller, more manageable tool to the farmer, and manpower needs were
further reduced by the one-man combine, now a standard tool of many
grain producers.

The use of machines thus led to the high man-hour re

turns which Kravis revealed in his research into productivity.

The

early use of machines prior to support programs may have eliminated many
sub-marginal wheat producers and dictated capital intensification for
all producers.
Mechanization in the production of corn was slower than in the pro
duction of wheat because of problems not encountered in wheat and small
grains.

High-yielding hybrid corn and wartime shortages combined to

give the requisite impetus to greater mechanization.

By 1946, 70 per

cent of the corn production was harvested-mechanically in the corn belt.
This and the use of the corn planter, with mechanical disking and husk
ing, have almost completely mechanized corn production.^
The cattle industry, dependent upon forage, received the boost to
ward capital substitution for labor as early as 1890 when mowing machines
came into use.

The windrow pickup hay baler of 1932, the silage of

green fodder in trench silos, windrow ensilage cutters, together with
the truck, hay fork, and tractor, considerably reduced the manpower re

's
A. P. Brodell, Machine and Hand Methods in Crop Production (Wash
ington, D . C .: Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural
Marketing Service, 1940) pp. 1-3.
^A. P. Brodell and J. A. Ewing, Use of Tractor Power. Animal Power
and Hand Methods in Crop Production (Washington, D, C,: Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, FM-69 Mimeographed, July 1948), pp. 12, 21.
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quirements of the cattle industry.

5

The work of Louis J. Ducoff for the Department of Agriculture shows
variations of productivity in 1939 from total production value at #82
per man equivalent on the smallest value category of farms to #2,850 on
the largest.

In other words, productivity on the largest farms ranged

to as high as thirty-five times that of the smallest farms.

The great

er productivity on the larger farms was associated with better re
sources and larger capital outlays per worker.

Employment of hired

labor on the larger, better equipped farms produced on the average
a greater output per hired worker than the average worker’s output on
£
farms manned entirely by family labor.
The implication of Ducoff's findings is that the larger the pro
ducing unit, the more efficient the operation.

This may not necessarily

be true, especially in periods of falling prices.

Yet, the trend to

ward mechanization has been evident for some time, as has the knowledge
that the large mechanized farm is generally more efficient.

The more

efficient the production possibilities, the greater■should be the chance
of a commodity retaining its place in the make-up of exports.

That is

to say, if efficiency allows the cost relationship to decrease faster for
one commodity, that commodity should become a better buy for foreigners.
With wheat this is probably true, yet wheat has been losing foreign mar
kets faster than tobacco, which is hand-intensive and usually produced
on very small tracts.

^James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Bcononw (Chapel
Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 98-99.
^Louis J. Ducoff, Wages of Agricultural Workers in the United States,
Technical Bulletin No. 895, USDA (Washington, D. C., 1945), pp. 11-12.
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Table VI shows the average hours of labor used per unit of pro
duction for wheat and tobacco and several other major export commodities.
The table shows that the most rapid increase in productivity of the

TABLE VI

AVERAGE HOURS OF LABOR USED PER UNIT OF
PRODUCTION ON SELECTED EXPORT COMMODITIES
Crop

1910-14

1925-29

1935-39

1940-44

1945-48

Wheat

100 bu

106

74

67

43

34

Rice

100 bu

154

87

64

64

56

Tobacco

100 lbs

44

48

47

44

43

Soybeans

100 bu

128

64

58

52

Cotton

Bale

268

210

190

182

277

Hours of labor are computed for the acreage harvested.
SOURCE:

Johnsonj Changes in American Farming. USDA, Table 11, p. 70.^

export commodities listed for the period 1910-1948 was in the produc
tion of rice and wheat, both major export commodities.

Soybean

production, which did not begin on a large scale until after World War
I, was only half as efficient in the period 1925-1929 as in 1935-1939.
However, it has shown continuing increases in productivity.

Cotton

production, on the other hand, was only slightly mere productive in

^See also The Economic Almanac 1958, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co. 1958), p. 58. Although Johnson's work was the last comprehensive
work on hours of labor used, the' yearly figures of the Agricultural
Research Service, USDA, as compiled in the Economic Almanac in table
form, show that the decreasing use of manpower is continuing. The
trends shown in Johnson's work continue with the exception of tobacco
which in 1955 had a considerably higher per man-hour output.
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1925-1929 than it was in 1910-1914, but has since become more effi
cient.

Mechanical improvements now make cotton production almost as

adaptable to machine production as wheat.

The production of tobacco,

one crop which has retained its export market, was no more efficient in
1948 than it was in 1910.
The efficiency of wheat production varies widely, with costs much
higher in some areas than in others.

Wheat could be produced for 70 to

80 cents a bushel in some areas of Kansas in 1953 and 1954* while costs
in Illinois were between $1.50 and $1.65 a bushel.

Yet the price sup

port of 90 per cent of parity paid by the government was at the rate
of $2.24 a bushel.

At the same time, the government was selling the

wheat it purchased to foreign countries for $1.65 a bushel under the
terms of the International Wheat Agreement which vras first negotiated
in 1949.8
The Wheat Agreement was an attempt on the part of several wheatexporting nations and forty-one importing nations to assure a quota
from each exporter between a minimum and maximum set of prices.

The

extension of the agreement in 1953 for three more years established a
quota for the United Spates of 209 million bushels at a minimum price
Q
of $1.80 a bushel.
The support level will, of course, be the market
price for wheat in the United States as long as supply outstrips demand,

^Walter L. Randolph, Vice President American Farm Bureau Federation,
A Statement in the hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES - COTTON. United States
Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C,, [1955)* pp. 149-151.
^Brainard, op. cit., pp. 483-485. See also Stephen Enke, and
Virgil Salera, International Economics, Third Edition (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957) pp. 443-453.
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while the export price will be.the wheat agreement minimum price.

The

equitable price sought by the producing countries of the wheat agreement
may be based upon wrong assumptions.

True, in the world-wide depression

of the 1930’s, when wheat prices fell all prices fell.

There was little

or no alternative use for resources going into wheat production.

How

ever, times were different following World War II, and an attempt to
retain stable marketing quotas and prices at the so-called equitable
level may have caused a slow-up of the readjustment from war stimulated
demand to normal demand patterns.

The equitable level is considered to

be that level which produces returns equal to returns from alternative
employment..
The wheat agreement and other plans for stimulating exports of com
modities with high output per man have the support of the Grange.

Lloyd

C. Halverson a Grange economist calls attention to the point that the
high standard of American living is due to that high output, and that
our policy makers must think in terms of full employment of the Ameri
can people in these industries which have the highest output per man
and therefore the greatest advantage in the world marlet.

This spokes

man also urges that the producers of export crops should not be required
to give up their normal share of the world market merely because they
have the benefit of a domestic program which raises the price above the
competitive level and artificially stimulates production abroad.

Instead,

a freer hand should be given to many of our producers who can produce at

^Enke, and Salera, International Economics, pp. 452-453.
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competitive world prices and still have some addition to income,^"
The impact of war demands and high prices for wheat under an ad
mittedly stimulating support level has had an effect on the pricing of
wheat land.

Farmers buying land and equipment to expand production at

a given price level need to continue receiving the same level of income
in order to obtain a satisfactory return on their investment.

When a

wartime demand returns to normal there is apt to be a call for continued
aid in maintaining exports at the wartime level.

Without some kind of

aid many wheat farmers would face disaster.

That they should receive

some help in readjusting is not qxiestioned.

What is questionable, how

ever, is whether a program should be used which will forever continue
the disequilibrium.
The situation with respect to rice is somewhat different from that
of wheat.

Rice is produced mainly in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and

California.

Production in Louisiana and Texas is least efficient in

terms of per-acre output, but alternative uses of land in these states
are few (mainly grazing), so that land is cheaper than in Arkansas and
California.^
Louisiana rice producers could show earnings of only 28 cents for
each hour of labor used in the raising of rice in 1945.

The rental

arrangement for land is 20 per cent of the crop, which amounted to
$13.73 per acre in 1945.^

It appears that land use is the productive

■'•-'-Lloyd C. Halverson, A Statement in the hearings before a sub
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM.
House of Representatives, S4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956),
pp. 1562-1563.
12
J. Norman Efferson, The Production and Marketing of Rice (New
Orleans: The Rice Journal, 1952), p. 455.

13Ibid.. p. 469.
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factor which causes rice producers to show less than a fair return on
their operation.

For example, by capitalising the returns for rent at

between 5 per cent and 10 per cent the land would have been valued at
between $137 and $274 an acre in 1945.
alternative.

This land had only grazing as an

The rent pattern, then, has capitalized the land values

so high that even efficient use of capital and labor results in a loss.
The farmers who are sharecropping the land may not be making a fair in
come, but a return of $13.73 an acre on land with few alternative uses
appears to be a windfall for owners.

Any export subsidy program under

an institutional rental program of the sort described by Efferson, where
a large portion of output is by sharecroppers paying 20 per cent of the
crop in the form of rent, will continue to inflate land values.

This

would seem to encourage the perpetuation of the status of sharecroppers
as landless farmers and make absentee landowners more and more vocal
for export subsidies.
Land which sold for $6 an acre in Arkansas before being planted to
rice is now valued at $150 an acre,^

This same land would be valued at

about $9 an acre if it had appreciated at the average rate of change for

15
all agricultural land. '

On the other hand, costs of preparing for rice

culture would never have been undertaken without assurance of an income
which would justify them.

^■"Old-Style Paddy Gone With the Wind,” The New York Times, Tuesday,
July 9, 1957, pp. 39, 44- It should be net ed that such a source as this
may be mere journalistic than factual in as much as costs of preparation
for paddy culture are not considered.
15
Average values of farm land per acre from Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1940, 1955, passim.
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Cotton, like wheat, is a commodity which can be produced by many
operators at costs competitive with world prices.

The support program

helps the inefficient cotton producer very little but .gives windfall
gains to low-cost producers.

The price subsidy adds significant amounts

to the incomes of producers whose costs are substantially below market
prices.

The high cost producer however, is not aided to any great extent.

In fact, farms producing cotton declined by 20 per cent since the advent
of controls.^
A support program not only fails to help the inefficient producer
significantly, but it also subsidizes production in areas abroad that
cannot match the efficiency of many of our efficient producers.

And

once American exports have been lost to foreign producers, a two-price
system may lead to counter subsidies for exports by these foreign pro
ducers.
producer.

Subsidies will not indicate which country is the most efficient
Instead, it will lead to objections by foreign producers who

claim such actions violate the rules of the Food and Agricultural Organ
ization, or the objectives of Gatt.

Moreover, it is very probable that

under a two-price system tax resources vrill need to be depended upon in
order to cover the difference between the two prices:

the support price

and the dumping price.
The cotton revolution which has seen the substitution of machines
for men and a shift from production on small acreages in the South to
large acreages in the West has also witnessed a shift in protectionist
sentiments in cotton-producing states.

With the shift of textile manu-

Murry R. Benedict, and Oscar C, Stine, The American Commodity
Programs (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 195^0, p. 45*
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facturing to the South, the erstwhile free trade arguments of the cottonproducing states changed to exhortations for protection of the textile
industry.

The more the economy of southern states becomes dependent on

textile income and the more ingrained the idea of government support
price purchases of cotton, the stronger will be the feeling for protec
tion.
The cotton support program, in addition to stimulating foreign
cotton production, also acts as a stimulant to the rayon industry which
has been producing fibers cheaper than cotton since 1943.

With greater

foreign competition, with more competition from rayon, and with high
stimulating price supports there has been a growing need to limit cotton
production.

The crop control program, with its aim toward a limiting

of acreage and the rewarding of efficiency, has encouraged a shift to
the cities.

This shift was facilitated in large part by a general im

provement in economic conditions sufficient to permit the absorption of
underemployed farm labor from the cotton areas.

The introduction of

farm machinery specifically tailored to produce and harvest cotton has
resulted in a reduction of costs.

The areas which mechanized most ra

pidly displaced labor and consolidated land ownership.

This, in turn,

widened the differences in farm income and increased the disadvantage of
the smaller farms lacking the necessary funds to expand.^

The slowness

of the south to adjust to mechanical substitutes for labor was partially
due to the abundance of cheap labor and the small-size cotton farms.
Table VII shows the per cent of mechanization in cotton culture in vari
ous areas in 1939 and 1946, with tractor power used in four categories

17
Gilbert G. Fite, "Recent Progress in the Mechanization of Cotton
Production in the United States," Agricultural History. No. 1, XXIV
(January 1950), 26-28.
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of operation serving as a sort of multiple index of the extent of
mechanization,

TABLE VII

USE OF TRACTOR POWER PREPARATORY TO
COTTON HARVEST; PERCENTAGE OF
OPERATION DONE BY TRACTOR
State Group

Land
Breaking
1939 1946

Harrowing

Planting

Cultivating

1939

1946

1939

1946

1939

1946

Southeast

10

33

8

29

2

13

2

11

Midsouth

16

42

13

37

4

16

6

18

Southwest

48

84

40

81

42

78

40

82

Far West

SI

94

67

89

64

81

69

SOURCE:

,

37

Bradell, and Ewing.

The mechanization of cotton production, that is, use of the me
chanical harvester with tractor preparation, also came first in the Far
West.

California in 1949 had 13 per cent of its cotton mechanically-

harvested and 67 per cent in 1955, while the Southeast harvested only
2 per cent in 1955.^
With the substitution of machines for men and mules, man-hours per
bale have been cut from 155 hours to approximately 132 hours per bale
with present equipment.

With increased use of mechanical pickers, and

when an assured weed control is developed, it is expected that labor re-

^United States Agricultural Marketing Service (formerly United States
Production and Marketing Administration), Charges for Ginning Cotton,
Costs of Selected Services Incident to Marketing, and Related Infor
mat ion~TWashington: USDA) Annual Report 1949 and 1955*
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quirements will be reduced to 10 or 12 man-hours per bale

With this de

creasing use of labor as a result of mechanization, there should be a
lowering of relative costs of growing cotton which should lead to a low
ering of supports if a ten-year running average with flexible support
levels is used to determine support prices.

It is argued by some that

such cost reductions will be substantial enough so that cotton produc
tion can again recapture markers taken by foreign producers and sub
stitutes.

This low cost production may be seen at work on many of the

more efficient farmsteads that produce under a cost schedule that would
prove profitable at world prices.
If those advocating adjustment to the forces of a free market are
correct in their thesis that technological advancements will cut costs
to a competitive level, there is still the question of how foreign buy
ers will be able to pay for American cotton.
Oils, fats, and oilseeds have been both imported and exported in
large quantities by the United States.

Our country has steadily in

creased its share in the world export market.

From a 2 per cent share

(1935 to 1939 average) United States exports have increased to 26 per
cent in 1954.

20

A part of this increase is a result of the introduction

of soybean culture in the United States.

Soybeans are easily adapted

to American farming techniques, and their production has increased

19

From information furnished by The United States Department of
Agriculture Neg. 47993-4, Bureau of Agricultural Economics as dupli
cated by Street, ££. cit., p. 170.
^^Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, ojo. cit.,
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rapidly in recent years.

The technique of tractor soil preparation and

the utilization of mechanical planters, rotary hoes, weeders, and a
combine for harvesting have made possible the record development of the
soybean industry in the United States.

21

With the use of modern methods

the United States has been able to enter the world soybean market, and
in a period of about twenty years has become the supplier of around 45
per cent of the world output.

The United States and China together pro

duce about 90 per cent of the world total.
The peanut, another of the oil-producing crops, is also adapted to
mechanical planting and cultivation.

The peanuts are harvested by a

tractor pulling a digging plow, after harvesting, the peanuts are al
lowed to dry for a few hours.

After the vines are dry a tractor with

a windrow shaker shakes the vines and pods free of soil.

In some areas

the peanuts are stacked, while in others they are dried in windrows.
The latter method is much cheaper and requires less hand labor.
nuts are mechanically picked from the hay.

Pea

After harvesting, hogs are

allowed to clean the fields, putting on a pound of pork for each 2 1/2
to 3 pounds of peanuts they pick up.

22

Lard is a by-product of pork production.

With the shift away from

the domesticuse of lard to the use of shortening, lard

must be shipped

abroad to areas where shortening has not yet become competitive with
lard.

Through selective breeding, hog raisers now utilize techniques

KLare S. Markley, Soybeans and Soybean Products (New York:
terscience Publishers, Inc., 1950), I, 28, 34-35, 42, 44*

In

G. Sturkil, and J. T. Williamson, The Peanut,"Cultural Prac
tices," A Symposium, Chapter 5 (Washington, D. C.:
The National
Association, 1951), PP* 196-208.
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which minimize fat production, but much lard is still produced.
The shift in demand from soap to detergents has had some effect
on both imports and exports of fats and oils.

The exports of inedible

fats from the United States are the lowest priced fats of this type
available and undoubtedly will maintain a place in world markets unless
synthetic detergents become more widely used abroad.^
American production of fats and oils varies in degree of mechani
zation.

The estimated returns per hour shown by Kravis place oil bear

ing crops second in productiveness of United States agricultural export
commodities.

However, there is a wide variation in efficiency because

of location and use of capital and labor.

Among ths major oils and

fats are butter, lard, and the oils derived from cottonseed, peanuts,
soybeans, olives, coconuts, palm, tung, whale, and fish.
The Unit ed States was a net importer of fats before World War II.
Since the war, exports have risen above imports.

The value of imports

of vegetable oils, fats, and oilseeds in 1954 was $142,213,000 as compared with exports valued at $301,000,000,

2L.

The increase in exports

was a result of the new production of soybeans together with increases
in the production of peanuts, lard, and cottonseed oil.

Nearly all the

major export oils and fats are suited to a high degree of mechanization.

Comparative Wages in Export Crop Production
In dealing with wage levels, as with all other farm comparisons,

^Paul E. Quintus, Head, Fats and Oils Division, Foreign Agri
cultural Service, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,
United States Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C
(1953"), p. 798.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, op. cit.,
pp. 3, 23.
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the data compiled by the United States Department of Agriculture are in
terms of averages.

Wage rates tend to be higher in the North and West

and lowest in the South,

In 1943 wages for farm labor in California and

the Pacific Coast area were about three and one half tines as high as
in the East South Central area.*^
ported from both areas.

Cotton was one of the major crops ex

In Arizona $2.70 a hundred pounds was paid for

picking while in South Carolina the rate was $1.25.

26

Although Kravis has shown some differences in hourly earnings be
tween import-competing and export commodities, there is a close relation
ship between wages for comparable jobs in an area regardless of which
commodity the workers are producing.

The wage rates may tend to remain

lower in some pursuits, but labor does have some mobility.

If industry

moves into a basically agricultural area with a low wage scale, there
will be demands for wage increases.
paid for picking cotton.

This is well illustrated by wages

During World War II when industries made in

creased use of southern areas for producing industrial products, cotton
pickers in the plantation areas of Arkansas and Mississippi were paid
more than after the war.

Cotton prices were higher following the war

27
but war stimulated industrial production had diminished.’' The com
petition between agriculture and industry for labor has resulted in a
steady migration from some states to others, as well as from farms to
the city.
Although wage rates have increased faster in the South than through-

^Ducoff, ojQ. cit., Table 14, p. 32.
26Ibid., Table 15, p. 34.
2^J. Lewis Henderson, "In the Cotton Delta," Survey Graphic.
XXXVI, No. 1 (January 1947), p. 51.
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out the entire nation, the South still has the lowest wages.

Among

the cotton-producing states, California and Arizona have had the high
est wage scales.

The South in 1943* while using nearly half of the

hired farm labor, paid wages averaging not much over half the rates paid
in the remainder of the country,"^

The nature of the labor force in the

South, largely unskilled, may be one of the reasons that wage scales
have not advanced as rapidly in the South as in other areas.
Cotton, rice, and tobacco are commodities generally produced in
the low-paying area, whereas the small grains are a product, for the
most part, of the Midwest and West where wages are generally higher.
Similarly in the case of fruit, high-wage California alone produces 45
per cent of the nation’s fruit.

The location of the production of com

modities may be a more important factor in determining wage scales than
the fact that the commodity is exported, or is an import-competing one.
Thus if a commodity is produced in an area of greater labor shortage, the
pressure to substitute capital for labor is likely to be greater than
it is in an area where abundant labor at low wages is available.
The rate of pay per hour or per day has less effect on ability of
a product to compete with imports or to obtain export markets than does
the efficient use of manpower and capital in its production.

Wages tend

to vary with location and according to the degree of competition for
workers.

Table VIII shows that the geographic distribution of wage rates

is such that agricultural wages in some areas are more than twice as
much as in others.

Yet the same crop is often produced in both areas.

The relative changes in the indexes of wage rates as between areas have

23
Ducoff, Wages of Agricultural Labor in the United States,
pp. 13, 32-34.

TABLE VIII
INDEX OF WAGE RATES; ANNUAL FARM WAGE RATES; WAGE RATS PER. MONTH WITHOUT
BOARD FOR 1910 AND 1953 (1910-1914 =100)
New
England

Middle
Atlantic

East
North
Central

West
North
Central

South
Atlantic

East
South
Central

West
South
Central

Mountain
States

Pacific
States

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

95
106
224.
200
203
137
152
175
233
282
314
344
367
415
440
496
524
542
543
564

96
104
235
203
195
113
140
173
216
265
302
331
367
422
435
485
513
530
529
538

96
104
225
171
156
92
126
161
196
245
279
30S
340
405
443
501
534
549
544
554

97
105
238
152
145
85
106
143
185
247
290
326
342
400
454
504
536
546
538
541

95
100
243
183
157
101
124
137
171
' 218
259
296
838
381
484
546
572
589
582
592

100
96
230
158
141
91
107
119
158
201
263
265
295
341
399
453
471
470
A56
471

98
101
246
154
139
92
108
126
175
234
285
324
344
395
455
507
538
533
527
542

99
102
214
142
143
95
112
148
I84
245
291
321
336
386
420
464
494
494
484
501

99
102
228
173
174
113
136
167
241
328
372
401
418
447
424
463
488
497
494
504

1910

$ 35.90

$ 31.88

$204.33

$ 36.28
$204.04

$ 19.75
$122.16

$ 20.28
$ 95.28

$ 23.83
$129.57

$ 44.87
$224.89

$ 47.21

1953

$ 32.27
1187.87

1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1941
1942*
1943
1944
1945
1946
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955**

$180.99

$236.95

100

■K'Data for 1910 through 1942 taken from Farm Wage Rates, Farm Employment. and Related Data, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, USDA (Washington, D. C., 1943).
*-*Date for 1943 through 1955 taken from Tables of Farm Wage Rates, Agricultural Statistics, USDA
(Washington, D. C., 1945-1956).
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not been very noticeable.

The areas that were high paying have remained

so, and the areas that were low are still low.

The East South Central

area appears to have lost some ground as have also the Mountain States
and the Pacific States.

The South Atlantic area has advanced relative

to other areas but still remains second lowest in wage rates.
The increasing demand for labor, while not greatly changing the
agricultural wage scale by areas, has, however, narrowed the gap be
tween wages for agricultural and industrial jobs.

The wages of all

private industries increased by 323 per cent between 1939 and 1956.
Manufacturing wages increased by 336 per cent while agricultural wages
2°
increased by 427 per cent. '

In order far farm products to remain at

the same ratio in the demand schedule of foreign buyers as manufactured
items, it would appear that the substitution of capital for labor in the
production of farm crops must be rapid enough to offset the faster in
crease in farm wages than in manufacturing wages.

In other words, the

productivity of farm output should be increasing more rapidly than in
dustry, or else the demand for agricultural exports may be expected to
decrease relative to industrial exports.

The lack of such an increase

in agricultural productivity as would be necessary to make United States
agricultural goods relatively less attractive to foreign buyers than
other industrial goods could be a strong force leading to demands for ex
port subsidies and dumping.
An argument often advanced by agricultural interests in favor of
subsidizing exports is the need for protection against cheap foreign
labor.

Mr. Brinkley, Executive Vice President of the National Council

^ T h e Economic Almanac 195&, p* 291.
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of Farmer Cooperatives, maintains that "we have cost burdens on pro
ducers in this country that producers in other countries do not have,
such as our high wage structure. .

30

This is true, but we also

have the greatest efficiency in production, which tends to offset high
wages.

What should probably be pointed out is that whenever the nature

of a crop's production precludes mechanization we are incapable of sub
stituting capital for labor in order to increase efficiency of output,
and this burdens us with higher relative wage costs than the costs met
by foreign producers of the same crop, if they have a greater relative
supply of labor.

Where this situtaion exists labor should be assisted

in moving to an area where it can be productive, rather than rely upon
an attempt to protect it against imports made with the use of cheap for
eign labor.
Any attempt to protect inefficiently produced domestic crops and
dump them abroad at the discretion of the treasury rather than to let
them depend on their competitive merits is likely to aggravate the malallocation of manpower.

Wages for such wasted effort are more apt to

be determined by the going wage scale of the area than by the produc
tivity of such labor.

In consequence, the ability of the economy to

readjust its productive factors would be hampered, and this is in con
flict with the objectives of increased standards of living and effi
ciency.

Import-Competing Industries
In addition to exports of capital-intensive farm commodities that
are efficient enough that many producers can compete in world trade,

30

Brinkley, ojj. cit.. p. 3&9.
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there are capital-intensive crops produced in the United States only
because they receive protection.

Among such crops are sugar and some

food grains which are imported and which provide competition for do
mestic producers.

Machine-Intensive Crops and Competition
Sugar production can be classed both as capital-intensive (as in
the case of cane sugar) and hand-intensive (as in the case of beet sugar
production). Although a great deal has been accomplished in the elimi
nation of hand labor from beet growing, labor demands are still high.
This labor demand is found in an area where there is a labor shortage.
Since the introduction of mechanical harvesting methods in the beet
fields, the use of 29.5 man-hours per acre has been cut to 5.4-

Never

theless, 28 man-hours per acre are still required for chopping and
thinning.

81

During the period of time when labor needs in beet pro

duction declined from 57.5 to 33.4 man-hours, there has been an increase
in alternative jobs for labor in the beet producing areas, making labor
even harder to obtain.
Sugar from cans is produced in Louisiana and Florida in relatively
small quantities compared, with total demand.

After adding the domestic

supply of beet s u ^ r to domestic cane sugar and imports from United
States territories, there is need for more to satisfy the demand.

The

Sugar Acts of 1937 and 1948 provided import quotas which allocated spe
cific quantities to certain producing nations.

This method was far more

effective than a tariff alone, because domestic quotas plus import quo
tas limit the quantity in such a manner that whatever price is desired

Sugar Beet Mechanization,11 Agricultural Situation. USDA (Wash
ington, D. C., May 1952), pp. 9-10, 16.
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may be obtained, because of the inelastic nature of the demand for
sugar.

Dr. Piquet states that ending the quota on imports would bring

United States sugar prices in line with world prices and increase im
ports substantially, perhaps as much as 100 per cent, Since the quota
mentioned above allows the United States producers about half of the
domestic market, its abandonment would in effect eliminate domestic production.

12

The import-competition of food grains is minor in scope compared
with exports of such grains, and much of this importation is from Canada,
which generally is as efficient in grain production techniques as is the
United States.

In addition, the Canadian economy is more closely tied

to our economy than it is to the British Commonwealth in which Canada
maintains a dominion status.

Imports of wheat from Canada into the

United States meet quota restrictions, but that country exports to us
such other grains as barley, oats, and rye, selling them for less than
the United States support price.

Only the tariff rates on these grains

keep the imports as low as they are,33

The higher price on wheat has

discouraged production of rye in the United States since World War II,
and Canada has increased her sales because of this void.3^

This prompt

gap-filling process is typical of what transpires as the result of close
ly tied economies.

Inefficiency in Capital-Intensive Production
The production of a given commodity on land unsuited for production
of that commodity on a. competitive basis with imports, would appear to

^Howard S. Piquet, Aid, Trade and the Tariff (New York:
Y. Crowell, 1953), pp. 63, 196-198.
33Ibid., pp. 22B, 233-235.
3^Ibid., p. 233.

Thomas
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be an uneconomic use of resources.

Nevertheless, import quotas, tariffs,

and price supports, may permit production at a price above the world price.
The domestic sugar cane industry depends on protection as capital use has
been unable to fully offset climatic disadvantages.
The importation of grain, one of the most efficiently produced of
American agricultural exports, may appear to contradict the law of com
parative advantage. In such an instance one might be inclined to agree
that import restrictions are justifiable.

But does an industry which on

the whole is efficient necessarily have all efficient producers?

Will

export subsidies and import restrictions maximize resource utilization?
If some imports can compete with marginal producers, the law of compara
tive advantage would indicate that these imports should come in and force
domestic producers to be more efficient in the use of resources.

That is,

marginal producers should not be protected.

Exports and Restrictions on Trade
In Chapter III, for introductory purposes, the major legislation on
imports was briefly mentioned.

It seems appropriate at this point to

determine what effect this legislation and other trade regulations have
had on the exportation of agricultural commodities.
of this section.

Such is the task

Following a discussion of the historic pattern of

agricultural exports, the effects of trade restrictions will be differ
entiated according to their application to capital-intensive as opposed
to hand-intensive crops.

The history of American Tariffs is summarized

in Figure I which lists the major acts and shows the levels of tax as a
percentage of dutiable imports.

This figure will also be used as a basis

for comparing quantities of export commodities with tariff rate levels.
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This will be done to show the effects of import restrictions on exports
of various commodities which require differing proportions of the basic
factors of production.

Historic Pattern of Agricultural Exports
The effects of tariff and other trade regulation on the various in
dividual commodities are vrorth examining in order to ascertain which of
the productive factors is most affected by restrictions on trade.

Wheat,

rice, cotton, oils, and tobacco will now be considered for this purpose.
Wheat, the leading export among the food grains, has long been de
pendent upon an export marlset for a very considerable percentage of its
total production.

From the Civil War until World War I, exports of.

wheat were generally between 12 per.cent and 36 per cent of production.
The average percentage of production exported between these wars was
24.9 per cent.

Exports increased to 43 per cent in 1920, then steadily

fell off to less than 1 per cent during the depression.
increased exports to 12 per cent of total output.

World War II

It was not until 1945,

after rehabilitation of the war-torn countires had begun, that exports
again amounted to a large per cent of output.

The percentages ranged

from 34 per cent to 38 per cent from 1945 to 1949* when they fell to 27
per cent.

The Korean conflict again revived exports to 35 per cent in

1950 and 48 per cent in 1951*

Details are shown in Table IX.

Since

1951 exports of wheat have returned to normal, if the average for the
1868-1917 period can be considered normal.

If the period 1922 to 1939

is considered normal, today's exports are about three times as large as
would be expected.

Total production expanded from around 250,000,000

bushels a year in the 1870*s to around 800,000,000 bushels in the years
after World War I,

Since 1944* production has been around a billion

TABLE IX
EXPORTS
Rice,1

Wheat^

1866
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
19541955,
1956^

Exports
1,000
bushels

Exports as
percent of
production

12,647
52,547
188,308
109,01?
220,653
70,119
369,538
111,996
4,415
33,848
390,588
366,145
274,289
260,000
451,000

6.4
20.5
37.5
24.3
36.8
11.4
43.8
12.6
.7
4.2
34.4
35.9
27.8
27.8
45.2

Exports
1,000
bags

487
7,142
4,552
1,369
5,651
11,469
13,167
14,385

Imports
1,000
bags

3,382
1,568
575
947
334
127
787
64

Cotton^Exports as
percent of
production

4
31
23
8
23
37
34
22

Exports
1,000
bales
1,324
2,894
4,409
5,859
6,800
8,027
5,973
7,133
6,267
1,174
3,678
4,280
3,585

Tobacco"*"
Unmanufactured

Exports as
percent of
production

Exports
1,000
pounds

Exports as
percent of
production

51.2
66.4
66.6
67.7
67.1
69.1
44.5
51.2
58.9
9.3
40.8
42.7
26.2

399,030
563,958
633,531
473,187
189,075
595,523
523,605
515,195

34.9
37.4
38.4
36.3
12.9
29.9
25.8
23.0

^Yearbook of Agriculture 1935 and Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Yearbook 1956.
2

Bales 500 pounds each.

3
^The Economic Almanac 1955. P • 45.
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bushels a year.

35

Rice, although historically unimportant in foreign trade in the
western hemisphere, is a small grain that has become increasingly im
portant in the export pattern of the United States since World War II.
Before World War II, North America produced only about 1 per cent of
the rice entering world trade.

After World War II, Asia, a pre-war ex

port area, had become an importer.

The United States, which had become

a net exporter in 1919 in the period after World War I, began to expand
output tremendously after World War II.

By 1948 exports had tripled

those of 1940, and when Korea became dependent on United States imports,
exports were five tine s that of 1940.^^

The stimulation of the rice

exports of the United States, over the years, appears to have occurred
after wars as a result of the United States being committed to aid Allies
rather than from any ability to compete economically in the long run with
other rice-producing areas.

Cuba, a heavy user of rice, depended upon

United States production when World War II cut off her sources of supply.
Korea and Japan both became heavy importers of rice from the United
States when China ceased to supply Japan and the civil war curtailed
Korean production.

In 1954 Korea, discontinued imports of rice and again

became self-sufficient.

Whether or not the high degree of mechanisation

has made American rice production efficient enough to compete in world
markets cannot yet be answered as the bulk of our exports have been under
government programs.

35
^ The percentages of domestic production figures are from the Year
book of Agriculture 1935. Statistics of Grains, USDA (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1935), Table 1, p. 349; Foreign
Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit., Table
and The Economic Almanac 12£8, op. cit.. p. 46.
3^Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, og. cit.,
Table 56, p. 45, and Efferson, The Production and Marks ting of Rice, pp.
39—465 also see Table 4, p. Ill*
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The United States has been a major exporter of cotton ever since
the introduction of the cotton gin permitted the economical separation
of seeds from the fiber.

As soon as the Civil War ended, the South

again depended upon exports for disposal of the largest part of its
cotton crop.

As shown in Table IX, cotton exports increased steadily

from 1866 until 1898. From-1899 until 1911 exports were about the same,
1911' was a banner year with 11 million bales exported.

After 1911 cot

ton exports gradually decreased until 1917, when just over 4 million
bales were exported.

Between World War I and World War II exports gen

erally varied between 3 and 9 million bales a year.

Representative of

the post-war years is the period 1948-1951, during which exports were
less than 4 million bales per year.^^

This post-war period of relative

ly small exports was when most of mechanization of cotton production took
place.

It was also the period of high price support levels.

Vegetable oils also appear to have been a decreasing export commodi
ty from 1910 until 1934.

Lard, on the other hand, had increasing demands

in foreign markets from 1910 until 1923-1924, followed by a steadily de
clining market until after World War I I . Since World War II oils and
fats have occupied an increasingly important place in the export pattern
of American agricultural commodities, as is shown in Table X.

The de

velopment of mechanized soybean culture in the United States and the use
of detergents probably accounted for some of the recent increase in ex
ports .

-^Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, ojc. cit..
Table 231, p. 199, and Yearbook of Agriculture 1935. op. cit., Table
113, pp. 425-426. Table 98, p. 146 shows,cotton exports and exports
as a percentage of production for selected years.
38
Yearbook of Agriculture 1935. op. cit., Table 447, p. 636, and
Table 452, p. &6l.
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TABLE X

FATS, OILSEEDS, AND OILS;
UNITED STATES EXPORTS, 1,000 TONS
Commodity
1935-36
Edible
Vegetable Oils

1945-49

Averages
1950
1951

1952

1953

1954

41

174

352

454

293

287

638

1

15

47

46

28

46

317

Animal Fats

97

312

520

629

709

842

854

Marine Oils

1

a

36

25

23

54

71

140

509

957

1,154 1,053

1,229

1,880

2

13

15

19

26

Industrial Oils

Total
United States
Per Cent of
World Total
SOURCE:

IS

IS

Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA (Wash
ington, D . C ., 1956), Table 219, p. 179.

Exports of tobacco, the major export crop still lacking a high de
gree of mechanization, have consistently been smaller percentagewise
since the depression of the 1930’s than before; but since 1945 those ex
ports have been of about the same absolute size as before the depression*
Domestic use, however, has nearly doubled since the depression, notvdthstanding the recent cancer scare.

Correlation of Exports with Restrictions on Imports
Perry has demonstrated in his work the effects of tariffs on exports
of agricultural products.

The volume of exports grew at a lesser rate

or actually declined every time protective tariffs were in force.
Perry shows clearly the detrimental effects of import tariffs on
agricultural exports, and traces this relationship from the beginning
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on
of the nation until 1908, 7 Since the publication of his book other,
even more effective measures have been devised for limiting imports.
These were mentioned in Chapter III,

Mainly, they include import quotas,

import licensing, exchange controls, and price controls.
According to Johnson much of the recent restrictive legislation may
be attributed to attempts to protect agriculture,
"Over the last fifteen years various sections of and
amendments to agricultural legislation have contained
provisions for the control of and use of export sub
sidies or dumping, import quotas and import fees, and
and compensating import and processing taxes have been
added as a part of the Internal Revenue Code to provide
additional protection for certain agricultural products,
principally fats and oils. , . .Import quotas have been
applied in the case of cotton, wheat, and sugar. "40
Using the level of tariffs and plotting the percentage level of tar
iffs to value of exports as a base, it is interesting to note the con
trast in these fluctuations when compared with fluctuations of exports
of various commodities.
ports.

Figure H shows the fluctuations in wheat ex

During the period when the West was growing rapidly, exports did

not increase as rapidly as output, and the tariff rate was high and of
a protective nature until the time of Wilson’s administration.

With

the lowering of the tariff under that administration, exports of wheat
tripled.

Then after the Republican high tariff and other restrictive

measures were instituted to protect American industry and agriculture,
exports fell to only a small fraction of their former levels.

By World

War II the United States had practically withdrawn from the world mar
ket although tariffs had been lowered.

Since World War II most exports

^Perry, 0£. cit., pp. 9-48.
40D. Gale Johnson, "Reconciling Agricultural and Foreign Trade Poli
cies," The Journal of Political Economy. LV (December 1947)> PP» 567-568.

FIGURE II
WHEAT EXPORTS
TARIFF RATES AS PER CENT VALUE OF DUTIABLE GOODS
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Sources; Wheat exports, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE. Statistical Handbook, USDA, Table ^8 , p. 35.
Tariff Rates, FIGURE I. p. 106.
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have been subsidized and large quantities sent to the Allies and oc
cupied territories that were attempting to rehabilitate.

So the rapid

increase is therefore not to be attributed entirely to the lowering of
tariff rates.

This is evident in an examination of the fluctuations

affecting several individual commodities.
Figure III compares the fluctuations of cotton export quantities
with the tariff rates.
War until after 1900.

There was a steady rate of growth from the Civil
Cotton exports fell off rapidly when war started

in Europe in 1914, but had almost regained pre-war levels when the de
pression occurred and the high tariff levels of 1930 were instituted.
The depression probably was the major factor in the subsequent decline,
but the high tariff of 1930 was enacted at the same time cotton exports
were declining rapidly.

Since World War II cotton exports, although

subsidized by the government, have never been as important as during any
other period since the turn of the century.
Figure IV shows the fluctuations in tobacco exports.

Since 1890,

decreasing tariffs appear to correlate with increases in tobacco ex
ports and vice versa.

This commodity, as noted earlier, has an in

elastic demand and the fluctuations are not as violent as in the case of
wheat or cotton.
Relying on the findings of Mr. Perry and the three commodity com
parisons shown here, it seems safe to conclude that import restrictions
generally mean fewer exports of domestic farm commodities.

Conversely,

lower rates seem to stimulate exports of these commodities.

Shifts from Production of Efficiently-Produced Export Crops to Other
Commodities.
When an export crop that is well suited to the combination of pro
ductive factors in a given locale loses much of its foreign market,

FIGURE III
COTTON EXPORTS
TARIFF RATES AS PER CENT VALUE OF DUTIABLE GOODS
COTTON EXPORTS
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Source: Cotton Exports, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE. Statistical Handbook, USDA, Table 231
Tariff Rates, FIGURE I, p. 106,
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FIGURE IV
TOBACCO EXPORTS
TARIFF RATES AS PER CENT VALUE OF DUTIABLE GOODS
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Source: Tobacco Exports, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE. Statistical Handbook, USDA, Table 220, p. 180.
Tariff Rates, FIGURE I, p. 106.
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alternative crops must be produced and domestic consumption stimulated,
or land must be retired from cultivation.

The commodity that normally

goes into the export market under competitive conditions is usually the
one that makes the best use of productive factors.

And in some instances

small farms specializing in an export commodity and having little or no
flexibility are apt to be hurt much more than larger concerns with a
greater degree of flexibility.
If we must use mechanized production methods in agriculture to re
main efficient, and the trend from mule to tractor would indicate that
this is so in the following must accompany increasing mechanization:
(l)

enlargement of the acreage base of the farm operation; (2)

an in

crease in the technology of production methods on existing acreages; or
(3)

a decrease in the amount of labor used in similar farming processes.^

The loss of exports would have the effect of cutting total acreage and
increasing the amount of labor on the same acreage on those farms which
are too small to produce alternative commodities.

Farms large enough to

shift production would, of course, still be less efficient when the new
commodity is not as well adapted to the productive factors as the lost
export crop.

In addition, the producers for domestic markets would face

increased competition and depressed prices when the export producer shifts
to domestic commodities.
Except for the present, with policy now aimed at liquidating sur
pluses, agricultural exports have been declining for a number of years

^ •Family Farms in a Changing Economy. (Washington, Agricultural
Research Service, March 1957)/ p . 57.
^Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit.,
Table 1, p. 1. And The Economic Almanac 1958. p. 48. The use of current
dollars fail3 to show a decline. It is only when constant dollars are
used that a value decrease is evident.
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that agriculture, generally, may not remain a
labor-intensive occupation."^3
The advantages which American exports enjoy are, in Humphrey's
opinion, generally due to a high degree of capital utilization.

Thus,

the expectations for future trade are for a decrease in agricultural
exports or an increase in imports which are not adaptable to machine
cultivation.

Conversely, if the United States is to remain a major

exporter of agricultural commodities, the crops most likely to make
up these exports, in the long run, would be those capable of using
capital with a great deal of efficiency.

The short-run pattern may

be different as long as there remains a great deal of under-employ
ment in cotton, tobacco, and other export crops.

It is possible, of

course, that price supports will not remain an unalterable bar to even
tual use of equilibrium forces to allocate resources and increase
efficiency.

Capital-Intensive Crops and Exports
Wheat production, as has already been noted, has been particular
ly adpated to conditions found in America and historically has been a
major item of export.

Because America has had relatively high cost la

bor, capital has been substituted whenever possible.

England, unable

to use extensive farming methods was unable to compete and repealed the
Corn Laws in 1846 in order to import from America, and other areas that
produced wheat cheaper,

'
‘/heat production continues to adopt capital

using production methods and wheat is a major export item.

JO
Don D. Humphrey, "Forces of Disequilibrium and World Disorder,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (Washington, D. C.,
December 1953)* pp. 553-554*
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Another significant shift in the pattern of our trade was mani
fested by the beef export industry* which flourished in the United
States as long as the frontiers were open to extensive use of range
lands.

The United States had a comparative advantage over all other

producers until the advent of refrigeration.

The reason for this ad

vantage was that the major importing nation, England, was too far from
any other basic producing area.

As the population of the United States

grew, as homesteaders blocked the open i,western rangeland, and with the
advent of refrigerated shipments of meat, the United States lost its
advantage.

By 1908' Argentina was supplying 64 per cent of England’s

beef imports.^

By 1913 the United States became a net importer of

beef products and has remained so except during periods when war stimu45
lation temporarily increased exports. ^

In the case of beef exports,

the use of capital (refrigeration) by competitors forced a reduction in
the amount of American exports.
Cotton exports had grown steadily until just prior to World liar I.
Then world conditions and possibly foreign resistance to the high tariff
levels of the United States caused exports to be reduced.

After the war,

jt

cotton exports almost reached their former level before increasing tariffs
and price support programs plus general world disequilibrium again caused
a reduction of exports.

During this unstable period between wars mechan

ical advancements began to affect cotton culture.

^International Institute of Agriculture, International Trade in
Meat (Rome, Italy: Villa Umberto I, 1936), pp. 21-22.
^Lynn Ramsey Edminster, The Cattle Industry and the Tariff (New
York: J. J. Little and Ives Company, 1926), p. 48. During World War
II the United States was temporarily a net exporter of beef products.
Today certain of the beef products are exported while others are im
ported.

120
An absolute decline in exports of agricultural products is to be expect
ed when the stimulus of war and rehabilitation ceases*

This, of course,

will inevitably increase the competitive pressure on the commodities not
dependent upon exports for a market or call for a program of dumping.
It would seem that as much as possible of the war-stimulated export mar
ket should be maintained, if possible, by reducing barriers against im
ports rather than by the use of dumping.
The domestic agricultural support programs, by their continuation
of. "floors”, are a major factor in the decline of exports.

These

government "floor" prices, which have been shown to be above the cost
of production of many producers, exclude exports on a competitive basis
and lead to dumping when an attempt is belatedly made to recapture a
lost export market.

The Shifting Pattern of
United States Agricultural Exports
Humphrey points out some major influences on the general pattern
of our agricultural exports as follows:
"As a general rule, America's comparative advan
tage lies increasingly in capital-intensive
industries which are, also, the growth indus
tries, ... To the extent that imports create
additional agricultural exports, these can gen
erally be provided by existing underemployed
resources in tobacco, cotton and certain other
export crops. Moreover, agricultural exports are
already distended by foreign aid and American con
sumers will not buy much more food and fiber simply
because aid is reduced. The long term trend, as
indicated by the decline of agricultural exports
relative to total exports, seems to be in the
direction of reducing our comparative advantage in
agriculture, generally. It is possible that this
trend has been interrupted by mechanization and
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The mechanization of cotton production has developed since support
programs have become a factor in the pricing of cotton.

As long as the

administered price level channels cotton into government warehouses rath
er than into foreign trade at world prices, there will be little oppor
tunity to determine whether efficient production, of itself, will be able
to recapture lost export markets.

As it is, exports of cotton are just

as likely to be from a high-cost operation as from a low-cost one.

As

long as supports and quotas determine price and acreage in cultivation,
there will be little chance for efficiency in cotton production to de
termine the export pattern.

The factor that is more likely to determine

export levels is the output of competing nations at prices below United
States support levels or the dumping policy that is used in order to re
duce the "surplus" of American cotton.

In addition to foreign cotton

competition, the competition of synthetic fibers and paper must be con
sidered in predicting future export patterns.^

The ability of poten

tial import nations to obtain necessary foreign exchange to pay for
American cotton may also be a major factor affecting the quantity of
cotton exports.

Hand-Intensive Crops and Exports
As was shown above, the production of cotton is both hand- and
capital-intensive.

That is, some farms make maximum use of mechanical

implements to reduce hand labor, while others still follow age-old
production methods of man and mule.

In any event, different factor

combinations are used to produce a homogenous product.

The lesser ef

ficiency of hand-intensive culture might be said to be indicated alone

^Benedict, op. cit., pp. 33y 43-45
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by the rapid change from men to capital in the past few years.

The

picking of cotton was entirely by hand until 1926, when the cotton
stripper began to take the place of human pickers.

It was not until

1948 that successful use was made of cotton picking machines.

Never

theless, cotton was successfully holding its share of the export market
before mechanization started.
Since the advent of mechanical harvesting and cultivation, cotton
has been losing its place in world markets.

As mentioned above, sup

port programs have not helped American cotton hold its place In the
world market.

Synthetic fibers have begun to compete for its customers.

Industry moved to the South in ever increasing magnitude during and after
World War II and this increased mobility affected the demand for harvest
hands in such a way as to force labor costs up in the areas that have
long been dependent on cheap hand labor in the production of cotton.
Tobacco farming, as contrasted to cotton production, is one field
of agricultural endeavor which has not yet been able to make use of any
appreciable substitution of capital for labor.

In fact, most tobacco

farms are so small that it would be uneconomic to attempt mechanization.
The average size of tobacco plots is about 2 acres for each farm unit.^,':
,
On such small plots the necessary capital investment far a tractor
would not pay for its saving in labor.

The farms producing tobacco

usually are small, 15 to 30 acres, and they depend on general farming
as well as on the small tobacco plot which is the chief source of cash.

^ J . E. Thigpen, Director, Tobacco Branch, Production and Marketing
Administration, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee
on Forestry and Agriculture, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,
United States Senate, £3rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953)> p. 81S.

f
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Larger farm units would be more suitable for mechanization* but the
large amount of hand labor required to produce a crop of tobacco limits
the size of tobacco plots and limits the time that can be spared to till
the other crops.

Largely by reason of the nature of the work of tending

and harvesting tobacco* the tractor could not be utilized at the peak
season of labor use.

Tractor use would there foie not materially reduce

labor costs* but it would certainly increase capital investment, an
investment which would not pay for itself by means of a reduction of
other eosts.^
American production of tobacco is making no appreciable headway
toward mechanization as contrasted with production changes in most ex
port industries.

But the major reason for the limitation on our for

eign sales of tobacco is the lack of dollars on the part of foreign
buyers rather than a decline in our comparative advantage with respect
to that crop.

Comparisons with foreign produced tobaccos are difficult

because of differences in the types of tobacco raised.

Experience has

established the fact that* where, there is available foreign exchange*
American tobacco will very frequently be purchased in preference to

49

other tobacco. 7 The pattern for exports would thus seem to depend on
the purchasing ability of consuming countries.

American tobacco pro

ducers are heavy users of hand labor* yet the efficiency with which
that labor is used appears to be enhanced by reason of the comparative
ly high quality of the tobacco produced.

Tobacco, in fact seems to be

^Street* 0£. cit.. pp. 230-231.
49

J. C. Lanier, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
United States Senate* Washington* D. C., 83rd Congress* (1953)j
pp. 824-827.
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the major exception to the generalization that American agricultural
exports will need to substitute capital for labor in order to remain
competitive in world markets.

Summary
By way of a recapitulation of the major generalizations to be de
rived from this chapter are four statements which might be made to serve
as guides to policy affecting foreign trade in agricultural products.
(1)

Leading export crops tend to be more efficiently produced than

most crops, if agricultural efficiency, like industrial efficiency, can
be measured in terms of man-hour returns.^

Since costs are determined

to such a large extent by the relative scarceness of the factors of
production, efficiency in American agriculture is generally higher in
the production of those commodities which are adaptable to the condi
tions of the land on which they are grown, and which are readily pro
duced with a high degree of mechanization.

Tobacco production affords

one of the most notable exceptions to this general rule.
(2)

Internal price support programs act as a deterrent to exports

when the price floor is above world price levels.

Once established, a

price support program through which the government takes ownership and
has its sales abroad limited to these which can be made at higher than
world prices eliminates even the most efficient producers from the ex
port market.

When the government is burdened with unsold quantities

-^Professor Kravis in his article "Wages and Foreign Trade," pre
viously cited, shows the correlation between industrial export items and
their relatively high man-hour returns based on Bureau of Labor Statis
tics input-output studies of 1947 and 1952. However, the findings of
hourly earnings in agricultural commodity production in this same arti
cle are based upon prices relative to input costs, which would tend to
show the crops with the highest support price, and which make the great
est relative use of productive land, due to acreage limitations, as the
most efficiently produced.
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of commodities, pressure to dump surpluses on foreign markets is ap
plied.

The alternative actions involve the use of marketing quotas or

acreage restrictions.
(3)

Wages paid for any one crop’s production are determined more

by the worker's alternatives than by any margin of production that could
be attributed to him.

Where wage rates are high relative to output, the

tendency for the substitution of capital or to shift production to other
crops is strengthened.

Attempts to subsidize hand-intensive export pro

ducers often leads to dumping.

The need of protection for the purpose

of subsidizing capital-intensive crops is also a burden on the economy.
(4 )

Historically, the exporting of agricultural goods has shown

an inverse relationship between quantity exported and degree of protec
tion from imports.

The exports lost because of protectionist actions

are generally the commodities most efficiently produced, or those most
highly capital-intensive.

The loss of exports means increased com

petition for domestic markets and thus has a depressing effect on do
mestic price levels.

Such a loss also means a loss of production

efficiency by reason of a shifting to crops less adaptable to the re
sources which are available.
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CHAPTER V

HAND-INTENSIVE CROPS AND RESTRICTIONS

Some of the hand-intensive crops that will be dealt with in this
chapter were included among the capital-intensive commodities of the
preceding chapter.

The reason for inclusion of these crops in both

chapters is that, for one and the same crop, widely different pro
duction methods are used.

Variation in methods is frequently dictat

ed by differences in sets of circumstances under which production takes
place.

Domestic Output of Chief Import-Competing Crops
In this chapter, as in Chapter IV, Table 8 in the article "Wages
and Foreign Trade" by Professor Kravis will be used as the basis for
determining major import-competing and major export commodities.^

Man-Hour Returns of Leading Import-Competing Crops
There is very little contrast between the man-hour returns of importcompeting and export commodities, for practically all the major export
commodities are also import-competing.

When weighted by their importance

in the trade pattern, however, it can be seen that the leading importcompeting industries do not return as high hourly earnings as do the export crops.

2

Again, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, the

-*-5upra, TableIV, p. 106.
^Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Table 9, p. 30. The work by
Kravis, as noted on page 124, was based .on Bureau of Labor Statistics,
input-output studies of 1947 and 1952, as far as industrial efficiency
was concerned. The efficiency findings, as far as agricultural commod
ities are concerned, were originated by Kravis who used raw data fur
nished by the U.S.D.A. This, of course, would tend to show a high degree
of correlation between crops with a high support price and efficiency.

12?
inability of freedom of market price to operate as a determinant of
production may be as much a causal factor in determining hourly earn
ings as is efficient use of resources.
Inefficient producers are those -who are unable to make use of the
given factors in a combination which would allow them to enjoy a compara
tive advantage in competition with other producers.

Comparative advan

tage, according to Humphrey, lies increasingly in capital-intensive
industries, which are also the growth industries.

Our comparative

disadvantage, on the other hand, is increasingly concentrated in the
labor-intensive branches of agriculture which suffer from relatively
stagnant markets.
lem

The same writer insists that America's import prob

may be attributed to under-employment, especially in southern

agriculture.

In spite of some alleviation of under-employment in that

area, agriculture is not yet able to absorb the workers who would be
•3

displaced by increased imports.^
As for the effects that foreign trade would have on the effective
use of manpower if restrictions are eased, Johnson points out the
following.

Freeing trade would have little or no direct effect on the

number of job opportunities in agriculture.

However, shifts would

occur within agriculture Twith losses in some import-competing crop pro
duction and some gains in the export commodities.

Estimates show that

protected products account for about 15 per cent of labor requirements
in farming while export branches account for 30 per c e n t A s the ex
port commodities have been shown to have a higher per man-hour return

•^Humphrey, "Forces of Disequilibrium and World Disorder", pp. 553554.
^D. Gale Johnson, Trade and Agriculture (New York:
sons, 1950), pp. 52-53.

John Wiley and
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than those receiving protection, agriculture, as a whole, would be
better off even if jobs did not increase in numbers in response to the
easing of trade restrictions.
Any shift due to easing of trade restrictions, however, could be
toward increased sales of industrial prodiicts to foreign countries in
order to balance increased imports, and not toward an increase in sales
of agricultural exports. If such were to happen, agricultural unemploy
ment would increase and thus make farming an even less favorable compet
itor of industry for capital and labor utilization.

Because the labor

used in rural areas seems, to be slow in moving to industrial employment,
the areas most affected by increasing imports of competitive, hand
intensive commodities would suffer increasing unemployment, and indus
tries producing for the enlarged export market would make greater
demands on a limited supply of industrial employees.
If it were possible to shift workers off the farm as fast as their
crop could be displaced by cheaper imports of competing commodities, it
would make possible an increase in non-farm employment and general liv
ing standards.^

With less labor called for, increased adjustments in

capital use, larger farm units, and. less pressure on land prices, farms
would strongly tend to become efficient in resource utilization at a
much accelerated rate, or cease to exist as farms.

Table XI shows the

shift away from Glass IV, V, and VI farms and the increase in Class I,
II, and III farms.

^Don D. Humphrey, American Imports (New York:
tury Fund, 1955), p. 254o

The Twentieth Cen
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TABLE XI

NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL FARMS BY ECONOMIC CLASS,
UNITED STATES, SPECIFIED YEARS 1929-1954
Economic Class
of Farm-*Class I

Number of Farms in Thousands
1930
1940
1945

1950

1954

47

60

91

103

134

Class II

205

252

347

381

449

Class III

560

535

723

721

707

Class IV

1,073

1,015

976

882

811

Class V2

1,274

1,070

367

661

536

Class VI2

1,559

1,233

937

717

463

All Commercial
Farms

4,723

4,265

3,941

3,465

3,100

Classification of farms by value of sale based on 1954 prices.
o
""Excludes farms whose operators worked off the farm as much as 100 days
or those with other income (of operators and family members) greater
than sales from farm commodities.
SOURCE:

Family Farms in a Changing Economy. Agricultural Research Ser
vice, USDA (Washington, D. C., March 1957), p. 48.

The operators of the larger farms have generally adopted new tech
niques before the average farm operator.

The time lag between invention

and utilization tends to be fairly short on larger farms which show more
adaptability to production conditions,^
Assuming that the trend to larger farms is caused by increased pro
ductivity, and that most of the import-competing commodities have
producers in all six commercial farm categories, the effect of any in
crease in imports will be felt most by the Class IF, V, and VI commercial

^Family Farms in a Changing Economy, Agricultural Research Service,
USDA, op. cit.. p. 48.
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farms.

The gains from protection that accrue to the larger, more

efficient producers will be capitalized into land values.

That is

to say, land will be valued in accordance with artificially maintain
ed domestic prices and not according to world prices.
the result of price-cost relationships.

Land value is

The costs of labor-capital

inputs relative to price of commodities determine rent and estimations
of future rents.

The expectations of rent, when capitalized, determine

the value of the land.?
Land use in commercial agriculture where landlord-tenant relation
ships exist will produce a contract rent whether paid in cash or on
shares.

This rent is a direct payment for the use of land and is often

determined by the bargaining power of landlords and tenants.

Where in

tense competition arises for tte privilege of using the land, rents will
be so high that the renter must take reduced wages.

This gives the rent

er a lower standard of living, and the "windfall" rents of landowners
become converted into land value,0
The statement on land value, as given above, is not amplified to the
point of taking into account what would arise if the element of absentee
ownership were not present and an arbitrary division were necessary to
determine rent and wage returns.

Over a period of time this problem

would be ironed out of itself, as new farmers would buy farms from
estates and from retiring farmers.

Experiences connected both with

World War I and World War II tended to show that the time period for
land values to appreciate was relatively short.

7
'Ely and Wehrwein, oj). cit., p. 121.

®Ibid., pp. 132-133*

Table X U shows the lag

of land value changes behind the change in commodity prices between 1940
and 1956.

From 1940 to March 1943, for example, the index of land values

rose from 82 to 167.

During the same interval, the commodity price index

rose from 101 to 296.
In Table XL1 the land value index shows very little change from 1952
to 1955 during the period that the commodity price index shows a decline
of 50 points from 300 to less than 250.

With a poorer relationship be

tween rentals, or returns on land, and commodity ;rices, farmers were
faced with the problem of increasing output or facing a lower level of
living.

This was especially so fortenants who were farming in an area

of underemployment of agricultural production factors.

With increasing

disparity between land value and commodity prices, the competition of
share croppers or renters for land to work would force the major share
of the loss onto the shoulders of the renter.

Under such conditions;

and with a very high level of industrial employment, the normal reaction
to expect would be an increase in the movement from farms to industry.
Table XL1 shows that this movement was under way when the last census of
agriculture was taken.

The less efficient farms were being consolidated,

and capital was supplanting labor which was shifting into industry.
Protection from foreign production, along with support prices at
admittedly stimulatory levels since World War II, have tended to retard
the shifting of resources to more effective utilization.' Economically,
this action seems as ill-conceived as an attempt to support industry by

9
Present price support levels are
if the AAA levels of 52 to 75 per cent
store farm incomes to the proper ratio
was deemed to be by the administration

considered as being stimulating
of parity were adequate to re
with other income groups as it
and Congress in 1933 •
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TABLE XII
INDEX NUMBERS OF LAND VALUES AND COMMODITY PRICES

Year
and
Month
1940
1941
1942
March
July
Nov.
1943
March
July
Nov.
1944
March
July
Nov.
1945
March
July
Nov,
1946
March
July
Nov.
1947
March
July
Nov.
1948
March
July
Nov.

Commodity
Prices-1-

Land
Values2

101
105

82
33

144
153
162

90
89
91

179
194
194

98
100
103

198
19 8“
194

112
115
117

202
207
206

124
128
130

212.
218
252

140
144
148

260
271
280

155
158
160

296
290
288

167
171
174

Year
and
Month
1949
March
July
Nov.
1950
March
July
Nov.
1951
March
July
Nov.
1952
March
July
Nov.
1953
March
July
Nov.
1954
March
July
Nov.
1955
March
July

Commodity
Prices

Land
Values

265
256
244

172
170
167

237
246
268

168
171
179

295
307
294

193
201
205

300
291
289

211
213
212

270
261
255

209
207
201

255
255
246

201
202
204

243
244

206
213

Index of prices received by United States farmers, (1910-1914 - 100).
Indexes shown are an average of the four previous monthly indexes. Cur
rent data published in monthly price report, agricultural prices (AMS).
21912-1914 - 100, Indexes for 1940 and 1941 are as of March 1. Indexes
for 1942 and later years are as of March 1, July 1, and November 1.
Data published three times a year in Current Developments in The Farm
Real Estate Market (ARS).
SOURCE:

Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit.. Table 17, p. 64.
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continuing to purchase tanks, guns, shells, battleships, and uniforms at
the same rate now as during the height of World War II but at prices that
would give satisfactory incomes to the inefficient manufacturer. This
protection could have been provided, but what would have happened to
the shift of resources into production of goods and services that con
sumers desired?

Such a shift would probably never have been made be

cause the government was in a position to bid up prices for guns and
tanks.

The same is true as far as agricultural production is concern

ed.

Comparative Wages Paid by Import-Competing Producers
It must be pointed out here, as it was in Chapter IV, that wages
are not necessarily determined by the effectiveness of the use of labor.
The scarcity of or abundance of manpower in an area is apt to be more of
a wage determinant than the relative efficiency of the use of the labor.
A farm that produces 10,000 bushels of wheat and is ranked highest in
efficiency of resource use would have to pay the same wage to hired help
who produce hay on the area not allocated to wheat production; yet hay
is the least productive of the users of productive factors among the
major import-export agricultural commodities,^

Total wages, because

of any lessening of domestic production of import-competing crops and
any increasing of export commodity production, may be less than it was
before the change was made.

This is true because, with mere efficient

use of factors, less labor and more capital will be used.

When less

labor is used and wages tend to be affected by alternative uses, the
distribution will give more to capital and less to labor, although
possibly wage rates will rise a little.

1QSupra. Table IV, p. 51.

The landowners and capital

13^
holders will be better off but labor may be hurt.

If, however, there is

full employment, labor would have nothing to fear from imports produced
in low-wage countries.
Trouble may arise, however, from the fact that much of our agricul
tural help in rural areas is under-employed and incapable of shifting
into industrial areas of the economy where we often have "over-full
employment."

Over-full employment exists whenever there is a much

greater number of vacancies than of people looking- for jobs.^

The

over-full employment status often occurring in some industries and in
some areas tends to increase the rate of supplementing capital for la
bor, and by so doing, the increased technological advancement gives a
competitive advantage to other countries in those industries which are
not susceptible to mechanization.

This pressure from imports of labor-

intensive commodities causes import-competing blocs to lobby for greater
protection.

Wage level increases, which are dictated by rapidly advanc

ing productivity in dynamic industries, leave the relatively stagnant
home industries less able to compete against imports.
The special interest groups do not emphasize the comparative wage
rates within the United States.

These groups with vested interests com

pare American farm wage rates against foreign wage rates which are lower.
Import restrictions and export subsidies are asked on the basis of low
foreign wages and living standards in import-competing and export indus
tries .
An example of the arguments given for continued aid for an industry
that is unable to compete in world trade and is accordingly fearful of
imports is that given before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1956

11
Ohlin, The Problem of Employment Stabilization, p. 6,
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by the Assistant Secretary of the National Milk Producers Association.
"Agriculture is the largest segment of the Ameri
can economy, and dairying is the largest segment
of American agriculture. The economy of the
whole country would be impaired by foreign-trade
policies which resulted in serious dislocation
for the American dairy industry.
"During the past 20 years, there has been built
up in this country an economy which in many re
spects is above the world level, This is partic
ularly true with respect to wages, living standards,
and costs of production. In order to keep the
prices which farmers receive reasonably related
to the cost of the things that farmers buy, and
thus maintain the purchasing power of this impor
tant segment of the economy, the prices of many
agriculture commodities must be maintained at
levels substantially above world price levels.
"As long as this condition exists, effective
import controls will be necessary to prevent the
dumping of world surpluses on our shores, and
some form of export price adjustment ’will be need
ed to permit American agricultural products to
move in world trade at competitive prices in suf
ficient volume to retain a fair share of the world
markets.
This is the type of argument given by most vested interest groups
that wish to continue using too many resources to produce too few con
sumer goods relative to alternative uses for capital and labor.

The

figures which are used in such arguments to prove the plight of the
producer to be so much below other segments are averages which relate
to Class IV, V, VI commercial farms, and non-commercial farms.

No

mention is made of the adequate incomes of Class I, II, and III farmers;
or the under-employment of resources in Class IV, V, and VI; or the living-in-the-country aspect of the million and a half non-commercial rural
homes listed as "other farms."

12

Patrick B. Healy, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, House of Repre
sentatives, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C., {l95^)i P* 508.
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First, it should be noted that purchasing power would be higher,
not lower, for the nation if resources were not under-employed in agri
cultural pursuits.

At the same time that resources have been under

employed in much agricultural production, there has been over-full
employment in certain industrial areas.
Secondly, if agricultural prices are above world prices with too
much of the nation’s resources allotted to agriculture, American con
sumers must pay higher prices than would otherwise be necessary to buy
the unwanted quantities which high prices beget.

Instead of being

solved, the problem of uneconomic production will be perpetuated, in
part, because of a continued plea to stop foreign nations dumping in our
market and because of a sustained pressure in favor of our dumping in
their markets.

The misdirected use of resources, if continually and

adequately subsidised, will forever preclude their shift to an economic
use where productivity would allow high returns to the factors.

The

income problem will not be solved for the marginal producers, yet wind
fall gains will be had by many.

Historic Pattern of Import-Competing Commodities
Wool was the oldest of the hand-intensive commodities, although
additionally a land-intensive commodity, to seek and receive import
restrictions.

Sugar producers also were early in their demands for

protection, and when protection was first sought, cane production m s
hand-intensive.

Now, however, domestic cane sugar producers have shift

ed to machines to replace labor which has become relatively more
expensive.
Imports of wool made up about one-third of the amount used by
domestic processors in 1910.

This share increased to about three-

13?
fifths in 191S but dropped to about one-eighth in 1932.

After 1939 im

ports increased to about three-fourths of that used during the last
years of World War II*

13

Since the end of the war, quotas and tariff

restrictions have not been able to materially stimulate sheep growing
and wool production.

Western grazing lands have been too profitably

engaged in cattle production to return to sheep grazing, although
imports of wool carry a tariff rate of 25 l/2 cents per clean pound,
"More than half of domestic wool production has been displaced by im
ports without injury because cattle raising, dairying, and other types
of farming offered profitable alternatives."^
lationship between wool imports and wool prices.

Figure V shows the re
When wool prices went

down, imports declined, and when prices went up, imports were generally
increased.

From this information it may be deduced that price declines

were not caused by imports.
Tobacco cannot properly be included in this section on importcompeting commodities, because tobacco which enters United States
markets from foreign sources is not import-competing but is made up of
specialty types that the United States does not produce.
Palm oil and coconut oil compete with domestically produced oils.
Although the palm and coconut oil imports are hand-intensive, they are
for the most part competing with capital-intensive domestic oils from
sources other than palm and coconut trees.

Coupled with increasing

productivity in soybean, peanut, and cottonseed oil production, there
has been a change in demand from soap to detergents within the United

^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit.,
Table 2<5o~ p. 229.
"^Humphrey, American Imports. p. 47S.

FIGURE V
WOOL IMPORTS, PRICE OF WOOL IN CENTS
IMPORTS MIL. POUNDS

PRICE PER POUND

T

1000

i

/ _j
t
y
/
/ i/

50*

750

40*

500

30*

Imports
\
s

250

1925

/

\

1930

20*

1935

1940

19^5

1950

1955

10*

Sources; Wool prices furnished by the United States Department of Agriculture as presented in the 1953
Senate Hearings FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.p. 513- The price went to $3.86 a pound
for cleaned wool in March 1951.
Wool imports were obtained from FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRAuE, Statistical Handbook, USDA, table
260, p. 229.
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States, and this has lessened the demand for tallow and grease.

While

the United States yearly exports in fats, oils, and oilseeds have in
creased from 41*000 tons in 1935-1939 to 638,000 tons in 1954* the total
world trade excepting that of the United States decreased by 540,000 tons.
The United States percentage of total world exports increased from 2 per
cent to 26 per cent in a period of just under twenty years.

Imports of

copra were about one-third higher in 1955 than in 1925-1939; coconut oil
and palm oil imports declined about 50 per cent and 80 per cent respectively in the same period.

15

Table XIHshows how the United States has

increased Its exports of oils, fats, and oilseeds as compared with the
total world exports.
In spite of the optimistic outlook for oils and fats in general,
tung oil producers asked for protection in 1953 and received it in 1954. ^

Imports and Restrictions Placed Thereon
Special restrictions on imports of agricultural commodities have
proved embarrassing in many instances where America has attempted to
assert leadership in international affairs.

Quotas and embargoes that

have provided minimal benefits to farmers have handicapped American lead
ership.

On the other hand, import quotas on commodities that normally

are leading export crops, such as wheat, make little distortion in nor
mal trade channels.

^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o j d . cit.,
Table 219, p. 179- The exports of fats and oils increased markedly in
1955 and again in 1956. See The Economic Almanac 1958, p. 45.

16

Th~irty-Ninth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission
1955 (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 19."
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TABLE XIII

UNITED STATES AND TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS
OF FATS, OILS, AND OILSEEDS
Commodity

Average Annual in 1,000 Tons
1935-39
1945-49
1950
1952

1954

Edible Vegetable
Oils

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

World Total
United States Total

1,753
41

850
174

1,430
352

1,210
293

1,810
636

885
97

765
312

1,150
520

1,250
709

1,465
654

6,561
140

4,042
509

6,201
957

5,672
1,053

7,268
1,880

2

13

15

18

26

Animal Fats
World Total
United States Total
Grand Total
World
United States
United States
per cent
SOURCE:

Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA,
^Washington, D. C., 195&T7 Table 219, p. 179*

Import duties are less offensive to foreign exporters than the
other protective devices employed to protect domestic producers.

The

tariff, although obstructing imports by making them expensive to Ameri
can buyers, is non-discriminatory to the export nations.

On the other

hand, allotting import quotas to supplying countries is at best an
arbitrary action and may prove very discriminatory to certain suppliers.
This discrimination by arbitrary allotments may be especially distaste
ful if quotas are based on past import quantities and a certain country
should wish to enter the market as a newcomer.

Argentina has repeat

edly protested the 1930 sanitary regulations act since it is obvious
that exclusion of Argentine meat under this act is more than a biolog
ical measure] and since the application of the act is nationwide, it
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thus includes the disease-free regions as well as areas that have traces
of certain diseases such as the hoof and mouth affliction.^

Effects on the Status of Protected Producers
In the case of domestic support programs for particular commodities
■which are normally import-competing, quotas limiting domestic output
must be coupled with import restrictions.

Without such limitations,

consumers will buy imports to use and pay taxes for government pur
chases of domestic production.
And in addition, as long as the lower income group of commercial
farms and other farms are included with the upper income group of farms
producing a particular commodity, the average income levels are apt to
indicate a need for protection.

With the use of averages based on all

producers it is difficult to determine if the farms which are efficient
actually need protection from imports.
With many United States exports categorised as luxury and semi
luxury items and with basic or primary products making up a smaller
portion of the American export pattern, tariffs are apt to be more ef
fective than when primary products made up the bulk of exports.

As

long as American exports are of such a nature that they must be had re
gardless of the price, tariffs are apt to be lees effective.

Of course

absolute quotas or quarantine will prove protective regardless of the
highly inelastic demand for American exports. A nation desperately
desirous of certain goods that the United States produces is going to
obtain those goods even if it necessitates subsidizing exports of com
modities to offset the effect of protective tariffs on like American

^Hickman, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
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products.

Or if that nation is not permitted to sell its exports in

the American market, it may be farced to curtail its American imports.
An illustration of this is found in the case of Cuba.
Cuba exports a great deal of sugar to the United States; in fact
her position is that of residual supplier.

In addition to being given

a rigid quota Cuba is permitted to make up 90 per cent of the deficit
in American quotas which may be unfilled.

Congressional action affords

protection for the American sugar industry by means of a quantity limi
tation on Cuban imports.

During the past few years the shortage of

dollar earnings that has resulted from such limitations on Cuba’s chief
crop has caused that country to save scarce dollars whenever possible.
On land that could profitably be planted to sugar, if the market
warranted, Cuba is now producing rice.

Mr. Reid, President of the Rice

Millers Association, which represents over 75 per cent of America's rice
producers, confronted a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Commit
tee, investigating customs and tariff laws, with the information that
American rice producers were losing the Cuban market.

This market has

been developing for American suppliers since the war clouds began gath
ering in the Orient in 1937*

The peak was reached in 1951.

Although

Cuba cannot normally compete with United States producers, rice produc
tion was introduced in the late 1940's.

A tax of 6 per cent was imposed

on imports from the United States, which nullifies the preferential treat
ment Cuba had given in 1947 under General Agreement on Tariff and Trade,
In addition to the import duty, Cuba set quotas on imports and required
import licenses.

In 1955 Cuba placed quality limitations on rice im

ports, and in July 1956 raised these quality standards.

Reid further

stated that since that date only the highest quality and most expensive
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rice has been allowed into Cuba, thus pricing much United States rice out
of the market.

The exports of American rice to Cuba fell rapidly from

1950-1951 to 1955-1956, with total exports to Cuba declining more than
half, from 6,959*703 bags to 3,037*614 bags.^

This decline of exports

definitely is a blow to the American Rice IndustryA for Cuba has consist
ently been America's most important export market with over half of the

19
total exports going to Cuba during several years. 7
It appears that one special interest group is being discriminated
against in favor of another when sugar is protected.

Our limited im

ports of sugar, if expanded, might furnish the foreign exchange needed
by Cuba to pay far American rice which our domestic rice producers are
eager to sell.

American rice producers have as yet not been proven,

under normal trading conditions, capable of competing with other sup
pliers in the world market, but the case of sugar is clear.
sugar admittedly is unable to compete in world mariets.

American

In this in

stance government policy appears to discriminate against rice growers
in favor of sugar producers and apparently assures less efficient use
of American resources, especially those in one state, Louisiana, which
is a major producer of both commodities.
American wool offers another example of a supported industry unable
to stand unassisted against foreign competition.

Yet it is protected so

^William M. Reid, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Re
presentatives, 34th Congress, Washington, D. C., (l95^)* pp. 391-393.
The statistics used by Reid are almost identical to USDA data as tabu
lated in Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, Tables 56
and 57* pp. 45 and 46•
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, op. cit,,
Table 57, p. 46.
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efficiently as to prove detrimental to another domestic industry, that
of woolen manufacturing, as well as harmful to the exporters of other
American goods.
Argentina and Uruguay are two Latin-American nations that depend on
exports of meat, hides, grain, and wool for the exchange necessary to
purchase the finished commodities they desire for a higher standard of
living.

According to Willoughby both o-f these nations use multiple ex

change rates as a means of subsidizing wool exports to the United States
in order to obtain dollar exchange.

In 1953 the official exchange in

Argentina was 5 pesos for an American dollar, yet 7 l/2 pesos was given
for each dollar obtained from the sale of wool.

This then was a sub

sidy of 50 per cent paid to Argentine wool growers.

Uruguay had an

official exchange rate for its peso of 1.519 per American dollar, yet
20

gave 2.35 pesos for each American dollar obtained by selling wool. u
Uruguay was thus paying a subsidy of 54.7 per cent to wool growers.
These subsidies paid to obtain dollars no doubt meant that the goods
and services which these nations could obtain in any other market would
be lost, as exports, by American suppliers.
Wool consuming industries have been confronted with a 66 per cent
tariff decrease on wool textile imports since 1939, while duties on

20
Ray W, Willoughby, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953)s pp. 470471. See also, Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange in the Postwar
World, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1954)» p. £>30 and p. 641.
The official buying rate in 1953 for Argentina was 5 pesos for one dollar.
50 per cent of dollar exchange from wool sales to the United States was
at this rate ani 50 per cent at 7.5. Uruguay paid 1.519 pesos for 35 per
cent of dollar exchange from sale of wool to the United States and 2.35
for the remaining 65 per cent.
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apparel wool have been reduced 25 per cent.

21

According to Senator

Kennedy the woolen textile industry has been declining rapidly.

Be

tween 1949 and 1953 nearly 100 woolen and worsted mills with around
40,000 employees ceased operation.

In addition, many other mills had

partially or fully suspended operations.

The wool growers in the United

States depend upon domestic producers of woolen goods, since wool is
not exported.

The high domestic price of woolens is partially caused

by a high price of wool.

The high price of American woolens invites an

increased importation of comparatively cheaper woolen textiles, and thus
places American producers in an increasingly more difficult position.
Allegedly, the high costs of wool were caused more by tariff paid on
imports than by payments to American wool producers. 22

There are, how

ever, no available statistical means of proving or disproving the valid
ity of this statement.
Wool production is a joint undertaking with that of raising lamb.
Even an increase in price for lamb and wool was incapable of increasing
production between 1940 and 1949*

As prices went up from $15 to $44

per hundred pounds for lamb during that period, output declined from
over 4 million pounds of wool to about 2. l/2 million pounds. Had it not

nyiost American woolen textiles- are produced from wool finer than
grade 44.
22John F. Kennedy, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,
United States Senate, 83**d Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953), pp. 529539, See also Business Statistics 1955. United States Department of
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. IBB. The output of apparel wool
in 1951 was higher than it had been in the period before World War II,
During the war output had nearly doubled. Senator Kennedy was refers
ring to the loss of wool textile production occasioned from the loss
of war markets, but there has been a steady decline since 1951.
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been for the break in the cattle price in 1952, wool production would
probably have declined further.

The decline in sheep production is

traceable to the refusal of farmers to produce sheep when there are more
profitable outlets for them than in sheep production.

Dairying in the

East, cattle raising in the West, and cash crops where possible have
been expanded to take the place of sheep raising,^

Figure 6 shows the

relationship between wool price and domestic production.

It can be

seen from this relationship that production has not adjusted to price
changes.
With wool, growers attempting to restore tariff rates or impose quo
tas on imports and textile manufacturers asking for relief, the wool
program was changed to one of incentive payments under the Eisenhower
Administration.

The Brannan Plan had earlier been condemned by the

same administration while it was seeking election.
Production of such tree crops as almonds and filberts grew with the
aid of import fees and producers of these nuts probably need continued
protection if production is to continue at anywhere near the present
level.

These commodities are relatively hand-intensive but need a long

growing period of several years before production starts.

Any tariff

reduction would probably result in increased imports and would conflict
with domestic price programs.
Cotton, basically an export crop, enters this country in the form
of extra long staple which is free of quota limitations. Short staple

^Humphrey, American Imports, pp. 84-S6.
^Farm Policy Dictionary, og. cit., p. 9. Incentive payments is a
form of compensatory payment in which supports are set high enough to
encourage production of a commodity at a desired level.

FIGURE VI
WOOL PRODUCTION, PRICE OF WOOL IN CENTS
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IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. p. 513* The price went to $3*85 a. pound for cleaned wool in March 1951*
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and medium long staple are subject to quota.

Cotton,, one of the basic

crops that is under a price support program,is one of the commodities
that is produced by both hand and capital-intensive methods.

Cotton

of short and medium long staple could be import-competing, if there
were no import restrictions, although historically it has been our lead
ing export commodity.
The domestic price support programs on import-competing commodities
appear to necessitate import curbs if the programs are to survive.

Thus

the price support program, while not itself a curb on trade, proves to
be restrictive to trade because a support program cannot be maintained
if imports are freely permitted.

Once a support program is instituted

at above world price levels it seems to be self perpetuating.

If the

price support program is to be a permanent feature of agricultural poli
cy, protection against imports must also be maintained.
Utilization of Resources When Trade Restrictions Protect Import-Competing
Commodities.
Protection, which appears to be part and parcel of domestic support
programs, has the same effect on resource use as do price support pro
grams.

Any text in the principles of economics has a chapter devoted

to the agricultural problem.

The consensus seems to be that agriculture

has too many resources producing more commodities than consumers will
take at the prices the producers desire in order to maintain a standard
of living comparable to that which comes from other resource uses.

The

economist's answer to such a problem would be, "let economic forces re
allocate the resources."

However, the problem is not solved as simply

as it may seem and it is likely to remain unsolved for a good many years.
Protection to make price support programs tenable in order to raise
farm incomes limits imports and often forces consumers to pay higher
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prices than would otherwise be necessary.

Production under protection

and support programs normally leads to acreage allotment and marl® ting
quotas.

Marginal operators are given quotas proportional to the most

efficient; this stifling of efficiency, in turn, keeps marginal produc
ers farming when under a competitive situation they might shift to other
employment.

Stimulation of prices of protected commodities is aimed at

paying the productive factors, inefficiently used, as much as the re
turns would be if such factors were more efficiently used.

As efficient

use of resources increases in the dynamic industries, less progressive
import-competing producers will be faced by higher costs which are not
matched by higher productivity.2-*
Coffee and rubber alone have accounted for over 40 PQr cent of
American agricultural imports in recent years.

Cocoa, tea, and bananas,

like coffee and rubber, are not import-competing.

Less than half of

our agricultural imports are of such a nature that they compete with
domestic production.

In the group of imports that are domestically

produced, many such as wool, sugar, olives, tung nuts, and filberts are
not produced in the quantity that is required to satisfy American con
sumers.

The first group of commodities has no reason to expect restric

tions on their import as they are complementary to American agricultural
crops.

The second group is of such a nature that protection through

high tariff or quota restrictions is apt to be very costly for American
consumers and not necessarily too beneficial for those that are pro
tected.

Wool producers, even with high protective tariffs and war-

stimulated price increases, suffered a major decrease in output.

Of

the total agricultural output less than 2 per cent is by import-ccmpeti-ng

^Humphrey, American Imports, pp. 4&0-461.
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producers in this category of producers ’’needing protection."

Yet, pro

tected as they are, they have not been able to satisfy demand.
Another group of commodities imported in direct competition with
American crops is one in which domestic producers are capable of satis
fying total American demand.

Dairy products, butter and cheese, are

the major commodities in this category.

Yet it js not our imports of

butter that hurt dairymen most; it is domestically produced margarine.
Most other agricultural crops are ones that sell at world prices without
protection or else are selling above world price because of domestic
support programs.'"

According to Trenton,

"... less than ten per cent of farm income is
earned with products in need of protection
against competing or supplementary imports.
More than half our farm population depends on
exports. Their real interests ride with the
advance of free trade abroad and the abolish
ing of quota restrictions discriminating against
our agricultural products. But their policy
statements have favored protection born from
fear of the repercussions free trade might
ert on our domestic price support program."'''
It appears that import restrictions are a product, for the most
part, of the domestic support programs.

This relationship means that

inefficiencies shielded by, protection can be traced to the need of pro
tecting the support programs more often than to the need of protecting
domestic producers from importers.

2^*R. W. Trenton, "The Farmer's Stake in our Foreign Policy," The
Southern Economic Journal. XX (April 1954), pp* 335-33B. See also,
Halcraw, 0£. cit., pp. 236-239> his coverage of the problem is not as
detailed as Trenton's but the findings are similar.

27Ibid., p. 339.
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Exports of Hand-Intensive Commodities
Tobacco, one of the heaviest users of hand labor, is and has histor
ically been one of America's major exports.

The government price support

level is the price determining factor since tobacco growers must sell to
buyers from an oligopsonized industry.

Tobacco buyers for the large

tobacco firms usually have from two to three years' supply on hand,
and this puts the tobacco producer in an unfavorable bargaining position.
Since the institution of the tobacco support program, producers have had
the choice of selling to a bidder at the auction or turning it over to
the government under loan.

The loan rate is fixed at 90 per cent of par

ity for most tobacco.
Tobacco is a commodity with an efficiency of production that is
difficult to compare by using productive factor cost structures be
tween nations.

Although tobacco production in the United States uses

as much hand labor as in any other nation, there is no ground for com
parison based on capital-labor efficiency.

It seems that tobacco quality

depends much upon soil and climatic conditions.

Thigpen maintains that

the comparative advantage for various differing types of tobacco is de
pendent not upon the economic use of labor or capital but upon soil,
climate, and physical conditions affecting the tobacco plant.

28

"Move

ment of United States tobacco into foreign markets since colonial days
reflects a definite comparative advantage in terms of soil and climate,
,.. This Comparative advantage differs among the classes and types of
tobacco."

29

2^<J. E. Thigpen,
29Ibid., p. 819.

o jd .

cit., pp. 818-819.
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The export market for tobacco seems to be controlled more by the
ability of buying nations to obtain dollar exchange than by ability of
other areas to produce an acceptable or competitive substitute.

The

soil and climatic conditions are held to be the dominating factor in
the production of tobacco.

If they were allowed to be the dominating

factor, American production of this crop, which makes such large de
mands upon scarce labor, would not be penalized.

However, the labor

problem of the producers of tobacco is not presently acute, because
tobacco is produced in areas where there is now a great deal of under
employment of labor.

The problem to be solved in order to increase

exports seems to be that of getting more dollar exchange into the
hands of would-be foreign consumers.
The consumer demand for American tobacco in foreign countries has
led to black-market operations when dollars were hard to obtain. Govern
ments generally allocate foreign exchange for tobacco because of the
great demand for American tobacco and the ease of taxing tobacco sales.

30

Total export has been consistently high since World War II despite the
loss of Oriental markets, despite the demand for production machinery
and the short supply of dollars in many would-be import nations.

The

British have been reluctant to purchase as much tobacco as they ’would
like because of the restriction that at least 50 per cent must be shiped in United States bottoms as required by Public Law 480 for govern-

30
Edwin D, White, Deputy Director, Office of Food and Agriculture,
Foreign Operations Administration, A Statement in the hearings before
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL
SURPLUSES, United States Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C.,
(1955), p. 310.
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ment-owned commodities that are declared surplus.

31

France in the early post-war years, although favoring United States
tobacco, liras forced to limit purchases of American tobacco, which was
less costly than French tobacco.
lack of dollars. 32

The reason for such curtailment was

France produces several items used in the United

States that, in 1953, carried relatively high duties.
had a duty of 7 1/2 cents per gallon.

Ethyl alcohol

Earthenware and chinaware had

an ad valorem rate of 67 per cent on lower-priced ware.

Automobiles

had a 10 per cent ad valorem duty, wines had duties of 24 per cent for
champagne, and 15 per cent for still wines.

Woolens and worsteds had

an ad valorem equivalent rate of 33 per cent; rayon yarn, 29 per cent;
and leather gloves, from 25 to 74 per cent.

These imports among others

from France are items that would have increased from moderately to sub-

33
stantially if the protective tariff were to have been removed."'
Earthenware, wines, woolens, and leather gloves, as produced in France,
are hand-intensive.

The United States is not capable of producing such

commodities as efficiently as does France by hand-intensive methods.
This results from the more productive uses for labor in the capitalintensive industries.

Yet the high level of duties on the commodities

mentioned prevented needed dollar exchange going to France.

American

consumers were forced to purchase a domestic product or pay a higher
price if they insisted on the import.

-^Gustave Burmeister, Assistant Administrator for Market Development,
United States Department of Agriculture, A Statement in the hearings’
before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL
SURPLUSES, United States Senate, £4th Congress, Washington, D. C,, (1955),
pp. 352-353.

"^Thigpen, og. cit., p. S22.
-^Piquet, 0£. cit.. passim.
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During the period when Americans were prevented from buying French
imports of hand-intensive commodities that they as consumers wanted,
France was unable to obtain the dollar exchange that she needed in order
to make purchases of tobacco.
Before the exclusion of free entry into world markets a . a com
petitive level United States cotton production had captured most of the
world's cotton market.

After the Civil War, hand-intensive cultivation

appears to have been efficient in the South, which had become a back
ward area.

Cotton production under the plantation system used only one

white to each eight colored workers.
duction was by white field hands.

By 1867, 40 per cent of the pro

The desire of whites who had been

unable to own land under the slave plantation system, and of ex-slaves
to own their own farms led to the creation of many new small farms.
With little atlernative to producing the cash crop of cotton, mono
culture continued with an increase in small family operated farms.

It

was not until underemployment began to be affected by war shortages
for labor and the increasing industrialization in the South that the
small hand-intensive farms began to feel the competition of mechanized
cotton production.

With continued mechanization, labor saving produc

tion methods, and alternative outlets for use of labor, hand-intensive
cotton culture will undoubtedly continue to decrease relative to mecha
nized production.
Fruit exports are much smaller now than before World War II, al
though in Table V vegetables and fruit are revealed as being among
those industries with high returns.

Citrus fruits have been the cen

ter of controversy, and the problems faced by grapefruit growers were

■^Street, o£. cit., pp. 18-19.
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brought to the attention of Congress.

The plight of grapefruit grow

ers was pointed out as the need fa- special aid.

Some of the reasons

for the loss of grapefruit exports were discussed at the recent Senate
Committee hearings on Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses.
In the recent hearings Senator Holland of Florida points out that
grapefruit has not been declared surplus and therefore is not eligible
for government aid under Public Law 480, which deals with the disposal
of "surpluses".

He further shows the "absurdity" of the British po

sition of protecting Jamaican grapefruit production by other than
incentive methods when Jamaica is able to furnish only a small fraction
35. H e also points out that Israeli citrus pro
of Britian’s n e e d s
ducers are selling grapefruit to European marteting organisations on
a consignment basis with no assurance of pay, if those receiving
Israeli fruit agree not to trade in American grapefruit.

This the

Senator intimates is unfair competition especially in the light of
the fact that Israel is receiving American aid,'
The Jamaican grapefruit industry was fostered by the British to
save badly needed dollar exchange during and shortly after World War
II, and today the position of grapefruit production in Jamaica is
vulnerable to competition from American producers.

Jamaica furnishes

about one-fourth as much canned,aid about the same amount of fresh
grapefruit to England that the United States furnished before the war.

35

The Senator is condemning the British for a program which is very
similar to the.one our wool producers had demanded in this country be
fore incentive payments were used.
Senator S. L. Holland, Hearings before the Committee on Agricul
ture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES, United States
Senate, £4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1955), p. 298-299.
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The Foreign Operations Administration offered Britain loans for pur
chase of American citrus fruit; yet the British refused to purchase the
fruit, although earlier shipments had been made under FOA and the Mutual
Security Act.

The British have felt that loans should be used for

commodities and goods more beneficial to their economic recovery than
fruit, which they consider as a luxury item.^?
The imports of apples, prunes, pears, cherries, and other fruit are
considered as luxury items by nations that are attempting to recover
from the war and increase their productive capacity.

Although these

crops appear able to compete favorably with other users of resources
in productivity returns, nations with shortages of dollars are apt to
allocate what they have for items they do not consider to be in the
luxury category.

The difference between the export positions of fruit,

and tobacco would appear to be in the demand elasticity of the import
ing nations.

Tobacco seems to be an item which many nations refuse to

do without, while fruit often will not be allowed to command dollars
that are in short supply.

The way to increase exports of "so called"

luxury items would appear to be in the direction of an increase of
dollar exchange in the hands of potential importers.
As the use of capital-intensive production methods in the United
States increases, making hand-intensive commodities less attractive in
the export pattern, there is the likelihood of an increased competition
for markets once held by American producers of many types of fruit.
Senator Holland emphasized that point when he referred to the inroads
that Israel has made in the European grapefruit market.

Much of the

37lbj_d,, pp. 296-307. Edwin D. White of the Office of Food and
Agriculture, Foreign Operations Administration, answers to Senator
S. L. Holland,
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fruit production in the United States takes place in areas which have
often experienced over-full employment.

For this reason alternative

uses for labor very often necessitate higher agricultural costs.

In

the Pacific Northwest many orchards have been abandoned and owners have
gone to work in lumbering and other basic industries, using their fruit
and vegetable farms as merely a rural residence or as a means of supple
menting industrial incomes.

Alternatives for Hand-Intensive Producers
If hand-intensive commodities are to find themselves excluded from
export markets or displaced by imports, a question of alternative uses
for their resources will arise.

The first step in a solution of this

problem, as in the solution of any part of the farm problem, is to main
tain a high national level of inc ome and employment so that alternative
uses will be available for resources no longer needed when exports are
lost or when imports replace domestic production.

Next would be the

need for aiding marginal producers in the reorientation of their fac
tors of production.

This reorientation would include such alternatives

as labor entering industry, land going into more economical size units
for capital utilization, placing land into range, forestry or recrea
tional pursuits, or "mothballing" land for emergency uses.

Industrial Employment: Possibilities and Limitations
To aid industry help rid a gricultural pursuits of under-employment
by continued operation at near full employment trade barriers could be
reduced during a period, such as 1956-1957* when many industries were
suffering from over-full employment.

There would be a much better

chance of displaced agricultural labor finding employment in industry
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during periods of high industrial activity.

If trade barriers are to

be reduced on imports at a time of general economic disorder, the pro
ducers of protected crops will find themselves worse off with little
or no alternative employment possibility.
Although labor tends to be immobile because of the lack of certain
needed skills in certain productive processes, location factors, inade
quate knowledge of job opportunities and other reasons, there will be
a greater inclination on the part of industrial employers to hire un
skilled labor when there is a labor shortage.

The most rapid exodus

from farming takes place during periods of prosperity, although the
differences between farm income and industrial income are greater in
depressed periods than in periods of prosperity,^

In 1910, when

total population was 92 million, our farm population was 32 million.
This dropped to 31 million during the prosperity period of the 1920*5,
but it increased to 32 million during the depression of the 1930's.

By

1954* during the post-war period of prosperity, the farm population had
dropped to 22 million, while total population had grown to 162 million.
The farm population in 1954 was considered to be 13.5 per cent of total
population.-^

Table XI7

shows the relationship of total population to

farm population for selected years.

According to Black, this trend away

from tie farm is apt to continue for a number of years.
farm labor force of around 5 million by 1975*

He foresees a

This is considerably less

than the 6.6 million figure for 1955. ^

^Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit., Tables 102, 103, p. 86.
3Q
'Family Farms in a Changing Economy, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
^Black, "Agriculture in the Nation's Economy," og.- cit., p. 17.
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TABLE XIV

UNITED STATES TOTAL POPULATION;
FARM POPULATION SELECTED YEARS

Year

Total

1910
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1954

92
107
115
123
127
132
140
152
162

SOURCE:

Population
Millions

Farm

32
32
31
31
32
31
25
25
22

Farm as
per cent
of Total
34.8
29.9
26.9
23.6
25 .2
23.5
17.8
16.4
13.5

Family Farms in a Changing Economy, Agricultural Research
Service, USDA (Washington, D. C., March 1957), Table 1,
page 8 , from Statistical data compiled by the Bureau of
the Census.

The period of rapid farm-to-city movement following World War II,
as shown in Table XIVr has taken place in spite of protection for do
mestic producers against imports, along with the use of export subsidies,
and with domestic price support programs designed to help solve the low
farm-income problem.

Instead of measures which announce as their intent

a fair share of the nation's wealth to farmers so that farmers' income
will be adequate, policy would probably be more compatible with higher
national living standards if the over-full employment conditions with
which industry is often faced were eased with the under-employed fac
tors in agriculture.

Resources remaining in agriculture would then have

fewer claimants for the returns from agricultural produce which so fre
quently faces a relatively inelastic demand situation.

Resources

leaving agriculture would generally be more productive in industry.
The over-supply of farm labor has not been adequately encouraged in,
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an attempt to transfer to industry.

Emphasis by policy makers has

been placed on supporting prices and restricting imports rather than
on subsidizing a transfer from agriculture.

It seems that such trans

fers of the factors could be encouraged, as an agricultural objective,
as easily as any other objective of an agricultural program although
opposition may arise from sources such as labor unions.
An alternative solution, for farmers who are wider-employed, to that
of giving up their homestead and their inadequate income in order to
pursue industrial employment in a city, is to have them take industrial
jobs within commuting distance.

This trend actually is increasing,

particularly in the South, because of the increasing industrial activ
ity in that area.

In this manner many under-employed farmers hove

become full-time industrial workers and part-time farmers.

Reluctance

to leave land that is owned is not encountered when it is possible to
live on the land and commute to one's work.

Specialization in Forest. Range. Recreation, and Capital-Intensive Crops
Other possible objectives of a continued protection of hand-intensive
industry— at least as far as the under-employed farmer is concerned— may
be found in reorienting the land to other crops or to other than hand
intensive uses.

If reallocation is not too greatly hindered by govern

ment policy in the form of price supports and acreage quotas, land and
labor can often become more productive in other pursuits.

Grazing and

forestry, for instance, are alternatives to cotton culture in much of
the South.

The Yazoo-Little Tallahatchie flood prevention project,

cited earlier, is an 'example of government policy oriented toward so
lution of malallocation of resources rather than a perpetuation of those
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conditions,^"

It would appear that tax money is more productively em

ployed in such a project than in purchasing "surplus" commodities at
stimulating price levels and dumping these commodities into foreign
markets.
Watershed improvement and recreation areas may be an alternative
use for submarginal farming enterprises if the ocst is borne by society.
This method of conservation and shifting of resources is held to be one
which depends upon government aid, since farmers cannot, by themselves,
give up cash crop production in order to rehabilitate a watershed.^
Substitution of capital-intensive methods of production or a shift
to the production of an alternative commodity may mean that a once hand
intensive commodity can become competitive with imports, or that re
sources will be shifted to a mare productive commodity.

A shift to

capital-using productive methods normally demands larger farmsteads.
A logical approach to the elimination of farms so small that for pur
poses of mechanization they are uneconomical, is to aid in consolidation.
To consolidate small units into units large enough to mechanize profit
ably demands readily available sources of capital.

An agency such as the

Farm Credit Administration might be called upon for funds to aid in the
consolidation and mechanization of units that are too small to mechanize
singly and which lack the necessary funds.
Measures Looking Toward the Elimination of Inefficiency^
A large part of present farm protection is pointed toward the con-

^ Supra. p. 55.

^Rainer Schichele, Agricultural Policy (New York:
Book Company, Inc., 1954)> pp. 127-133*

McGraw-Hill

^Here, as throughout this paper, inefficiency is considered to be
the use of resources to produce goods whose total costs are more than
costs would be for producing a given commodity by a different factor
combination.
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tinuation of inefficiency.

The provisions of most price-support pro

grams, import restrictions fee* protecting American producers, and
export subsidies are, from the point of view of the analysis contained
in this study, attempts to subsidize inefficiency through price mani
pulation.
Production and import control, commodity loan plans designed to
increase prices, and surplus disposal operations must be discarded if
comparative advantage is to be the directing fcrce in the elimination
of inefficiency.

Agricultural programs which involve subsidised farm

ing should be allowed to have only a minimum of influence on market
price.

In order to maximize efficiency in resource use and to allow

the comparative advantage benefits to accrue from, international trade,
farm subsidy payments should be in the form of transfer payments out
side of the price structure.

Imports and exports should be free to

move in accordance with those productive factor combinations which give
producers an advantage in relationship to alternative uses.
To pave the way to an acceptable program for supporting incomes,
not prices, consumers as well as farmers and their spokesmen should
first be made to realize that price supporting actions are every bit
as much of a subsidy payment from the government as would be a direct
payment from the treasury for the difference between price times quan
tity sold, and the desired income support level.^
Any over-expansion of agricultural production because of war needs
which has induced an uneconomic use of resources is a problem of such
broad scope as to forbid its being treated as a farm problem.
spokesmen should not be permitted to dictate its solution.

Farm

Instead,

society should consider such over-expandion as a cost of the war and

^Johnson, "Reconciling Agricultural and Foreign Trade Policies,"
pp. 570-571.

163
accept the responsibility of reallocating the resources to other uses.
If wartime industrial investments deserve special consideration by the
government, it seems only fair that agriculture should be equally well
treated.

Summary
The returns from production of hand-intensive commodities, which .
must compete with imports from nations having abundant labor reserves,
are generally too low for the level of living that Americans desire.
The chief reason for such low returns is to be found in the relative
scarcity of labor and its low rate of productivity as compared with the
productivity of labor supplemented by capital.

The opportunity costs

for labor are so high in the American economy that production of hand
intensive commodities, which are capable of being produced in areas of
abundant labor resources, must depend upon protection or see imports
undersell them in the American market.
If the production of a commodity is inefficient because of its de
mands for large amounts of labor, it may yet be permitted to continue,
if imports are excluded.

When an efficient method is discovered for

producing such a commodity and when part.of the production becomes ef
ficient, the returns will continue at the same protected level because
of the single price aspect of marketing, and because the land will re
ceive the increased returns through capitalization.

Once land is so

capitalized at the protected price level, the gains of efficiency are
lost and protection must continue.
Labor returns are often more likely to be determined by institu
tionalized or acceptable levels of living rather than by productivity.
If imports of hand-intensive commodities are allowed to increase, those

I6h
receiving dollar exchange would be capable of purchasing more American
exports.

Most Americanexports are capital-intensive and therefore

more productive in man-hour returns than imports.

Labor in rural areas

will suffer lower returns because of the loss of the import-competing
crops sales.

Industrial production will tend to become more fully or

over-fully employed and will accordingly reap higher returns.

With

greater demand for workers in industry, wage levels tend to rise.

Yet,

even though manpower is marked by great immobility, the unemployed and
under-employed rural workers tend to shift to better-paying industrial
jobs when such jobs are available.

And those jobs are being made in

creasingly available to the "commuter" type of worker who continues to
maintain his residence on a farm.
The wage-rate argument for the protection of import-competing com
modities is unsound.

American producers are not competing with low wage

rates paid in foreign nations; rather, they are competing against more
efficient uses of labor in America.

Protection does not raise the level

of living; instead, by misallocating resources to less productive pur
suits, it actually lowers the amount of total goods and services avail
able for consumers.
Most hand-intensive import-competing commodities have met with in
creasing foreign competition or have had to depend upon trade restrictions
to forestall such'competition.

Tobacco is an exception, but actually it

is not an import-competing commodity.

Tobacco imports are in the nature

of specialty products not produced in this country.

They supplement rath

er than compete with domestic production.
Only a small portion of farm production, about 10 per cent, needs
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protection from foreign competition in order to retain its domestic
market.

Protection is demanded, however, for thepurpose of making

domestic price support programs tenable.
Our continued exports of hand-intensive commodities will depend con
siderably upon the importance foreign importers place upon them.

As the

relative cost of such hand-intensive production methods increases be
cause of technological advances in competing industries, these commodities
will increasingly become a. poorer buy.

Tobacco seems assured of con

tinued quantities of exports because of an inelastic demand for the
American product.

Our fruit exports, however, seem to depend on in

creases in the amount of dollar exchange in the hands of other countries.
The longer the "dollar shortage" continues, the greater wall be the in
roads of competitive sources for this market.
It seems reasonable to maintain that dependence should be put on
finding other uses for labor rather than on more protection aiming at a
continuation of misuse of labor resources.

Full employment should be

maintained, if possible, for the purpose of stimulating movements of
labor from areas of under-employment to more productive pursuits.

Such

movements of under-employed resources should be fostered rather than
hindered.

Much of present agricultural policy, however, appears to con

template a continuation of the malallocation of resources.

If farm

incomes are to be bolstered, the procedures looking toward that objective
should take place outside of the pricing mechanism.

Tampering with

prices upsets normal trade relations and perpetuates rather than miti
gates the over-allocation of resources to agriculture.
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CHAPTER VI

EXAMINATION OF PROPOSED POLICY AS TO TRADE REGULATIONS
AFFECTING AGRICULTURE

This chapter proposes that many of the factors of production used
in agriculture should be re-oriented within agriculture and other factors
transfers! from agricultural pursuits if agricultural production is to
receive returns generally comparable with the returns to other indus
tries.

The need to permit increases of imports, including those that

compete with agricultural commodities produced .domestically, is also
asserted.

It is further proposed that society, which would benefit

from the above changes, should furnish assistance to those financially
unable to make the needed shifts.

In addition, this chapter includes a

discussion of price support programs, as some students of the subject
declare present price support administration to be one of the factors ■
necessitating import restrictions.

Furthermore, price support legis

lation is often alleged to be a factor that could lead to dumping.
Before examining any proposals, and lest the reader is to assume
that the writer is postulating the tenets of classicism, it is necessary,
at this point, to indicate some of the difficulties that must be faced
in any attempt to use policy as a means of better utilizing scarce re
sources.

The various hearings, before both the House and the Senate,

that have dealt with agriculture and trade in the past few years, have
all been confronted with numerous spokesmen presenting evidence of the
lack of freedom of price determination in the world markets.

The USDA

has recently compiled a digest of agricultural policies of foreign gov
ernments which includes trade policies affecting agriculture.

A cursory
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study of this pamphlet leads one to suspect that the commodity entering
world trade is rare indeed, if it does not come under some sort of reg
ulation.

And this regulation generally emits from "both the shipping

nation as well as the one receiving the commodity.^
With all other nations practicing regulation, is it not therefore
mandatory that the United States also maintain tight reigns on such
agricultural commodities as enter or leave this nation?

This is a

persuasive argument which is often used, and it is an argument that ap
pears to have merit when one considers the doctrine of "an eye for an
eye."

However, when one examines the reasons for such regulations on

the part of foreign nabions, and the reasons for United States regula
tions, as well as the effects that such regulations have, perhaps it
would be better to forego retaliation.
Most of the under-developed nations of the world, which largely
produce primary products, stress increased agricultural production in
order to better their diet, to provide raw material for whatever in
dustry they have, and to increase exports.^

They generally have a very

limited number of export items with which to pay for desired capital goods.
They do have, in most instances, some agricultural commodities that they can

1
. Agricultural Handbook No. 132, Agricultural Policies of Foreign
Governments. USDA op. cit. This Pamphlet is the latest in a series that
have been published, starting in 1932, and dealing with this subject.
Government intervention in agriculture is seemingly standard practice
throughout the world. Foreign trade regulation with the use of internal
market regulations is a common policy tool of most nations. There is
little doubt that these regulations seriously curtail the operation of
the law of supply and demand, and, thereby, greatly influence the allo
cation of resources.
^Ibid., p. 1 .
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sell to obtain needed foreign exchange.

In addition, they usually are

able to furnish enough food for their ovm use.

It is, therefore, not

surprising that most underdeveloped nations, with a factor combination
of relative abundant labor and land as most such nations have, subsidise
exports of agricultural commodities and restrict such imports.
On the other hand, higher income, industrialised countries, mainly
those of Western Europe, attempt basically to increase the relatively
lew income level of their farm population which has no industrial al
ternative comparable to America.

Another reason for regulation is to

maintain food production as a national security goal.

Thus, the social

goal of maintaining prosperous, or, at least, less miserable small farm
steads, that prompts regulation in industrialized countries is not
primarily an attempt to expand farming, but an attempt to stabilize the
rural society at a level of living that somewhere nearly approaches the
industrial standard.

This is the reason most often given for such reg

ulation in the United States.

The differences in factor combinations,

economically speaking, are a reason why actions that may be permissible
in one nation make economic nonsense in another.

The United States, at

the present time, is the major nation having a relatively hard money
which is desperately in demand by nearly all other nations.

The impli

cation is, of course, that all nations want more United States goods than
the United States wants of other rations.

And were this demand to be

satisfied, more productive capacity than the United States has would be
needed to fill the wants.

This would call for the shifting of more re

sources into export production.

Perhaps then, the. United States, at

this time, is the lone major nation capable of reducing regulation, or,

^Ibid., pp. 1-2.

at least, is in the bast position to continue the sustained effort to
ward increased multilateralism.^

Proposed Measures for Supporting the
American Scale of Living
If the United States is to maintain a large export trade, and if
the agricultural segment of our economy is to continue as an important
beneficiary of our agricultural exports, there are two major alternative
courses open,

//e can continue to export commodities to foreign areas and

pay for the exports with federal appropriations, or we can export the
commodities others want and make it easier for them to pay.

In this in

stance, to pay means allowing imports of products into the United States.
The latter choice would be less costly to taxpayers and would permit a
higher standard of living manifest by more goods and services for the
consumers.''
Any attempt to make it easier for other nations to pay the United
States entails a trade program which will encourage imports.

There has

been a sustained effort since 1934 on the part of the national administra
tion under both Democrats and Republicans to lower trade barriers.

Never

theless, there still remain sizeable hurdles to importation of many items
such as industrial, manufactured, and farm products.

The importer con

tinues to be plagued by tariffs, quotas, and standard trade restrictions.
In addition, among the most effective barriers to payment for United
States exports is the confusion that archaic tariff regulations and red
tape pose for would-be importers.

These regulations entail the u?e of

complicated nonstandardized forms, haphazard

procedures, arbitrary

V . V. Meyer, "Complementarity and the Lowering of Tariffs," The
American Economic Review, XLVI (June 1956), pp. 323-335.
^Halcraw, op. cit.. pp. 237> 252-253.
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valuations, delays, special taxes, confusing classification methods,
and other nuisances, and these trade restrictions often multiply the
protective effects of tariff duties.

Student in the field refer to this

sort of protection as the invisible tariff.
Any policy that is instituted by society in order to support a high
standard of living must be considered in the light of such policy's ef
fect upon all facets of society.

Any such policy that increases the

standing of a certain group at the expense of other groups is not aiding
society as a whole, if the total of goods and services remains the same.
Such policy, if it increases the standing of a certain group, while
hurting other groups and indeed lowering the total of goods .and ser
vices, is by no means an economically acceptable policy.

Furthermore,

any policy instituted to help a specific group, but which has been
shown to offer very little aid to most of that group, is reprehensible.
It is all too likely to throw the burden of support of that policy upon
society as a whole and to result in a demonstrably lowered standard of
living than otherwise could be obtained.

Because any support measures

for agricultural groups are bound to affect society as a whole, such
policy must be considered in the light of its totality.
According to Black, and based upon his use of USDA and Bureau of
Labor Statistics data of 1954* agriculture engages approximately 6 per
cent of the labor force, uses 12 per cent of the tangible productive
assets, yet turns out only 4 per cent of the nation's gross national
product.^1 Since 1910, the index of farm output has roughly kept pace
with population growth.

Nevertheless, total farm hours of work have de

creased by over 30 per cent, and farm population has decreased from

^Black, "Agriculture in the Nation’s Economy," p. 21.
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around 30 per cent of the nation’s total to about 13 per cent.
The absolute position of agriculture, economically speaking, has
not deteriorated.

In fact, on a long-run basis the year of 1?50 showed

the agriculture growth pattern to be keeping up with population .growth.
The farm price index in 1950 was 253 compared to 139 for the wholesale
price index based on the year 1900.

However, 1955 does show that farm

prices had dropped to 205 while wholesale price index had advanced to
212.

During the time that national wealth was increasing from a base of

100 to 257 (1900 to 1950) total farm assets had grown .from 100 to 270.
The weighted average of agricultural, manufacturing and mining produc
tion and construction had risen to 230, or a full 40 points below agri
culture .®
This national income analysis as well as the individual farmstead
and farm class information provided by the census of agriculture indi
cate that agriculture as such is now in no more need of special con
sideration than it was in 1900.

Notice, however, must be taken of the

case of seasonal crop variation due to weather uncertainties over which
the farmer has no control.

Also, it must be remembered that farm in

comes, although maintaining their relative income ranking, started at a
level much lower than the remainder of the economy.

This lower relative

income position is a reflection of excess resources dedicated to agri
culture .
Agricultural and trade policy should be reoriented in such

a

^Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit., passim.
Aryness Joy Wickens, "Changing Prices and Values in the First
half of the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, XLVI No. 2 (May 195^), 70-75, Table 1, 72.
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manner that agricultural exports capable of selling competitively in
the world markets will not be hampered.

In addition, imports of com

modities should not be excluded to maintain production of very high cost
hand-intensive crops.

The commitment of 12 per cent of the tangible

assets and 6 per cent of the nation's labor force to the production of
4 per cent of the nation's gross national product would seem to indicate
the need for major resource reallocation.

The chronic income disparity

within agriculture further indicates a need for policy reorientation.
To this it should be added that society, because it will benefit
thereby in the long run, should incur the immediate costs of reorien
tation.

The low income group of farmers, who are not contributing

their share to the economy's growth and who have no possibility of so
doing if they remain in agriculture, pose a problem which should be
solved by society.

The educational and training levels of low-income

farm .groups are such that those groups are unable to return adequate in
come levels on the farm.

In addition, without further training their
q

income level potential will also be low in industry.'

borne of the vari

ous roads that policy could take in order to support the society's
level of living will be presented in the following sections.

Allow an Increase of Imports Whenever Demand Increases for Supported Crops
It is not easy to convince any group that society will be better off
by any proposed lessening of import restrictions that will not benefit
them.

Or, if such a group is cognisant of such knowledge, they, as in-

Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Agricultural Price and Income Policy (Third
Edition, Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press, 1952), Ch. 19, Agri
cultural Incomes Gan Be Made Comparable With Incomes For Equal Ability
In Other Lines, pp. 266-275*

dividuals, are more interested in their own loss than in any gain to
society.

Any proposal to ease import restrictions m i l immediately

bring forth the wrath of a few, very vocal, very persistent groups with
vested interests in the continuation of present controls.

In retrospect,

Milton, during the later l600's in his work Areopagitica, and John
Stuart Mill, in 1359 in the On Liberty, both noted the influence a
small vocal group could have on society under a democratic political
s y s t e m . U s u a l l y when a few are loud enough and persistent enough
they inflict their wills on the majority who are generally passive and
take little personal interest.

With this in mind, opposition to any

policy advocating increases in imports must be anticipated, and the
benefits to society that m i l accrue from such policy must be spelled
out and presented as the need for adopting such policy.

The long-run

benefits for those under-employed resources in agriculture, after re
allocation, should also be noted.

Agricultural policy has been and is

oriented toward the goal of isolating domestic prices from world prices.
With this in mind, one ’way to start reversing the trend of protection
for commodities that are unable to compete against foreign imports would
be to allow increased amounts to be imported whenever domestic demand
is increased.

Whenever the domestic consumption trend is increasing,

the added demand should be satisfied with imports.

This would not solve

the problem of present misuse of resources, but it would prevent any
additional resources entering the production of a crop which is unable
to compete on its own merits.

10
Paul Robert Lieder et. al. editors, British Poetry and Prose.
Revised Edition Vol. two (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933), PP. 475477.
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If such a policy were instituted so as to permit the satisfaction
of increased demands from imports, there would be a gradual increase in
foreign exchange available to these nations that took advantage of this
expanding market for imoorts.

As the foreign exchange derived from this

expanded market became available to make purchases of goods and services
produced in and by the United States, there -would be a natural shift of
productive factors to export production.'*''''
One merit of this gradual increase of imports is that there would
be no sudden increase of unabsorbable factors, mainly labor, thrown upon
society.

Many of the lower Income, marginal operators that would be

eliminated from crop production would, under this plan, have time to be
trained for assimulation into other economic pursuits.

Domestic con

sumption levels would gradually rise as under utilized resources, now
in agriculture, shift to other uses.

If the labor and capital that

Black indicates Is unproductively employed in agriculture

12

were to

produce as much as in non-agricultural pursuits it would mean between
$8 and £12 billion added to G. N. P. at 1957 price levels.
over twice the amount given as U.S. foreign aid in 1957.

This is
In addition,

the factors remaining in agriculture would each receive a large portion
of agriculture's share of G . N . P . This total share might even be larger
with Increased national productivity and increased consumption due to the
addition of resources In non-agricultural pursuits.

^Lorie Tarshis, Introduction to International Trade and Finance
(New York: John fJiley and Sons, Inc., 1955)> pp. 525-527.
•^Black, "Agriculture in the Nations Uconomy," p. 21.
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Gradual Reduction of Restrictions as Industry Absorbs Farm Resources
This would be much like the above proposal.

The difference would

be that a set period of time would be announced in which a gradual de
creasing of trade restrictions would eventually eliminate such restraints,
With a long range program of restriction elimination, assurances of near
full employment would be required.

A schedule of restriction reductions

would, during times of recession, force factors from agriculture vrhen
society offered no alternative.
would benefit.

Here, as in the first proposal, society

Accordingly, the costs of reorienting resources should

be borne by society.

Workers must be trained or they will be little

better off in non-agricultural pursuits than if they had remained in
agriculture.
Texts in the principles of economics often define full employment
somewhat like this: A nation has reached full employment when it is satis
fied with the performance of the economy, and those factors are employed

1R
which are seeking employment at the socially acceptable level of return. '
Such an ambiguous-definition does not bake into consideration the vary
ing degrees of employment in the different economic endeavors.

While

some segments are under-utilizing resources, others find it hard to ob
tain enough resources to satisfy their demand . For this reason, a
sustained effort to maintain a semblance of full employment and continued
aid in transferring to other vocations those desiring to leave agricul
ture, the under-employed segment of the economy, would be the best method
of solving the problem of too many resources allocated to agricultural
production.

In addition to needing full employment, the artificiality

TO

'David McCord Wrig’" ‘"
MacMillan Company, 1954., .

1 ‘ Modern .Economics (New York:

The

of prices under support plans would have to be remedied to allow either
of these two plans to work.

Any price support plan, as has been shown

earlier in this paper, encompassing support at above the world price,
needs import restrictions in addition to marketing controls and acreage
restrictions. If domestic producers are to be subsidized, they should
be forced to receive such subsidy outside of the market pricing mecha
nism.

Whatever subsidies are maintained, should be for programs such

as disaster relief, crop failure, agricultural financing, and for train
ing and assistance to those leaving agriculture.

Give Assurances to Importers and Lessen Import "red tape"
The "red tape" items of United States Customs Operation are probably
as effective at restricting imports as are tariffs, licensing and quotas.
Any study into ways of increasing dollar earnings of would-be customers
of America's farm producers must go beyond the tariff.

A recent survey

■was made of 336 United States’ firms and the impediments to their pri
vate foreign investments.

In many instances the impediments were of the

same sort that domestic exporters of agricultural crops would be faced
with, including prominently those connected with "invisible tariffs".
Trade barriers other than tariffs that were specifically mentioned by
one or more firms are:

import quotas, customs policies and administra

tion, the Buy American Act, the requirement for shipping in American
vessels, price controls or "any artificial control," international ma
terials control plan, and United States immigration laws and restrictions.
The administrations have, since 1934, attempted to reduce for the
most P^rt, restrictions to foreign trade by such programs as the recip-

^Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Factors Limiting United States In
vestment Abroad, Fart 2, Business Views on the United States Government’s
Role, United States Department of Commerce (Washington, D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1954)> PP- 12-13.

rocal trade agreements and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Often such effort has been confronted by strong sentiment on the part
of pressure blocs attempting to influence certain elements of Congress
to thwart such programs. Also, when an attempt was made in Iff6 to sim
plify the customs reg’ilations, there was such strong opposition that a
modified compromise was finally accepted.

During the period that the

Senate Finance Committee was doing research for the formulation of this
legislation, spokesmen for numerous firms and many consultants were
questioned in the committee hearings.

When the finished product of

these hearings, known as the' Customs Simplification bill, was signed
in August 1956, it had lost much of its meaning through compromises.
The original purpose wasto formulate a single base for tariff on im
ports.

That is, insteadof

using the wholesale price in the exporting

nation or the import wholesale price, whichever was higher, this bill
would have made the import wholesale price the tariff base.

This act

would have given foreign exporters a good deal more assurance in the
way of tariff rates to be expected, eliminating the difficulty of basing
the rate on foreign market values calculated in terms of a multitude of
exchange rates.

Finally, a compromise three-year trial plan was con

sidered, with both standards to be used, thus postponing a decision for
three years.

The bill, as finally passed, xvas signed into law August

2, 1956, but it would bepermitted to apply only if the tariff on the
import value was such asto show less than a 5 per cent decrease in
tariff rates. 19
The compromise, which was an attempt to end delays entailed by long
investigations to determine foreign value or export value, so complicated

^ The New York Times, August 3> 1956, p. 22, column 1.

178

the immediate procedure that little benefit was obtained.

The three-

year trial period was dropped, but the treasury was required to determine
average value for 1954* placing on a new preliminary list items that
would show a 5 or more per cent higher appraisal than they would have
shown under the new system.

Items on this preliminary list, when

finalized, would continue to be a upraised under the old system and
other items would be appraised under the new and simpler system.^
Eventually this compromise bill will aid in the simplification of
tariff rate understanding.

However, during the years of needed research,

uncertainties will exist and the treasury department will be forced to
spend time and money in determining ’
which items will be simplified and
which will continue under the old system.

Even when this job is com

pleted, only a fraction of. the "invisible tariff" will have been dealt
with.

Any further attempt to simplify any one of the many remaining barri

ers vrill be confronted with a very determined effort to prevent such
changes.
As American tariff law grew through the various acts which culmi
nated in the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930, American protection grew multifold
through growth of the "invisible tariff."

The reciprocal trade acts have

reduced visible restrictions to trade, but attempts to eliminate the ad
ministrative red tape has not met with the same success.

Although cus

toms administrative laws and decisions are usually not deliberately
formulated to discourage imports, they often have that result.

A customs

lawyer is often as necessary for the importer as the ship to transport
the goods.

Some of the costs that an importer often must bear are:

cus

toms lawyer’s fees, premiums on bonds, litigation costs, and costs which

*i z

The Mew York Times. August 12, 1956, Section 3* p. 1* column 1
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result from delay in appraisement for duty, 17‘
The urvwillingness of Congress to face up to the responsibility of
formulating positive control over imports has done much to bring about
the transfer of tariff-making powers to the executive.

Thus the tariff

commission has gained authority through Congressional default, and the
President is able to use the commission as a fact-finding board on which
he bases his rate-making and tariff-bargaining powers.

These powers

were granted in 1922 when Congress conferred on the President ratemaking authority, and in 1934 the trade agreements act gave him tariff•
•
bargaxnmg
power. is

^

Protected interests continue to appeal to congressmen to amend or
repeal or allow the trade agreements acts to expire.

Economic sanctions

and the placating of interest groups are easily accomplished by the
administrative action which can be incorporated in tariff acts.

Much of

the President's rate—making and tariff bargaining ability are lost by
such actions.

In addition, the fear of sudden import policy reversal,

such as ending the trade agreements or by escape clause action, tends
to weaken the desire of many foreign export producers to develop American
markets.

The refusal of Congress to extend the trade agreement legis

lation, which they must do periodically, would prove to be a catastrophic
blow to many foreign firms selling in the American market.

■^Percy W. Bidwell, The Invisible Tariff (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1939 ).» pp. 2-S. Bidwell states that administrative
measures are far more comprehensive than visible tariff, since they af
fect goods on the free list as well as goods which are dutiable. He
further states that the complexity of tariff schedules grew out of at
tempts to stop seepage of illegal imports and some regulations appear
to be devised to make it as difficult as possible for importers.
^ I b i d ., pp. 12-13.

It would aopear that Congress, which has refused to accept re
sponsibility for tariff administration, is unwilling to allow the
executive branch to which they have defaulted, a free hand.

Without

the ability needed to assure a continuous import policy, the adminis
tration is seriously hampered in any attempt to increase imports.

Free

world marketing and production patterns in many countries are based
much less on a mass market concept than they are in America.

No firm,

which is unsure that it will be allowed to remain in a market that it
could deve,lop by changing production and marketing methods, is apt to
gamble millions of dollars which would be a total loss if that market
were closod.

As long as customs regulations remain on an uncertain

basis from year to year, there will continue to be reluctance on the
part of foreign firms to gear production fully for the American market.
Imports will, in many instances, be an adjunct to domestic production
In the export nation.

Thus, the malallocation of resources needed to

produce hand-intensive products in America is not permitted to readjust
smoothly.

Producers in foreign nations are not secure in any attempt

to gear their operations toward securing the dollar exchange their coun
tries so sorely need.
In order to secure more hand-intensive imports in exchange for
American capital and land-intensive exports, it is imperative that
American customs procedures be simplified and made into a more stable
instrument of United States international relations and policy.

If

domestic pressure groups are capable of drastically curtailing imports,
the cost in level of living that such actions entail should be clearly
pointed out to domestic consumers and taxpayers.
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Wethods of Minimizing or Eliminating
Harm to United States Agriculture
Any attempt to solve poor allocation of resources within agricul
ture in order to increase the American scale of living should minimise
any loss to those in agriculture who will be affected.

Such policy

should take into account both the short-run as well as the long-run
effects.

Several of the policy suggestions for aiding agriculture are

largely outside the scope of this study, but they should be mentioned
at this point.

Johnson suggests a national food and fiber program to

expand and stabilise the demand for agricultural products, forward
pricing, and a storage program; all attempts to increase income sta
bility.

In addition, he mentions compensatory payments in a disaster

relief rcle and a conversion program to ease the needed shift from
1c
agricultural product ion.“'
An attempt to readjust the productive factors must take into ac
count the under-employment in agriculture, particularly Southern

agriculture.

Unless an acceleration of resource shifting is accomplish

ed, any increase of import competition will only increase the disparity
in factor prices.

At the present time under-employment of productive

factors, which is greatest in the South, is attracting industry to that
area.

V/ith an increase in imports there should come an even greater

impetus for industry to move to such areas as the South, to furnish

IP

Johnson, Trade and Agriculture, op. cit., pp. 137-18S, 95-109.
See also J. K. Galbraith, "Economic Preconceptions and Farm Folicy,"
The American Economic Heview XLI7 (March 1954), pp. 40-43. Galbraith
emphasizes the failure of present programs to help those it was designed
to aid. He indicates that price policy does not appear to aid in better
resource allocation and is oriented toward economic nationalism.
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greater employment opportunities for under-employed resources.”

Some of the methods of assisting the shift of under-employed re
sources from import-competing crop production to export crop production
or non-agricultural pursuits will be presented in the following sections.
“Base out’1 Social Assistance Payments and Training to Rehabilitate
Inefficient Producers*--1Because society gains when the factors are producing maximum re
turns, public assistance in a more efficient allocation would have
positive income effects.

Marginal and submarginal use of productive

factors in certain agricultural pursuits gives such low returns that
these factors are of themselves unable to leave a. given agricultural use
and migrate to other crops or to non-agricultural utilization.

Economi-

cally speaking, costly reallocation of resources is socially desirable,
It has been shown that, in most instances, hand-intensive production
gives the lowest return to the combined factors.

Public policy should

therefore generally be oriented toward shifting resources into capitalintensive pursuits and away from production of hand-intensive crops.
Many of the low-income small-sized farmsteads should be made eligible for
a “social assistance" rehabilitation program.

Such a program might take

the form of the Labor-Mobility-Assistance Loan program that was proposed
^Gottfried Haberler, "The Theory of International Trade in a World
of Trade Barriers and Controls and of Variegated National Economic Sy
stems," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. XLIV No. 2,
May 1?54, 556-557.
^Again the term "inefficient" is used to denote producers capable
of greater returns if productive effort ware used in different pursuits.
22see T. W. Schultz, Redirecting Farm Policy, Chapter 4> "Resources
and Income," (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943). Schultz shows
that the farm income problem is more than one of farmers' income levels.
The resource problem and effects to society occasioned by administrative
decisions are of greater importance. In peacetime, distribution is of
greater significance than production which receives most attention.

for Federal Housing Authority administration as a means of removing more
than a million farm families from agriculture. ?3
In some instances the movement of factors from agriculture might wel
be coupled with farm consolidation, and in other instances with total
abandonment of farm production.

The Committee for Economic Development

recommends a complete reorientation in the farm land retirement program.
Whereas the soil bank permitted farmers to take land out of production
in an attempt to reduce "surpluses," it did little actual good where aid
v.ras needed most.

The small uneconomic, often submarginal farm received

little or no assistance.

The Committee for Economic Development pro

poses that entire farmsteads be taken into the program.

It would retire

an entire farm, not a portion of a farm, in the case of those farming
in the lowest income brackets.^ This actually would take little of
the better land out of production, but it would make much labor avail
able for non-farm use.
In order to take the less productive land out of production, the
philosophy, often amplified by elections, of something for everybody
should be changed to allow selectivity of land to be retired.

Only

that land which is unable to return reasonable, income should be retir
ed.

Again, the farmsteads that such a plan would include would employ

a large portion of the farm labor force, albeit the lowest income group.
This kind of land retirement -would make labor available for other use,

'"'■''This proposal was suggested by the Columbia University Seminar
on Rural Life in 1950 as reported by Leonard H. Schoff, A. National Agri
culture Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) pp. 47-50, 134-135.
^CED, Toward A Realistic Farm Program, (New York:
Economic Development, 1958 )","pp. 32-3o.

Committee for
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but society would be responsible for preparing this labor to
be profitably used.

The low productivity of many low-income

farmers would mean that such farmers would be forced onto re
lief or into low-income non-farm jobs if they were not trained
to fit a more productive job classification.

At the present

time many of the under^employed southern farm workers drift into
large northern cities and are not able to find employment in any
except menial jobs.

Even during booming prosperity, untrained,

unskilled workers often have low incomes while industry is hardpressed to obtain an adequate labor force.
Many of the operators of the million or more farms, that
probably should be abandoned to land retirement, as well as
many of the operators on small farms, that need to be consoli
dated if they are to become profitable, are old and can not be
trained to take a different type of job.

These persons could be

permitted to remain on those farms earmarked to be retired from
agricultural production until attrition remedies the situation.
Younger operators on farms in need of consodidation are a
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different problem.

These could be aided in their attempt to expand or

could be given social security type payments if they retire.
Payment to those retiring their land could be extended over a
period of years or made in the form of rentals.

As for the many who

are not owners and who would get no land retirement payments, a train
ing-on-the-job program of assistance like the G. I. training pro,gram
following World ’War II would certainly make it easier to obtain jobs
in ncn-agricultural industries.

If full employment were maintained

and the cost of training were not all borne by the employer, many of
the under-employed agricultural laborers could readjust into far more
productive positions.

Those remaining on the land could improve their

income status through consolidation and mechanization.

Even for these

persons, aid, to facilitate acquisition of land and machinery, should
be made available by soctet?/.
Rural Development Program^
The Rural Development Program, as sponsored by the Eisenhower ad
ministration, is a step in the right direction in relieving some of the
under-employment in "rural slum areas,"

So far, pilot projects are be

ing carried on with 46 operations in 24 states.
with state and local leaders.

Cooperation is sought

Emphasis is placed on industry training

for youth and the enticement of industry to rural areas to make use of
under-employed labor.
Although this program is being sponsored by the Department of

^ Rural Development Program, USDA, Office of Information, March,
1958, This information sheet shows how 62 pilot counties are now on a
demonstration basis. The goal is to develop a program that strikes at
the basic trouble instead of treating surface symptoms.
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Agriculture, close cooperation is maintained with four other depart
ments; Commerce; Labor; Health Education and Welfare; and Interior.
The joint cooperation is maintained in order't:o have a balanced pro
gram which includes trade, industry, and education, in addition to
better farming practices.

The program holds much premise, for in the

short period of its existence it appears to be working with and not
against economic forces.
The major objection, economically speaking, to the Rural De
velopment Program seems to be that not enough emphasis is being
placed on its progress.

Possible mishandling of the project may come

from very heavy reliance for direction of the prgorams on rural area
leaders.

Solution of problems encountered in the local rural area may

depend on more than local judgments.
even federal guidance.

In fact, it may demand state or

Most of the pilot plans have placed some em

phasis on industrial opportunities and education, but this has been
done mainly on the assumption of the local use of non-agricultural
skills.

More emphasis should be on interregional use of under

employed resources.

Employment training and preparation, including

knowledge of opportunities elsewhere, for industrial and service po
sitions should be intensified, ^

Major emphasis should be placed on

the attempt to make qualified labor more mobile.

26
Don Paarlberg, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, "Status
of the National Rural Development Program to Date," Journal of Farm
Economics. No. 2, XXXIX (May 1957), 261-270.
^Raymond J. Penn, "Discussion: Status of the National Rural
Development to Date," Journal of Farm Economics. No. 2, XXXIX (May 1957),

278-281.
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Federal Aid to Bural High School Technical Training in Arte and Sciences
Because farm youth has a better chance to gravitate to non-farm
jobs or to be trained to be profitably employed farmers than those with
family responsibilities, the rural schools are a focal point for aid in
any attempt to decrease the number of farmers with inadequate incomes.
Studies have shown that farm youth have inferior school facilities.
This limits the studentfs opportunity both on the farm- and in com
petition x-ri.th urban trained youth when seeking a non-farm position.
For these reasons, improvement of educational opportunity becomes a
fundamental objective of curative agricultural policy.

This objective

will need to be supported by local and state funds as well as federal
funds.^
Because farm incomes are lower than non-farm incomes, schools in
rural areas generally have less income to tax, this helps to account
for less able teachers and poorer facilities.

Because students in ru

ral schools, in many instances, will leave the farm and even the farm
ing area, and many need to if they are to become as economically pro
ductive citizens as possible, society as a whole has a stake in their
education.

The farm population reproduction rate is higher than the

urban rate, and the excess farm population must seek urban employment.
Education, therefore, of rural students is a cost which should be assumed by society, not just by the rural community.

29

An informal study which has been continuing for several years, and
which is being conducted by instructors in the Social Science Depart-

^Halcrow, o£. cit., p. 200,
York:

^Theodore ¥. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy (New
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945*17 PP* 205-208,
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ment at California State Polytechnic College, shows a biinodal distri
bution for agricultural students when compared with non-agricultural
majors.

The majority of the agricultural students come from rural

areas, while the majority of non-agricultural students are from urban
areas.

A possible explanation for the much lower grade distribution

to the agricultural students is the inferior preparatory training that
many of the agricultural majors receive in the rural schools.

Compari

son can not be ended on this note, however, as the students that get to
college level are the outstanding students and1.many rural youths drop
out of school at a younger age than urban children.
Relative.economic position is usually reflected in school expendi
tures.

The attitude toward support of school facilities is less

favorable in areas of lovrer income.

Since expenditures indirectly

measure education’s quality,-the low-income rural areas would be ex
pected to produce persons least prepared to take a productive place
in the economic and social order.
The Morrill Act’of 1862, giving aid to land grant colleges for
agricxxlbural training, could easily be the precedent for federal aid
to rural elementary and secondary schools.

The difference would be

that training would not be mainly oriented to vocational agriculture
as today’s programs are in many rural high schools.

Rather, the em

phasis would be on such training as would prepare the graduate from
such a school to compete favorably with -urban school graduates in ob
taining non-agricultural positions.

-^Alvin L. Bertrand, ’’The Many Louisianas," 3ulletin Wo. 496,
Louisiana State University, 1955, p. 9.

Any such braining program for rural youth involves a long range
policy decision.

For this reason, it is exceedingly difficult for a

low-income area to bear the burden of such a program.

First, the

people of such areas would see no reason why they should bear the bur
den of training persons to be employed elsewhere.

Second, they probably

could not afford the necessary instructors and facilities to give the
required education.
Allow Prices to Seek World Market Level with Mon-stimulating Supports
"We must free the farmer from the shackles of acreage controls and
marketing quotas."''"

Turn the farmer loose from the straight jacket he

is in and let him make adjustments as the free market dictates.

These

ideas, says Hughes, would be possible with an economic, and not a. po
litical, solution to an economic problem.

He further states that when

a government encourages inefficient farmers by handouts of a few dollars,
it hurts everyone, low-income farmers by continued poverty, and non
op
farmers by high taxes and prices.
There might be some merit in the striking proposals that Hughes
has made, particularly since the world’s economy is beset more by food
shortages than it is plagued with surpluses.
animal element to be considered.

In addition, there is the

Whenever feeds become plentiful,

grains may be used to feed animals to produce eggs, milk, and meat
products, if grain prices are low enough for such use. Thus, if

11

Sari Hughes, "Let's Set the Farmer Free," Readers Digest. March
195S, pp. 93-94. Mr. Hughes, an agricultural economist, resigned from
the position of chief custodian of the government's farm surplus board
in 1956 to retirn to farming. His reason for leaving the position is
given as wishing bo get out of a hopeless 'situation which, he says, con
sists of holding a bear by the tail and being afraid to let go.
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certain foods become plentiful in the United States, they could, given
a free market, be traded for products of other nations or be diverted
to other uses.. The variables to be considered in case of exports are
international price, foreign exchange levels of importing nations, and
ability of importing nations to increase their own production. 33
Major opposition to any such proposal from farmers ’-nth land valued
according to the sale of its products under a government support pro
gram would be partially overcome if society were to shoulder such burden
of loss.

Farmers could be reimbursed through damage payments or tax

readjustments and write-off as was accorded industry, that also expand
ed production to satisty war needs
Federal assistance to farmers who

were

hurt by revision of import

policy and the end of stimulating price supports would be costly to
society.

This cost, however, would need be borne only once and not

every year as is the case with present support prices that force an
annual burden on consumers and taxpayers.

As Witt says:

"The payments,

properly assessed, would not exceed the gains to the general economy
in lower prices and increased goods.

The nation would gain out of

better international relations ... The payment to injured producers would
be paid once and liquidated, ... ,"33
would have no further fear of erratic
American trade policy.

jn addition, foreign

suppliers

and unpredictable changes in

This would permit

foreign producers

to setup

33Scboff, og. cit.. pp. ?6-77.
3/!fLawrence Witt, "International Programs and Agricultural Policy,"
The Southern Economic Journal, XXI, No. 2, (October 195A), 171.
35Ibid., pp. 171-172.
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permanent distribution organizations and programs in the American mar
ket .
Under any program that attempts to encourage imports, domestic
supports must be less than the world price.

As he s been shown, price

supports fail to solve the low-income farm problem.

They have no

justification for continuation if adequate income to low-income far
mers is the reason for their existence.

For this reason, any sort

of price supporting policy should be aimed at disaster relief rather
than at supporting an adequate income.

A disaster relief program could

be made compatible with increasing imports, while a price support plan
avowedly aimed at maintaining adequate incomes could not.

Legislation and Effective Policing of Anti-trust Regulation of the
Production of Agricultural Equipment and Buyers of Agricultural Crops
Generally speaking, the outbursts of newsmen like Drew Pearson and
some of the farm organisation spokesmen about monopoly getting the pro
fits while the farmer does the work are grossly exaggerated.

Nevertheless

there is need to assure that the Federal Trade Commission and the Jus
tice Department receive ample funds.

Effective vigilance will help

assure that the farmer and consumer are not taken advantage of by il
legal actions of commodity buyers and farm suppliers.

V/ith so few

firms producing farm implements, cooperation in actions is easy to ef
fect.

Although formal connections between firms are missing, "price

leadership" does exist among the eight firms' that furnish the bulk of
all farm machinery in the United States.

International Harvester Com

pany and Deere and Company generally announce their prices before other
firms

36Purdy, Lindahl, and Carter, o£. crt., pp. 270-275.
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The meat packers have often come under fire for monopoly practices
said to be in restraint of trade.

This has also been true of cotton and

tobacco firms as well as many others.

The more localized and isolated

the specific market, or the larger and fewer the firms, the more apt is
sentiment for control to be voices.
History has shown several revolts against the monopoly power of
farm suppliers in the markets.

The Granger movement encouraged the

enactment of laws to control railroads, and warehouses.

Farmers joined

labor and other groups to assure passage of the Sherman, Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts.

Attempts to circumvent monopoly power

in marketing has also taken the path of becoming as strong as those
with which the farmer must deal.
this attempt.

Cooperatives have been fostered in

Legislation has been fostered to aid the farmersr at

tempt at countering industrial monopoly power in most states and by
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 which was strengthened by the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.-^
Government programs in effect remove much of the monopsonistic
or oligopsonistic power of large buyers of agricultural products pro
duced under supports.

This might raise a major problem if supports are

removed for all but disaster relief use.

For example cattlemen, who

are not under a price supporting program, saw the price of their stock
decline drastically after the cattle price break in 1952. Yet there
was no corresponding break in meat prices to the consumer.
In Table XV the increased use of some farm implements is shown.

^John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston:
lin Company, 1952), pp. 159-170.

Houghton Miff
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TABLE XV

MACHINES ON FARMS

Machines

1940
Thousands

1950
Thousands

1955
Thousands

Tractors

1,545

3,609

4,750

Motor Trucks

1,047

2,207

2,750

636

740

Milking Machines

175

Grain Combines

190

714

960

Corn Pickers

110

456

660

SOURCE:

Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, Agricultural Marketing
Service , USDA (Washington, C. C
November 1955) > P* 60,
Table 4.

During the period, 1940 to 1955? farmers became more dependent on
farm implements than ever before.

For this reason they are now more

than ever dependent on oligopolies, industries. And if price supporting
is lessened and an increased impetus given to imports, there will be
need of increasing protective vigilance• Farmers will have become more
vulnerabel to cost squeezing than they have been in the past.

However,

it is possible that increases or threats of increases of imported farm
implements might prove to be a mitigating factor.
Summary

Policy compatible with public welfare would attempt to wed an in
creasing standard of living, by allowing accrual of benefits from com
parative advantage, to a more prosperous agriculture.

Continued support

of inefficient resource utilization should not be tolerated if it is
economically feasible to shift such resources to areas of increased
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productivity.

Authorities in both the' fields of agricultural economics

and. foreign trade have advanced proposals that could be joined in such
a way as to effect the needed shift.

Perhaps more emphasis should be

directed to the examination of such proposals.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, EVALUAT ION, AND CONCLUSIONS %

Under the last three administrations some success has been experi
enced in the effort to lower tariff rates and import restrictions.

Many

agricultural spokesmen, including representatives of the American Farm
Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union, have stated that they
favor increasing foreign trade, imports as well as exports.

Hov/ever,

within agriculture as throughout the entire economy, there are many
minority groups in favor of continued and increased protection for their
own commodity.

Problems of Increasing Imports
of Hand-Intensive Commodities
As this study has shown, those dependent upon protection are well
aware of the benefits to be gained from a protective policy and the
knowledge that others might be hurt by the policy will usually not deter
them from a goal of increasing their own benefits.

On the other hand,

those who stand to suffer because of import restrictions are generally
unaware that they may be hurt, or they are hurt so little as individ
uals that they do not voice protest.

Change from protective patterns

may be costly to those capable of production only with the benefit of
protection.

Lawmakers, then, will normally receive a great deal of

persuasion for protection from minority groups.

On the other hand, any

organized opposition against maintaining or increasing protection for
minority interests is seldom of an intense or sustained nature.

Recent

ly the President found it necessary to veto a bill passed by both
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houses of Congress when mail to the Department of Agriculture was 8 to
1 against the ideas contained in the bill.

Yet pressure had been sue-

cessfully brought to bear, by minority groups, on members of Congress,
The discussion of comparative advantage in Chapter II shows how
society generally receives greater returns for its factor output when
trade is not hampered.

The argument that low wage rates in low wage

nations injures labor in a high wage nation that received imports com
petitive to domestic commodities from such a source was found to lack
merit.

The ability of a nation's products to enter the world market in

the absence of dumping, state trading and trade restrictions is not de
termined by high or low wages per se, but by a nation's factor endowment
and the combination of these factors used in the production of the vari
ous commodities.
American agriculture is generally more dependent on world markets
than most other American industries.

Although many agricultural com

modities are imported, most agricultural imports do not compete with
domestic production.

Where, presently, threat of competition from im

ports would arise wLth an end of restrictive measures, much of the
threat can be traced to the high price created by domestic support pro
grams.

In the attempt to aid low income domestic producers with price

supports, imports must be excluded.

Unfortunately, price supports, even

Ezra Taft Benson in a speech to the National Press Club, Washing
ton, Feb. 6, 1958, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of
the Secretary, 351-58, stated that the results of a poll of farm people
showed them that less government interference and fewer programs were
wanted. Only 39 per cent wanted as much or more government participa
tion. At the same time, 8 out of 9 letterb from all sources, farm as
well as non-farm, were ih favor of less government interference. Short
ly thereafter Congress sent a bill to the President that would have
frozen price supports and quotas at the same levels of 1957*
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when used in conjunction with import restrictions, do not solve the low
income problem faced by a large number of farmers.
Attempts to secure adequate incomes far low income farmers by the
use of price supports have often led to very profitable operations for
a few farmsteads and landholders while many farmers have received little
aid.

A program which increases prices to consumers and provides little

aid to most farmers, yet a program which forces foreign countries to do
without desired dollar exchange, appears to need revision.

Such a pro

gram will undoubtedly continue malallocation of productive factors
longer than an adjustable program which would permit the easing of pres
sure on the scarcest factors and make greater use of the more abundant
factors.
A commodity that requires relatively large amounts of a scarce fac
tor may be protected if imports are excluded.
often advocated by various producer groups.

And such protection is
In the United States labor

is normally the factor in relatively short supply; consequently, it is
ordinarily a labor-intensive industry which finds itself in need of
protection from foreign imports.

Conversely, the products of American

industry which enjoy the greatest demand in foreign markets normally re
quire little hand labor in their production.

Since most trading nations

are plagued with a chronic dollar shortage, imports of hand-intensive
commodities should be encouraged from dollar-short areas while invest
ments of a private nature should be encouraged in the same area.

Both

actions would increase the dollar exchange available for purchases of
American export items which are normally of a more capital oriented na
ture than are our imports.
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One problem to be faced in a program that would shift underemployed
factors out of hand-intensive production into the production cjtf capitalintensive commodities, goods, and services would be the need of govern
ment expenditures.

The cost would be as high or perhaps higher than the

amount needed to carry on present price supporting programs.

However,

in contrast to the annual price support payments which do little or
nothing to solve the low income problem, the cost of shifting production
factors would be for one time only.
Another major problem to be faced in an attempt to shift produc
tive factors would be the effect on the nation's security.

Part of this

problem could be resolved with more emphasis on stockpiling from cheap
er sources and less reliance on the maintenance of high cost defense
industries.

General Conclusions
The United States is probably in a better position economically
than any other nation to permit an increase.of imports.

Imports should

be welcomed, and in fact, the goal of policy decisions should be to en
courage especially those imports that would require hand-intensive
production methods.

The flow of United States investment capital and

products into the world markets, while not balanced by the smaller flow
of world goods into the United States, indicates that all imports are
of a supplementary or complementary nature to the American economy.
Although a commodity may be directly competitive with an American com
modity, it is, none of the less, helping to balance the flow of trade.
The more such imports the United States is able to induce the more goodc
and services American consumers will have.

Any import restriction that
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the United States maintains will mean fewer returns to America's production factors.

2

Since lowering tariffs and curtailment of other trade barriers
will undoubtedly harm certain sections of the economy, policy should
include considerations for those who stand to be injured.

Within agri

culture where many would benefit by fewer trade barriers, many areas
would feel increased competition.
With a democratic type government that is responsive to peoples
wishes, trade and agricultural policy cannot be dictated by an allpowerful policy-making body.

Although Congress has defaulted much of

its authority for making trade policy to the executive branch, the
framework within which trade is regulated is determined by the legis
lature.

As Congressmen are responsive to constituents, it is possible

that certain groups may seem to be overly represented.

The general

apathy on the part of most voters makes it easier for minority interest
groups to seek and obtain Congressional succor at the expense of the
majority.
Congress, to set or police trade policy in a manner that would
raise the nation's standard of living should be aware of how the ma
jority would benefit, and it should not rely predominantly on testi
mony from special interest minorities for the basis of legislation.
There has been much written in the news columns about the need for
foreign trade.

Nevertheless, the advisability of continuing the Recip

rocal Trade Agreements Act has been in question from time to time when
it is tinder consideration for extension.

2Meyer, op. cit.. pp. 323-335.

The rising level of living enjoyed in America is in part due to
the rapid technological advances.

The motive for protection, however,

is basically a resistance to change and an attempt to assure the con
tinued income of those not making a change.

The incidence of protec

tion falls upon other producers and the consumers.

Protection thus

proves costly and permits protected producers to become complacent be
hind protective walls.

Insensitivness to technological change slows

the shift of productive factors that would be continual were protec
tion minimized.

Legislation should be designed to aid rather than

hamper factor adjustment.
speeded.

Progress toward freer trade should be

Such legislation should be made permanent and not subject

to extensions every two or three years.

Moveover, the full and en

lightened power of the government should be channeled into an attempt
to make agricultural policy more compatible with trade policy.
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